Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

317. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/32

Geneva, May 20, 1959, 1 p.m.

MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Mr. Merchant
• USSR
  • Ambassador Malik
  • Mr. Soldatov

SUBJECT

• Geneva Negotiations; The German Problem

Ambassador Malik gave me lunch at the Perle du Lac. Soldatov was there when I arrived and also remained for lunch. The early part of the conversation was light with both of them exerting maximum effort to be friendly and agreeable.

A number of points came up, not necessarily in the following sequence.

They both made a routine play for the participation in the conference of the Czechs and the Poles. I said that this was obviously a matter which was not ripe for solution. They laughed and dropped it.

They asked my guess on the duration of the conference and I said that based on the Berlin and last Geneva experience¹ I thought about three to three and one-half weeks. In reply to my questions, Malik guessed four weeks and Soldatov three and a half.

They asked me what our ideas were on a solution for Berlin and when were we going to make a proposal. I said that we already had made a proposal and one which seemed entirely logical. They attacked it on usual grounds and pointed out that they had made several suggestions. I asked if they planned to make a formal proposal at the conference. They looked at each other and then Soldatov said, “That is a matter still to be decided by our Delegation.” They kept asking when the West would be making counter proposals. I said we were awaiting their considered reaction which we hoped would differ substantially from their initial reaction to the Western Peace Plan. They said there was nothing new in it. I pointed out some of the major changes from our 1955 proposals. They asked again about counter proposals and I said we were looking to them as after all it was “their” conference. At no time did they drop any hints or express any overt interest in starting private talks.

The bulk of our luncheon time was used for a discussion of Soviet and United States policy with respect to Germany. I took the offensive by saying that we were frankly bewildered by the Soviets’ pursuit of a policy which to us would almost certainly lead to disaster in ten, twenty or thirty years. They reacted indignantly and accused the United States of seeking to use Germany as the spearhead of a military threat to Russia. I pointed out that our policy for the past decade had been designed to knit the Federal Republic into the fabric of Western Europe. I pointed out that NATO by its structure and nature could only operate defensively and that the Russians should be grateful that the United States played a major military role in NATO thereby removing any possibility of any future adventurism or independent action by Germany. The argument was vehement and prolonged with Soldatov losing his temper on two or three occasions. The conversation, however, ended on an even key.

After saying goodbye Malik followed me out to the car to urge as the most practical way of making progress that we should go over the Soviet piece treaty article by article. He insisted, as both of them had on a number of occasions during the lunch, that they had come to Geneva with a genuine desire to negotiate and to reach agreements. They thought a Summit conference was very important. They expressed doubt as to whether or not we were in the same frame of mind. I assured him that we were but added they would understand that their proposals as presented were totally unacceptable to us.

The net impressions left on me were (1) the Soviets want a Summit conference this summer and Gromyko has been instructed to make this possible; (2) they believe our statements that without some progress at the Foreign Ministers Conference there will be no Summit; and (3) they are not themselves sure in what area the requisite progress can be achieved.²

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338. Confidential. Drafted by Merchant.
1. For documentation on the Berlin Conference, January 25–February 18, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 601 ff. For documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, October 27–November 16, 1955, see ibid., 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 537 ff.
2. Merchant also discussed McElroy’s joining the U.S. Delegation and air transit routes to Moscow. Memoranda of these parts of the conversation, US/MC/33 and 34, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1338.