Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

329. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/43

Geneva, May 22, 1959.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Ambassador Thompson
• U.S.S.R.
  • Mr. A.A. Soldatov

SUBJECT

• US–USSR Relations

Soldatov asked me to dinner last night and it quickly became evident that his purpose was to indicate that Mr. Gromyko would like to have a conversation alone with Mr. Herter either at Mr. Gromyko’s villa or Mr. Herter’s. He was careful not specifically to ask for an appointment but said this would be the only way to get on with the Conference, that Mr. Gromyko would be in Geneva over the weekend, and that if Mr. Herter was interested I need only call Mr. Soldatov.

The rest of the evening was spent in a long philosophical discussion, the highlights of which follow: Soldatov outlined the intense desire of the Soviet Government for peace and an opportunity to build up their country, which he admitted would take longer than their slogans indicated. He asked me what I thought was the principal obstacle to improved United States-Soviet relations. I replied that I thought the root of the trouble lay in the ideology of international communism. Although they talked about coexistence they did not believe in it except as a temporary expedient. They believed in the inevitable struggle between the two systems and that eventually communism had to triumph. Their almost religious belief in their ideology led to complications and conflict in our relations. I pointed out, for example, that if East Germany did not have a communist regime, we could probably settle the German question very quickly.

Mr. Soldatov disputed some of my arguments but on the question of conflict between the systems remarked that we could not escape history by which he meant that communism was bound to win.

In discussing the German problem, Soldatov mentioned the special sensitivity of the Russians on this question because of their experience during the last two wars. He said, however, that if the United States and the Soviet Union could get together, there would be no difficulty in solving the German problem. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any reason to fear Germany in itself. The Soviets were afraid, however, that Germany acting as the spearhead would drag the United States into conflict with the Soviet Union.

When Soldatov spoke of the United States and Soviet Union getting together, I said it seemed to me that even Soviets who had lived in the United States failed to understand that under our system of government, the President could not engage in big “deals”. The President could lead his country within certain limits but Congress and public opinion had to be taken into account and imposed very definite limitations upon his actions. Soldatov said that Khrushchev was a realist and he was sure that he understood this.

Soldatov made many references to the bitter attitude of the American press toward the Soviet Union. Speaking of Africa, he said he had to laugh when he read accounts in American papers about the great Soviet influence there. He said he knew that such influence was virtually non-existent.

Soldatov referred many times in the conversation to the great impression which the economic strength of the United States had made upon Mr. Mikoyan and himself during their trip. He also expressed their great pleasure at the visit of Mr. Nixon. He said he was convinced that Mr. Herter was a “good” man and he was optimistic that we could work out our problems successfully.

At one time Mr. Soldatov asked me if I thought it was possible for a radical non-peaceloving man to come to power in the United States. I gathered he had in mind someone like Hitler. I assured him that this was not possible but that even if it happened, it could make little difference in our foreign policy because of our system of checks and balances.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Confidential; Limit Distribution. The source text indicates that the memorandum was drafted on May 22 so that the “last night” mentioned in the first sentence should be May 21. However, the U.S. chronology for May 22 shows the conversation taking place on May 22. (Ibid., CF 1355)