Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

344. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/67

Geneva, May 30, 1959.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Secretary McElroy
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Ambassador Thompson
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. Lloyd
  • Sir Gladwyn Jebb
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Mr. Laskey
• U.S.S.R.
  • Mr. Gromyko
  • Mr. Zorin
  • Mr. Malik
  • Mr. Pervoukhine
  • Mr. Soldatov
  • Mr. Groubyakov
• France
  • M. Couve de Murville
  • M. Lucet
  • M. Laloy
  • Ambassador de Jean

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Soviet-Western Differences Concerning Berlin

Mr. Gromyko opened the discussion after dinner by stating that in the talks on the plane returning from Washington and at the private meeting held the day before he had done most of the talking. He would like how to hear more of the views of the other Ministers. The Secretary pointed out that Gromyko had said he could not talk about certain proposals we had made. There were certain things that we could not discuss. Where did that leave us? The Soviets had raised the question of Berlin and we had in good faith made proposals which Gromyko now said he could not even discuss.

Gromyko interrupted to state that there were some things we could discuss later on. He had already mentioned two or three points. These included: (1) disarmament; (2) a zone; and (3) a non-aggression pact. In describing his list, he at one point mentioned a commission whereupon Pervoukhine and Soldatov immediately said “no” in Russian several times. Gromyko continued that they could not accept our proposals on Berlin as a basis for discussion and they would not discuss the extension of an occupation regime to East Berlin. East Berlin was part of the GDR. The Secretary said then it was perhaps better to discuss what the Western Powers would not discuss and then we would know what area was left in which a possible agreement could be sought.

Gromyko said that he could not agree that everything was all right in West Berlin. The Western Ministers had spoken of improvements in the present situation. He would like to know specifically what they had in mind.

The Secretary said he was asking us to give up our rights in Berlin. We would not do this even if our troops there were only symbolic. If the Soviets tried unilaterally to deprive us of our rights, no treaty with the Soviet Union would ever be any good.

Gromyko said he did not understand the Secretary’s logic. The Soviets had raised the question in order to discuss it. This was not unilateral action. He denied that he had threatened unilateral action.

The Secretary said that both Gromyko and Khrushchev had said that if we did not agree to Soviet proposals, they would take unilateral action.

Gromyko pointed out that they were now in the process of negotiation.

The Secretary replied that the Russians said our proposals were unacceptable and could not be discussed.

Mr. Gromyko said this was true when we talked about East Berlin. He asked if we wanted them to introduce an occupation regime in East Berlin. The Secretary said that they had an occupation regime there now.

Mr. Gromyko denied this, stating that they were fulfilling certain functions between Berlin and West Germany and there were certain rudiments remaining from the time when there had been an occupation regime in East Berlin. They had a military commandant in East Berlin who was concerned with certain functions of liaison with the Soviet Army but had nothing to do with civilian authorities. They did fulfill functions in connection with communications. This was in the Western interest. The Secretary asked if this was not what the Soviets had agreed to do.

Gromyko agreed this was so.

The Secretary said they had then tried to destroy this with the blockade. We had lived in peace in Berlin for ten years, now they wished to change the whole regime. The Soviets had created the East German Government but it had no authority. Mr. Gromyko had undertaken to see what the East German Government would do if an agreement was reached. It was perfectly clear that the GDR was the child of the Russians. Mr. Gromyko said with some heat that he rejected the Secretary’s words and asked him not to put such interpretation on words in his presence. It would be better to use them with respect to the West German Government. He had made his statement about East Germany because they had discussed the matter with the East Germans and knew what they were prepared to do.

The Secretary said that the East Germans and the Soviets were the same thing. There had never been any real elections in East Germany. The East Germans spoke for the Russians. It was better that the Russians spoke for both.

Gromyko said we had not come here to discuss elections but to discuss problems between us. He urged that we keep the discussion on this basis.

The Secretary said he had asked us to be frank and we were being so with respect to the GDR. The Soviets wanted us to recognize the GDR as a state.

Gromyko said that was up to us.

Malik interjected that we had not recognized the Soviet Union for 16 years. The Secretary said we were being frank in talking in realities. He asked if it were not true that the Soviets wanted us to recognize East Germany as a state.

Gromyko pointed out that East Germany existed. This problem had many sides but a discussion of this matter could lead too far. He suggested we not talk about ideology or internal matters but about problems between us.

The Secretary inquired how long the East Germans represented at this Conference would last in office if they said or did anything contrary to Russian wishes. He agreed, however, to drop the subject. Gromyko again suggested that we not discuss ideological matters. He inquired whether we thought the Soviets could make concession after concession and the Western Powers going on saying that the occupation regime was all right. The Soviets had expressed their willingness to negotiate but this was perhaps not understood correctly. The Western position seemed to be to stand on the same position and wait without making any change.

Couve de Murville said the Western Powers could have taken this position but they had not. The Soviets had raised the question of Berlin and we had answered we were ready to listen and to try to understand and see what we could do to alleviate Soviet doubts and fears. The Secretary had said we could not give up our rights or remove our garrisons. Now what could be done?

