Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

348. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/69

Geneva, June 1, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Secretary McElroy
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Ambassador Thompson
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • Mr. Lucet
  • Mr. Laloy
  • Mr. Andronikov
  • Mr. de Jean
• United Kingdom
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Mr. P.F. Hancock
  • Interpreter
• USSR
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Mr. Zorin
  • Mr. Soldatov
  • Two interpreters

SUBJECT

• Berlin

The meeting started informally with Gromyko’s reference to the fact that in these informal meetings there was no Chairman.

The Secretary then said that he wished to speak on the subject of subversive activities and inflammatory propaganda originating in East Berlin and directed against West Berlin and the Federal Republic. He referred to the campaign of vilification which was being conducted by the official East German press and radio during the course of the conference. He said attacks were not confined to West German personalities and that he himself had not been omitted from attention in the slanderous and scurrilous attack. He then said that he would read a statement in which he would cite chapter and verse, adding that he could amplify if necessary and that it was his intention in a later plenary session to repeat his statement for the benefit of the public.

He then read the two attached statements¹ seriatim, interpolating twice during the reading. His first interpolation was to read the text of Gufler’s telegram of May 26, No. 36 from Berlin.² His second interpolation was to read certain extracts from the compilation of attacks on the Federal Republic and Dr. von Brentano in particular in the official DDR newspaper.

In concluding, the Secretary said that his statement supports the contention that there is a massive effort originating in East Berlin to increase tensions both between East Berlin and West Berlin and between the Soviet Union and the West. He said that we were willing to do our share to relax tensions but he thought that Mr. Gromyko would agree that it was not possible to lay all the blame for tensions on the doorstep of West Berlin.

Gromyko, who had sat stony-faced through the recital, seemed to a degree at a loss as to how best to reply. He opened by saying that our people who had worked on these papers had obviously done much work. As to these actions and statements which the Secretary ascribed to the East Berlin press and radio and certain DDR authorities, he was not in a position to speak for them. It was better that they should answer for themselves. He could not refrain, however, from recalling the old military axiom that the best defense is a good offense.

Gromyko continued that he did not want to suggest, however, in talking about West Berlin some were on the offense and some on the defense. He then asked rhetorically whether we should take this road down which Mr. Herter was attempting to lead us. Should Gromyko himself prepare and similarly read material from broadcasts and newspapers in West Berlin and the Federal Republic about the Soviets? Then we would see on whose side are the most striking facts. The question was should we stoop so low or act as statesmen and seek to reach an understanding. Gromyko said that he had no material at hand at the moment but promised that when he collected it it would be several times longer than Mr. Herter’s list.

Gromyko concluded by saying that if we are to deal with these questions then when we summarize our talk on West Berlin we could say that both East and West Berlin should assume certain obligations not to do things to increase tensions. In conclusion he said that questions of propaganda and subversion were not one of the principal questions to be considered. This problem ranked in fourth or fifth or even sixth place.

The Secretary said that he had raised this matter because it had been Gromyko himself who had first raised the question and in public.

Gromyko replied that they do attach importance to it, to which the Secretary rejoined, “So do we.”

Gromyko then said that the Soviets had raised the matter in connection with the non-tolerance of subversive actions originating in Berlin but that it could be inferred from the Secretary’s statement that he intended to broaden the subject of discussion to questions of ideology in which case no solution would be possible for any of them. The Secretary replied that he had raised nothing whatsoever of an ideological nature. Gromyko had said in previous meetings that there was a risk of incidents in Berlin. If, as Gromyko now says, this question rates only fourth, fifth or sixth place, then it were better to consider the more important areas where the risk of incidents existed.

Gromyko said that the main question and the main risk of incidents lies in the presence of Western troops in West Berlin. There is danger in the occupation status. Incidents arising from the presence of the troops are different from what might be “improper” broadcasts. It was true that there had been no incidents recently but everyone knows that an explosion is preceded by silence. It was necessary that the conference come to an agreement. He asked if the discussion could not now be returned to the main road on the exchange of views on the main problems. He reminded the Secretary that on Saturday night³ he had asked for an explanation of the Secretary’s point of view on the matters we were discussing.

The Secretary rejoined that they had been on a bypath to which Mr. Gromyko had led them. Possibly the entire subject of subversion and propaganda should now be forgotten as of no importance. The Secretary then went on to say that on the main question we are prepared to talk within limits. These limits are, first, that we will not give up our rights, including the presence of our troops in Berlin, though it would be possible to talk about ceilings on them. Gromyko himself had agreed that they had no military significance. They were in Berlin as protection for the life of West Berlin. Secondly, the Secretary said we will not recognize the DDR. The third point is the question of access. On this we have an agreement with the Russians and Mr. Herter said that he assumed from what Gromyko had said in recent days the Soviets did not intend to act unilaterally with respect to this agreement. Within these limits we are ready and anxious to talk with a view to reducing differences and tensions.

