Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

318. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 21, 1959, 1 a.m.

Secto 86. Paris pass USRO. Eighth Session (3:30 to 6:40 p.m.)— Couve de Murville, Chairman.

Secretary reviewed respective positions second week conference (complete text sent Secto 82)¹ recalling United States prepared go to summit if justified by developments here “otherwise not.” Summarized events leading to present conference. Defended Western peace plan and refuted Gromyko’s criticisms, rejecting charge plan intended create difficulties and preclude agreement. Charged Soviet approach essentially formula for avoiding free election. Summarized Western concessions and dwelt on reasons for Western link security to reunification which Soviets themselves recognized in 1955. Justified provisions for resumption general disarmament discussions although these not linked to reunification either as condition or in point of time. Asked why Soviets rejecting plan and insisting peace treaty with two Germanies, Said West had gone as far as possible short of compromising with principle. Stated Soviet proposals “long step backward from 1955” and ended with plea for serious negotiation.

Selwyn Lloyd then spoke² and made four major points:

1) Both Western and Soviet proposals constitute essentially packages with interconnected elements;

2) All four powers have special responsibilities settlement German problem;

3) Will of people Berlin should be permitted prevail;

4) Both sets proposals contain certain security provisions. Concluded stressing security proposals Western plan can only be worked out with government freely united Germany and must be freely accepted.

Gromyko then made following comments³ various statements last two days by Western delegations:

1) Some positive aspects discussion because Western spokesmen touched upon certain concrete issues which also included in Soviet Peace Treaty;

2) Rejected charge Soviet Government wishes perpetuate division Germany, which not in accordance with facts or Soviet policy;

3) Peace treaty with Germany would mark final termination Second World War, would reduce tension Germany and Europe, would bar road to German militarism and nuclear armament Germany, would eliminate or reduce concern Germany’s neighbors and security and would furnish good basis bring together two Germanies. Main idea behind Soviet proposal Germany should be free foreign troops and bases. However, since differing opinions on this, Soviets prepared, as already announced, accept provision each Germany should for certain period time continue adhere existing military alliances. Thus cannot be said Soviets’ aim withdrawal Federal Republic NATO.

4) Soviet proposal good basis solution problem West Berlin. Would regret if Western powers took negative position but hopes possibility would remain seek solution and Soviet Government retains will to try.

5) Soviet attitude elections clear and incorrect attempt find inconsistencies or contradictions Soviet statements past and present. No reason why four powers should run elections for Germans who adult and mature people. Foreign supervision elections insult German people. Soviet Government has always insisted Germans carry out elections themselves.

6) Lloyd and Grewe had stated peace treaty can only be signed with all-German Government. Soviets had tried convince Federal Government and Adenauer correctness proposals for reunification and elections which rejected by them for which they to blame.

7) Nonsense charge Soviet proposals would isolate Germany. These directed re-establishment German authority over whole German territory.

8) Soviet proposals permit Germany benefit rights and obligations Article 51 UN Charter.

9) Totally untrue claim Soviet Union not interested European security, which however should not be linked to preliminary solution number European problems. Objected putting on same footing problems not on same plane.

10) Lloyd completely unjustified claiming Soviet proposals attempt impose “diktat” Germany; on contrary, Soviets object Western powers attempt impose diktat.

11) Couve had claimed no problem exists either peace treaty or Berlin. If this true what are we doing here? Problem peace treaty exists and this fault not Soviet Union but Hitlerite Germany.

12) Couve expressed surprise Soviet rejection Western plan and said this totally unexpected but why should West be surprised since, even before proposals officially received, Soviets knew about general approach and had expressed its position.

13) Couve claimed articles 3, 4, 22, 23 and 24 Soviet proposals unnecessary and represented no contribution solution German problem but what was wrong with these articles. Perhaps West has better formulations for these principles which stress need for peaceful and democratic evolution Germany. If so Soviet Government would like consider them.

14) Grewe said one defect Soviet proposals would impose economic restrictions Germany. This not true, but matter could be examined further if desire exists retain two Germanies within present economic areas.

15) Grewe said Soviet proposals would result elimination all political parties Federal Republic. Did he mean that all other parties “revanchist”. Certainly SPD did not agree.

16) Grewe had concluded differences should not be emphasized but should seek every means bringing positions closer together. If we all share same determination, Gromyko believed we have real opportunity achieve useful work here.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–2159. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Tyler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USUN. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VRS/8 (Corrected), and the summary of the verbatim record, US/VRS/8, May 20, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1353.
1. Dated May 20. (Ibid.) For text of Herter’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/18, May 20, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 135–141; Cmd. 868, pp. 62–67; or Department of State Bulletin, June 8, 1959, pp. 821–825.
2. For text of Lloyd’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/19, May 20, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 141–145 or Cmd. 868, pp. 67–70.
3. For text of Gromyko’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/23, May 26, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 146–157 or Cmd. 868, pp. 70–79.