Mr. Gromyko asked if this meant that everything was good in West Berlin. Couve said that we did not complain. Gromyko said the Russians did.

Selwyn Lloyd interjected to inquire what they complained of. He saw problems for them and for us as well. We must look to see what is practical. We cannot convince them and they cannot convince us. What could be done to improve the situation that lasted for ten years and was not too bad. Gromyko on the plane had said that certain things were of no great importance. In a speech today in full session, he had said they were very important. We also had complaints. The situation about our communications was not very clear. He asked Gromyko to believe that our approach was serious. We wished to know what could be done to improve the situation.

Gromyko pointed out that Lloyd and Couve had said the situation was not normal and could be improved (the Secretary had not said so). How could it be improved and how far would the West go? What did we mean when we said the activities of certain agencies could be changed? RIAS was not the principal question. Lloyd said we agreed the situation was abnormal and until Germany was reunited, we agreed on a number of things, such as reunification at some time, free elections at some time and a peace treaty at some time. He suggested we analyze the situation of Berlin. There were things to say on both sides. How could 10,000 Western troops be a threat? Were they a political threat to the USSR? If so, this could be examined.

Gromyko said Lloyd had mentioned political, military, propaganda and economic matters. He wanted to know what we had in mind.

Couve said we wanted to know what worried the Russians.

Gromyko asked if he had not said enough already. Lloyd said he had not done so specifically.

The Secretary said we could make progress if we could go forward with the Soviets admitting that we had rights flowing from the war which we retained and to examine matters within that framework. Within these limits we could talk about improvements. The Soviets wanted us to give up our rights.

Gromyko admitted we had rights that grew out of the war but said that 14 years had passed and certain changes had taken place in Germany. The West does not attach importance to these changes.

Lloyd said that speaking frankly and for himself, we wanted the Soviets to reaffirm our rights of access and the rights of the West Berliners to their own form of life. What he thought the Soviets had a right to expect from us was to examine Berlin to see if it is a political or military threat to the Soviets. Ten thousand troops were only symbolic. We were prepared to look at the propaganda and subversive aspects.

Gromyko replied that it was impossible to separate the political and military aspects. The occupation regime itself and the presence of troops was itself a political factor.

The Secretary inquired whether the Soviet troops in East Germany influenced the GDR.

Mr. Gromyko said if the Secretary insisted on this kind of talk he would have to raise the question of U.S. troops in the Federal Republic. He suggested they confine the subject of discussion.

Lloyd asked if Gromyko disputed what he had said.

Gromyko replied that his remarks were too general.

Couve inquired what was of first importance.

Gromyko replied that the occupational regime and the presence of Western troops was of primary importance.

Couve pointed out we had said we could not change that.

The Secretary observed that the Soviets wanted us to give up our rights. What did they offer in exchange? He suggested we talk upon the basis of the maintenance of Western rights.

Lloyd said the presence of troops was of no military threat. So far as occupation was concerned, we were committed to that until Germany was reunified. The point of substance was whether or not we could make things easier for one another.

The Secretary said we desired to lessen tension for a temporary period.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to be specific. The Secretary said we could talk within the framework of maintaining our rights and retaining our troops, although the numbers of troops could be reviewed. Lloyd suggested we look at the military and political aspects. The military were not a threat. He could see the possibility of a political threat.

The Secretary pointed out this worked both ways.

Gromyko said that whether there were 100 or 10,000 troops was not important and the presence of any troops was of significance. From a military point of view and in looking at the possibility of a military threat, the more troops we had in Berlin the better from the Soviet point of view, although they did not like to see this.

Lloyd observed that this then was the end of the idea that the three power troops were any military threat.

The Secretary pointed out that our troops were in Berlin only to give the Berliners assurance that they could continue to live as they wanted to live. Mr. Gromyko himself had said this and we agreed with it. Mr. Gromyko denied he had made such a statement. Gromyko said we did not need troops from a military point of view but kept them to maintain an occupational regime.

The Secretary asked if the Soviets wanted our troops out so that they could influence West Berlin. Gromyko said they did not want any interference from anyone in the life of West Berlin. No one could determine the internal system in the presence of foreign troops.

Couve pointed out that these troops were an insurance against incidents.

Gromyko asked why we kept troops if we were not worried about internal order in West Berlin. Gromyko asked if this meant that we wished to keep the present order unchanged. If so, this meant to maintain a constant threat.

Lloyd pointed out that Berlin was an island and this was the reason for our troops. The Berliners wanted them as a tangible sign that we would do what we said we would do.

The Secretary said he had a practical suggestion to make. We could meet on Monday and discuss what could be done to relieve Soviet fears and political tension in the context of Western maintenance of their rights and their troops. The Secretary said that Gromyko should also listen to our complaints.

Gromyko asked him not to raise questions of ideology.

The Secretary agreed.

It was agreed to meet at the Soviet villa at 3:30 p.m. on Monday, June 1.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1339. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Herter on June 1. The meeting was held at Gromyko’s residence following a dinner given by Gromyko at 8 p.m. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 57 from Geneva, June 1. (Ibid., CF 1327)