Gromyko replied that there was constant repetition of the formula that the West would not give up its rights, but what was meant when they spoke of changes while retaining the rights. He pled for frankness.

The Secretary said we have made a fair proposal for all of Berlin which is a property apart from either East or West Germany. The occupying powers in effect hold it in trust for a future reunited Germany. We have rights there which the Soviets admit. You have a responsibility in East Berlin. You admit that Germany should be united and Berlin established as its capital. Nevertheless you say that East Berlin is now the capital of the DDR and it is impermissible to talk about it. Gromyko replied that he had nothing to add to what he had already said concerning the Western all-Berlin proposal. East Berlin is not Soviet territory and the Soviets do not intend to reintroduce an occupation regime.

Couve de Murville interjected that after two weeks’ talk on Germany we had now been discussing Berlin but all that Gromyko wants to talk about is West Berlin. If this is the fact then here is the West’s position on West Berlin. We intend to keep our present position in West Berlin both juridically and in so far as troops are concerned. If there is anything that worries the Soviets we are prepared to discuss it and see what can be done. We are agreed that the garrisons pose no military threat. Their presence is symbolic and psychological.

Couve went on to say that there appeared to be a misunderstanding, Gromyko had said that the West had not made its position or proposals clear but the Western Powers have nothing more in mind than what they have already said. They have been frank and open and are prepared to look at whatever troubles the Soviets.

Gromyko asked for further elaboration and Couve de Murville replied if there is no settlement on Greater Berlin then the three Western Powers will keep their rights in West Berlin with its autonomous regime and maintain their troops there. West Berlin is economically linked to the Federal Republic and must remain so. We have a Four Power agreement with the Soviets on access for both civilian movements and the garrisons. We think we must keep all of these and see what changes in practice are possible to meet whatever may be the Soviet concerns. Ceilings, for example, might be considered for the troops. Means of avoiding an East-West Berlin war of subversion and propaganda could be discussed. On the matter of access no question really arises since there is an agreement in force and established practice. We think, however, that Gromyko himself has in mind making changes with respect to access and at one time he mentioned a possible Soviet agreement with the DDR. We are ready to consider and examine whatever the Soviets want to put up.

Gromyko came back with the statement that what Couve said made it appear that the West would propose no changes in West Berlin in fact. They wanted their troops to remain and then they wanted guarantees on the access routes. He said, “You speak of meeting our wishes but in actuality you want to gain further advantages for yourselves.”

Couve de Murville replied that we are asking nothing. Gromyko had said that we sought no change and that was perfectly true. Until Germany can be reunified there was no reason why we should abandon our own rights and duties. West Berlin admittedly must remain sui generis until Germany was reunified. Why then should the three Western Powers abandon their position in this interim period? They had asked no new commitments. Nevertheless Gromyko seemed to desire to make some change but we were in the dark as to what it was or why. When we are told we will look at it. Meanwhile we are satisfied with the present access situation.

Gromyko then attempted further to elicit from the French Foreign Minister what changes in the situation he visualized. He said that the situation of West Berlin was abnormal and could not be maintained; that the Soviets had come to Geneva to reach an understanding with us but that everything so far said by the West was vague and nebulous and the West’s apparent satisfaction with the present situation was far removed from reality.

Couve de Murville reiterated that what the Soviets proposed with respect to West Berlin was unacceptable but that we will consider whatever further proposals the Soviets may have in mind.

Couve asked Gromyko why he considered the present access arrangements unsatisfactory or abnormal and Gromyko replied, “Because the Soviets still exercise outlived occupation functions.”

Couve asked Gromyko if he was right in understanding that in this respect Gromyko referred exclusively to the access rights of the Western troops in West Berlin and Gromyko gave no reply.

The Secretary interjected that with respect to access the problem arose when Khrushchev spoke on November 10⁴ and followed it up with the first note⁵ on the subject which stated that on May 27 control over the access routes would be turned over to the DDR. This was what has created present acute tensions. We agreed to sit down and seek means of relieving these tensions but now Mr. Gromyko is suggesting that we are asking concessions in order to cooperate in removing tensions which the Soviets artificially created. It looks as though the Soviets wanted to take advantage of us. He then said soberly that he hoped the Soviets would not consider cutting off our access to West Berlin for the sake of their future relations with the United States and with many other countries. He concluded by urging that we see how the question of access could be improved and thereby lower tensions.

Mr. Lloyd then made his first intervention, saying that he did not consider that we were particularly satisfied with the present situation. The position of Berlin is abnormal and will remain so until German reunification. The problem is to see how the situation can be improved.

