Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

208. Memorandum of Discussion at the First Meeting of the Berlin Contingency Planning Group⁰

Washington, March 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary
  • Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
  • G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
  • Livingston T. Merchant, Asst Secy—European Affairs
  • Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secy—Policy Planning
• Defense
  • Neil McElroy, Secretary
  • Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary
  • John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secy for ISA
  • General N.F. Twining, Chairman, JCS
  • White House
  • Gordon Gray, Special Asst to President for National Security Affairs

Secretary McElroy expressed concern that the meeting with the President on Thursday, March 5, had not cleared up certain aspects of Berlin contingency planning.¹ He said that present military planning does not go beyond possible blockage of a Western probe after turnover. Should the Department of Defense be thinking of a garrison air lift while the case was in the UN. The advantage of resorting to the air would be that the communists would have to shoot first if they wanted to stop this form of access. Secretary McElroy expressed concern that the “turn-over” might occur in a matter of a few weeks.

Secretary McElroy asked how “stiff-necked” we were regarding document examination. He felt that it would be hard to sell America on general war merely to avoid East German stamping of our documents—unless it was clear that stamping amounted to US recognition of the GDR. It was pointed out that the UK position seems to be one of agreement that we should submit to no East German inspection or control, but the UK apparently does not want to resort to force over the matter of East German stamping of documents. Secretary McElroy pointed out that the West Germans accept East German stamping in connection with civilian traffic.

Mr. Quarles supported Secretary McElroy’s thesis that “stamping” was not a good point at which to resort to force. He felt that the West Germans were “leading us into a mouse trap”.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that Secretary Dulles had felt strongly that we should not submit to stamping. This was not just a legal matter, but had significant political overtones. Mr. Murphy pointed out that under European practice acceptance of stamping connoted acceptance of the stamper’s right of inspection. Secretary McElroy suggested that this matter be left, indicating that he thought we could reach agreement.

Secretary McElroy then said that, assuming a blockage had occurred, should the military be planning to fly a substantial number of planes into Berlin. Mr. Murphy pointed out that there would be no need for this in view of the adequate garrison supplies. Mr. Murphy felt that we should go to the UN before instituting an air lift. If supplies had to be flown in, the flights should not be designated as an “air lift”.

Secretary McElroy asked if we should plan to mobilize as soon as our ground access was blocked. Mr. Murphy thought that we should not, but that a number of preparatory measures should be taken. Secretary McElroy indicated that this is what he had meant by the term “mobilization”.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that after a blockage, it was likely that commercial flying into Berlin would cease and military planes would probably have to take up this load.

Governor Herter pointed out that presumably a UN meeting at this time would be the background for a “Summit” meeting. He added that a first indicator of Soviet movement would be the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR.

General Twining then read off a list of preparatory moves the military thought should be made.² The Chiefs would like to start such moves right away, but the President has reservations about the public impact.

There was general discussion about the desirability of beefing up the 7th Army in Germany and the effect which such an action would have on the adequacy of our central reserve in the US to deal with possible crises in other parts of the world.

Secretary McElroy thought that the Soviets were not concerned about a possible ground force move by the West. Mr. Murphy disagreed, pointing out that the great mistake, in his judgment, of the 1948–49 blockade episode was our failure to move on the ground.

Mr. Merchant expressed the opinion that, if we continue on a “business as usual” basis, the Soviets may miscalculate our intentions. He also felt that our allies would tend to become timid and look at this problem in a black and white fashion—either give up Berlin or go to total nuclear war.

Governor Herter questioned the wisdom of beefing up the 7th Army at the same time that we were going ahead with the 30,000 place reduction in our over-all armed forces.

Mr. Gray suggested that another meeting with the President should be held since he felt that the President was not sufficiently current on contingency planning.

Governor Herter read parts of the “Agenda for Discussion of Berlin” which was prepared for this meeting (copy attached).³

Mr. Quarles expressed concern about our public posture in this matter. He felt that we should say to the Russians, in effect, that we are glad they propose to give up their occupancy of East Berlin, and that we should avoid any implication that we wanted them to stay on. He wondered if we should not go further and replace Soviet inspectors with our own people when the turn-over occurred.

Mr. Irwin expressed the opinion that a firm US position would be more effective now and for the next few months than in the fall or next year.

Mr. Smith expressed the opinion that we had not yet made clear what it was we wanted the Soviets to do. Mr. Murphy said we wanted “free access” to Berlin. Mr. Smith expressed the opinion that firm American popular support for our Berlin position was based on a belief that the Soviets themselves plan to blockade Berlin. He felt that, when it became clear that the Soviet threat was much more ambiguous, there was danger of confusion in American understanding. Therefore, we should make very clear what it was we wanted the Soviets to do and what we wanted them not to do.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that a speech was being prepared for the President on the subject of the adequacy of our military establishment and, perhaps, reference in this speech could be made to our Berlin thinking.

There was further discussion about the possibility of deploying an additional division from STRAC to replace a division which General Norstad may have to deploy to the north and to the east in connection with the Berlin crisis.

The discussion was concluded with an agreement that the Chiefs and the Department of Defense would prepare a list of military moves which they thought should be made, and State would prepare a list of political moves. These two lists would be meshed and would be presented to the President probably after next Thursday’s NSC meeting.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–959. Top Secret. Drafted by Smith.
1. At 8:30 a.m. on March 9 Gray had discussed the Special NSC Meeting held on March 5 (see Document 201) with the President. Gray noted that that meeting “had not been too successful” and had accomplished less than he desired. He also stated that McElroy had called him following the meeting to voice his dissatisfaction as well. McElroy suggested that a small group be set up to “mature” the problem in preparation for another meeting with the President, and Eisenhower approved the procedure since he admitted “that he was still confused as to what we would do under certain contingencies.” (Memorandum of discussion with the President, March 11; Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)
2. Although this list has not been identified with certainty, presumably it is the one referred to in footnote 8, Document 201.
3. Not printed. Drafted by Morgan on March 9, this agenda listed minimum requirements, the “cut-off” point, countermeasures, preparatory measures, negotiating posture, and Allied solidarity as items for discussion.