In response to your request for information regarding the present Berlin
situation resulting from the Khrushchev speech of November 10, I enclose a status
report on this subject.
[Enclosure]
1
A STATUS REPORT ON BERLIN IN THE LIGHT OF THE KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER
10
The Khrushchev statement on
Berlin has naturally caused concern in Berlin and West Germany.
Newspapers carried the story in banner headlines. Editorial
reactions were, however, generally moderate and cool-headed; they
expressed confidence in Western guarantees to Berlin and interpreted
the Khrushchev statement as a
move in the war of nerves, possibly connected with the coming East
German and Berlin elections, rather than as a prelude to the actual
withdrawal of U.S.S.R. authorities from Berlin or to drastic
harassment of the city. The Berlin population has so far reacted in
a similar unhysterical fashion. Berlin officials have called upon
the Three Powers to demonstrate as effectively as possible the
determination of the Three Powers to honor their Berlin
commitments.
Although we have heard the reactions of one working-level Foreign
Office official we do not yet know the views of Foreign Secretary
Brentano or Chancellor
Adenauer. Ambassador
Grewe called on the Under
Secretary on November 122 to express the deep
concern of the Federal Government at the implications of the
Khrushchev statement.
Although there are a variety of speculations regarding Soviet
motivation this action seems clearly related to a long-standing
Soviet desire to force the Western Powers into de facto recognition
of an East German regime through the creation of situations on
allied access routes to Berlin calculated to compel the Western
Powers to deal with East German officials.
The Department in public statements is emphasizing our quadripartite
responsibilities in Berlin and the unacceptability of Soviet
unilateral abrogation of specific quadrilateral agreements on Berlin
(other than the Potsdam Agreement which is not pertinent to our
position in Berlin).
Consideration is being given to the desirability of some tripartite
reaffirmation of the Western position on Berlin. There is, however,
some difference of view as to whether this would be useful at the
present time. The British and Germans at the working level believe
it would demonstrate our nervousness more than our determination and
we think it advisable to wait at least a few days to see how the
situation develops before issuing a tripartite statement. This is in
line with our belief that
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our wisest course is to avoid actions which might over-dramatize the
present situation.
We are reviewing our contingency planning on Berlin in case the
Soviet Union carries out Khrushchev’s threat to our position in Berlin.