We for our part are ready to discuss the military side to prove that Western troops are purely symbolic. We are also willing to discuss propaganda and subversion and we are willing that West Berlin should continue to be politically neutral and no threat to another state (the Secretary interjected, “On a reciprocal basis,” which amendment Mr. Lloyd accepted). Mr. Lloyd went on to say that over the last ten years the situation with respect to West Berlin had worked pretty well on the basis of our agreements with the Soviets and that it “was not consistent with the honor and dignity of a great nation to try and change an agreement unilaterally.”

At this point Gromyko said that with respect to the free city proposal and the question of guarantees, the Soviet Delegation had now developed its ideas and reduced them to a document. Single copies of a proposed protocol on this matter⁶ were then brought in and distributed. Mr. Gromyko stated that it had been prepared after full consultation with the DDR. He added that he presumed that other Ministers would wish to study it before commenting on it.

Mr. Gromyko then said that Mr. Lloyd had touched on three points, the military aspects, the subversive aspect and the matter of free access but this was done in very general terms. Exactly what changes did Mr. Lloyd have in mind specifically?

Mr. Lloyd said he had really nothing to add to what he had already said. He inquired what are the Soviets’ complaints? He repeated that we would be willing to consider troop and equipment ceilings and on the political side evidence of tension created in Berlin by propaganda and subversion. He then said that there was one matter which had not been mentioned in our discussions which could be discussed and this was the question of refugees (Gromyko neither then nor later commented on this remark). On access, Mr. Lloyd continued, there is some unfinished business going back to the 1949 agreement.⁷ It seemed possible that supplementary agreements could be worked out here which would avoid future disputes and arguments.

Gromyko continued his old tactic of commenting that Mr. Lloyd’s statement was far from clear. He then repeated that the danger of incidents in West Berlin comes from the presence of Western troops there. Whether they were ten or twenty thousand or even only five thousand they represented the real danger.

Mr. Lloyd argued that the presence of Western troops in fact are a safeguard for peace and confessed his failure to understand Gromyko’s reasoning. Mr. Lloyd went on to point out that the allied troops in Trieste made for stability until a political settlement had been reached. He had no doubt that kidnappings in West Berlin would soar overnight were there no Western troops there. He then said that even a modest agreement arising from this conference could prove the turn of the tide in East-West relations. Then the four Heads of Government could go on to consider the big problems such as disarmament and European security.

Mr. Gromyko made some noncommittal almost inaudible comment.

The Secretary said that we had offered comprehensive proposals to deal with the whole German problem and that the Soviets had rejected them. He reminded Mr. Gromyko that there had been no incidents in West Berlin except for some minor ones on the routes of access.

Gromyko said he agreed that we were both talking about a temporary settlement for Berlin pending the reunification of Germany.

Couve de Murville then said that he had glanced at the paper distributed a few minutes before and, in connection with Gromyko’s statement that Western troops in West Berlin caused tensions, had been struck by the Soviet proposal that the four occupying powers plus the DDR form a commission to control the operation of the agreement for West Berlin. He asked what greater possible cause of tension could be devised than such a commission interfering daily in all of West Berlin’s affairs.

Gromyko said that the commission’s role would be observation and that interference in domestic affairs was contrary to Soviet policy. Couve de Murville commented that it was really a commission designed to interfere so as to ensure no interference.

Gromyko asked Mr. Lloyd if he had had a chance to read the paper. He replied that he had read it three times and had found no more virtue in it on the third reading than on the first. He suggested that all study it overnight and meet privately again the following day.

Gromyko with a straight face suggested that the Ministers meet again informally and privately but add the Germans, or alternatively meet in plenary session. There was considerable discussion in which the Secretary made clear that the East Germans would not sit in his house and likewise that he had never agreed to private meetings with the Germans present.

After some further discussion it was agreed that there would be held a plenary session at 3:30 at the Palais and a private session of the four Foreign Ministers at Villa Greta at 9 o’clock the same evening at which it was agreed the Soviet protocol proposal would be considered. Meanwhile it was agreed to keep its contents confidential.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter on June 2. The meeting was held at Gromyko’s residence. A brief summary of this conversation was transmitted in Cahto 59 from Geneva, June 1. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/6–159)
1. Neither printed. The first was a four-page paper entitled “Talking Points on Communist Activities in East Berlin,” May 31, and the second was a five-page paper that outlined intelligence agencies in East Germany and kidnappings of West Berliners.
2. This telegram transmitted East German radio broadcasts that attacked Western leaders. (Department of State, Central Files, 962B.40/5–2659)
3. See Document 344.
4. See Document 24.
5. See Document 72.
6. Document 349.
7. For text of the final communiqué of the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers, June 20, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1062–1065.