Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

263. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 15, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Germany and Soviet Tactics

PARTICIPANTS

• French
  • M. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹
  • M. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
  • M. Charles Lucet, French Minister of Embassy
• American
  • Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
  • Mr. Robert McBride, WE
  • Mr. L. Dean Brown, WE

M. Joxe expressed France’s regret at learning of the Secretary’s resignation² and extended his sympathy to the Secretary. He then asked Ambassador Alphand to convey the sense of the latest instructions from Paris.

The Ambassador said that Couve had sent a cable from London asking him to take up immediately with the State Department the French belief that European security and reunification should be combined in any presentation. The French have come up with a counter-proposal to the draft prepared by the London experts and hope that it can receive prompt consideration by the US. The French believe their proposal can receive the support of all concerned, including the Germans. (M. Lucet saw Mr. Kohler on this subject later in the day.)³

Mr. Joxe said that there are dangers in initiating European security plan consideration without this link. This could lead directly into the Rapacki plan. Security and reunification need to go hand-in-hand with parallel steps to be taken. This is what the French propose.

Mr. Murphy said that he too believed that a jump into thinning-out proposals could create dangers.

M. Joxe said that the Paris Accords⁴ provide a basis. Under these the Germans freely accepted certain limitations. Initially, the Soviets denounced these accords. They might by now have a different conception of them and might be willing to come up with some sort of “revised Locarno”.

Mr. Murphy said that the Soviets seem to be seeking to freeze the status quo, with, perhaps, an exception for Berlin.

M. Joxe said he believes they do fear competition from Berlin. He did not think, however, that the Soviets were searching for a permanent freeze of the status quo in Germany but rather sought the ability to play the German problem over a long period of time. It might be a neutralized, reunified Germany which could be a later goal. He asked if we thought the present freeze is due to Asian pressures.

Mr. Murphy said that this is certainly a reason. There are pressures within the Communist hierarchy and from Mao and Chou. The Soviets seek about for ways to ease pressures on themselves or put them on us. They tried in the Middle East and were rather checked by a lack of success with Nasser.

In response to M. Joxe’s question as to whether we believe the Soviets find Communist China a dangerous ally, Mr. Murphy said that he did not think it went that far. The Soviets are perhaps suspicious of the power and attitudes of the ChiComs. There is some uneasiness between the two. There is for us the question as to how we can estimate these differences.

M. Joxe said that he did not want to force conclusions. He saw difficulties growing; he noted the differences on agricultural theory. In the past, he continued, the ChiComs have been the pragmatic ones; the Soviets, the theoreticians so far as foreign affairs are concerned. They now seem to be reversing roles and it is increasingly clear the ChiComs are entering the international sphere as, for example, in Africa. When he sees Russians, he said, he finds that they tend to talk about Europe and regard themselves as Europeans. He has no illusions that there is a divorce between the Soviets and the Chinese, but we cannot ignore the evidence.

Mr. Murphy said that the Soviets who come here seem genuinely interested in the betterment of conditions inside Russia.

M. Joxe said the Soviets realize that they are without all the advantages of the US yet believe they can play a role in economic development. He had been encouraged to note that the Soviets were permitting a US exhibition at their Moscow fair.

Mr. Murphy said this seemed to illustrate a measure of Soviet self-assurance.

M. Alphand said there is a suppleness in Soviet policy. They are not issuing ultimatums. Their reactions to the high altitude flights showed self-assurance.

Mr. Murphy mentioned the recent C–97 flight⁵ and said we were undertaking another with a C–130 at a high altitude but had had no reports yet other than to say that there had been no incident.⁶

When M. Joxe said the West must remain firm, Mr. Murphy added that we must also not be afraid. Too many statements about apprehensions, as are being made in the UK, sap our position. We don’t want and don’t expect war and don’t believe the Soviets do either. Firmness is the only way.

M. Joxe agreed with this. He then reverted to Germany. He said we have made two tactical errors. We should not have agreed so fast that the two Germanies could attend the conferences. We should have waited and let this concession be extracted from us. Second, we talked too soon and too much about disengagement. We should have been more reserved.

Mr. Murphy asked if this had been discussed in London between Debre and Macmillan.⁷

M. Joxe said that he did not have many details on these talks. There did not seem to have been any agreement on European security. It was agreed the West had to remain firm on its access rights to Berlin.

Mr. Murphy said that he understood that there had been discussion of maintaining the base of our rights but superimposing other ideas on top of that.

Mr. Joxe agreed and added that we cannot negotiate a new juridical status for Berlin. One must be firm when negotiating with the devil.

Mr. Murphy asked if the French expected any accomplishment from the Foreign Ministers’ conference.

M. Joxe said that he foresaw a long series of conferences and meetings. We won’t know the Soviet position until the last moment as the Soviets are still testing whether we will remain firm.

Mr. Murphy said they might vary their behavior, alternating suppleness with hardness.

M. Joxe agreed and said the Soviets really want a Summit Conference. They may make gestures to make it possible.

In response to Mr. Murphy’s question as to why the Soviets want a conference, M. Jones said Khrushchev seems to need a Summit for internal party reasons.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the French had any thoughts on softening the presence of the three powers in Berlin, aimed at calming Soviet apprehensions on espionage, propaganda or refugees.

M. Joxe said this is a point to consider but we should hold it in reserve. We could ask them if they have such fears and then say we’ll consider what we might do.

M. Alphand said we could also stimulate contacts between the two Germanies.

M. Joxe interjected “but without recognition”. He then went on to say that he believed Adenauer had taken over the Presidency for internal reasons but doubted if he could go all the way and impose Etzel. The German position seems to have two cardinal points: hold in Berlin and no recognition. After these, it seems fairly open.

M. Alphand mentioned the Pan-German committee to prepare the electoral law, which the Germans had proposed.

Mr. Murphy said that this should probably be presented as something flexible rather than iron-clad so that it can contribute the idea that the two Germanies can live together.

Mr. Murphy then inquired about Italian participation. He said that Pella and Segni are pushing hard.⁸ He asked if the Italians had been in touch with the French recently.

Mr. McBride then said the Italians yesterday had proposed some new wording, including “support” and “from the outset”, which seemed difficult. They had said they had not yet tried the idea on London and Paris. We had suggested they do so. They also want now to take part in the 29th conference.

M. Joxe said that the latter is new. He will see if the French have been approached.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–1559. Secret. Drafted by Brown and initialed by Murphy.
1. Joxe was in Washington for tripartite discussions on Africa, April 16–21.
2. Dulles tendered his resignation as Secretary of State on April 15.
3. A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–1559.
4. For texts of the Nine- and Four-Power agreements signed at Paris, October 23, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.
5. Documentation on the C–97 flight on April 3 is in Department of State, Central File 762B.5411.
6. The second C–130 flight was made during the morning of April 15.
7. See Document 261.
8. On April 14 Ambassador Zellerbach reported that Prime Minister Segni spent the better part of a half hour conversation on the question of Italian participation in the forthcoming talks on Germany. (Telegram 3060 from Rome; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4–1459)