261. Telegram From Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 0
5330. Paris for Embassy, USRO and Thurston. Embtel 5248 to Department, April 10.1 Discussions April 13 between Macmillan and Lloyd and Debre and Couve de Murville concerned almost exclusively with problems Berlin, Germany and forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting with Soviets. Foreign Office quite pleased with talks and considers large measure of agreement exists between British and French approach these problems.
With respect Berlin Macmillan and Debre in agreement that there should be no tampering with existing legal rights but new agreements on access might be negotiated and superimposed on existing legal rights. Debre thought that in such new agreement provision should be made for guaranteeing right of access for civilian population. Debre also expressed view that in course negotiations with Soviets they might be given some satisfaction with respect 1) limiting propaganda originating in Berlin 2) ending obvious political links between Berlin and West Germany and 3) with respect to refugees (according Foreign Office Debre did not elaborate on latter point). In exchange Russians should be required recognize their responsibility for guaranteeing exercise Western rights in Berlin even if they were to conclude separate peace treaty with DDR.
British raised question of UN role in approving or giving sanction to East-West agreement on Berlin. Debre’s reaction was completely negative with respect to UN involvement in any way in Berlin settlement. He pointed out Soviets enjoy veto in Security Council and there might be adverse majority with respect Western position in General Assembly. He said that UN was of no use to West in matter and in fact Soviets might subsequently attempt make use of UN to get out of agreement if one were concluded.
On subject free elections Couve de Murville said that Western initial position must be more realistic than in 1955. It would not be realistic to put forward free elections as first step. He was not pessimistic about possibility obtaining German acceptance this point of view despite position taken by von Brentano during recent Washington meetings. Debre asserted with emphasis that other Western powers could not afford [Page 613] antagonize Germans even though it was necessary to get modus vivendi with Russians. There could be no de jure recognition of the DDR but increased contacts between Federal Republic and DDR were possible. According Foreign Office Debre repeatedly emphasized importance carrying Germans with us.
There was some general discussion Macmillan idea of zone of force and arms limitations with emphasis in British presentation, according Foreign Office, on zone of inspection. Debre was not opposed to special security zone in Europe provided there was no question of neutralization of Germany and provided present European “political organization” was not prejudiced thereby, i.e. NATO and presence American forces in Germany. He also expressed view such zone should embrace portion Russian territory. Without offering answer, Macmillan posed question of what proposals West should make in Foreign Ministers’ meeting after initial position based essentially on 1955 proposals had been tabled and rejected by Soviets. Debre thought that Russians would not play all their cards at Foreign Ministers’ meeting but would reserve fall-back proposals for summit. He thought West should do likewise. Macmillan said that it was important to be clear in our own minds whether we wanted to go to the summit or not so that our tactics at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting could be adjusted accordingly. He made it clear that UK Government continued to believe in desirability of summit talks. Debre said that Western Foreign Ministers at April 29 meeting should be able to take some definite decisions about Berlin but probably would be able express only general views on zone of inspection.