Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

162. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State⁰

Paris, February 6, 1959, 9 p.m.

Secto 17. Secretary’s talk with President de Gaulle, at which President was accompanied by Prime Minister Debre, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, Joxe and de Courcel, opened with suggestion by Secretary that Couve de Murville might wish to inform de Gaulle of matters discussed at meeting terminated one-half hour previously at Foreign Office.¹

Foreign Ministers outlined agreements reached on contingency planning, possible conference with Soviets and preparatory meetings which would have to be held before conference, and possible agenda for meeting with Soviets.

With reference to Berlin contingency planning, de Gaulle indicated he was entirely in agreement that we could not permit Soviets to turn over to vanquished (GDR Germans) rights which we had obtained as victors in Germany and that we should meet any attempt to interfere with our communications with Berlin with force.

Secretary went into more detail in this connection indicating that if Allied convoy was stopped by GDR it should be prepared to identify itself but go no farther in complying with GDR request. If GDR then attempted impede our access with roadblocks, blown bridges, or by other forceful means, we should take matter to UN.

At this point both de Gaulle and Prime Minister seriously questioned advisability of taking matter to UN before a) either resorting to force ourselves or b) mounting small air lift.

Debre made strong point that we should immediately go into air operation since it would be psychologically easier to do this at early juncture than later.

Secretary explained his fear that such a step might whittle away our determination to force our way on land, since public opinion might reach conclusion that as we were carrying along satisfactorily by air lift there would be no need to resort to force.

De Gaulle said matter is as simple as this: once Allied convoy in question had established identification to GDR it should brook no hindrance. He asked whether we would be prepared to permit GDR to stamp identification documents on pretext perhaps that this necessary for clearance through next security check point.

Secretary said we would not accept that. De Gaulle concurred, commenting that time stamp not necessary since notice could be telephoned to next checkpoint.

De Gaulle indicated that we must be clear on these little details for they could lead to considerable trouble later.

President de Gaulle did not appear to take to idea of having to wait while matter was taken through Security Council and possibly General Assembly, believing that UN would probably appoint commission, send Hammarskjöld to investigate on spot, authorize Hammarskjöld to assume responsibility for supplying and administering Berlin. Thus we would be faced with question of Allied rights in Berlin being substituted by UN.

Secretary explained that we could take temperature of how matter likely be received in GA and if it appeared it would go as President de Gaulle feared then Secretary would not be prepared to take matter to GA.

Secretary also explained that one reason for not forcing issue of passage immediately was that our military need to make certain preparations for such an operation. They would like to begin making preparations even now, but on political level we do not consider this advisable, therefore a certain time will be required from moment when we have ascertained that GDR prepared to employ force to hinder our passage until we are ready ourselves to use effective counter-force.

Secretary also indicated that such delay would enable us to build up public opinion and demonstrate clearly to UN and world at large, etc. that our rights were being interfered with and we were merely taking only justifiable measures.

Debre pointed out his view that it would be difficult to obtain 2/3 majority in Assembly approving Allies maintaining position in Berlin by force. He emphasized danger of position of our communication with our garrisons in Berlin becoming frozen unless some sort of air supply were quickly established.

Secretary pointed out that situation quite different from 1948 since our Berlin garrisons now have adequate supplies for six months and blockade would presumably apply only to our garrisons and not as in 1948 to Berlin as whole.

Secretary emphasized his belief that we might succeed in obtaining very strong vote our favor in GA, such as we did with respect to Hungary.

Debre countered this by saying situation quite different from Hungary for now Soviets have maneuvered themselves into position of appearing to be offering something to East Germans.

Secretary said he was quite prepared thoroughly to review policy of taking matter to Assembly if it appeared there would be an adverse vote, as he did not believe that our clearly established rights should be permitted to be dependent on UN approval.

Secretary added that at beginning of his talk with Macmillan,² British had seemed inclined to willingness provide GDR officials more than identification of vehicles and were perhaps slightly soft about getting into a position which could be interpreted as de facto recognition of GDR

Debre insisted that we should obtain very clear agreement on this primary principle with British.

Secretary felt that by end of his discussions with Macmillan, British were prepared to accept Secretary’s contentions and had so indicated. Secretary did not feel however that Macmillan was so solid that there might not be some slippage in future.

Foreign Minister pointed out that customary air traffic would be in operation even though there was not an airlift.

Subject of possible conference with Soviets next discussed and agreement reached that in our notes to Moscow we would not propose date prior to May 27, but that if Soviets suggested meeting before that date we were quite prepared to go along.

Foreign Minister said he feared that Macmillan, who anxious for early meeting, would discuss matter of dates on his forthcoming trip to Moscow.

Agenda for possible conference discussed next and Secretary indicated that prior to his departure from Washington he had received a letter from Adenauer³ suggesting that subject disarmament should be included.

Foreign Minister indicated that FRG [Fr?] opposed to this for reasons outlined in earlier conversation, to wit Soviets would probably drag China in and also Western Allies did not have agreed position on disarmament.

De Gaulle said one must admit that introduction of disarmament would cause trouble, but at same time if we hoped to accomplish anything with conference it would be necessary to touch on this subject. De Gaulle then inquired whether Secretary had any suggestions as to how something constructive might be accomplished in meeting with Soviets.

Secretary explained that he was not opposed to disarmament entirely for reasons outlined here by Foreign Minister, but more because as Foreign Minister had explained in earlier conversation it would remove conference from jurisdiction of four nations having responsibility for Germany. He added however that he did not exclude possibility that in such a conference we would have to give consideration to various suggestions such as thinning out of forces, Rapacki Plan,⁴ disarmament in Eastern Europe, etc., all of which was quite different from general disarmament.

At this point Debre interjected that we should bear in mind that Soviets’ primary objective was to get Allies out of Berlin.

Secretary agreed, emphasizing that people of Berlin would feel lost if we removed our troops and he questioned in any event value of UN guarantees.

In answer to de Gaulle’s inquiry as to how far Secretary thought Soviets were prepared to go, Secretary indicated that he thought Soviets were not genuinely desirous of solving Berlin and German question. They created difficulty in Berlin, they merely wished to try to force us to recognize GDR and to stir up trouble for their own advantage.

Secretary indicated however he felt that we should have to hold a conference to show to the world that we were reasonable people and prepared to discuss these problems, but he did not feel that we would at this juncture settle the German problem. Secretary continued that he thought point of departure could for such a meeting be revision of our proposals at the Geneva Conference of 1955 which were in themselves good proposals, but were too complicated to be understood by public, had been twisted by Molotov, etc. However, they had much merit and would have to be put in simpler form in which their merits would be more apparent to public.

President de Gaulle was particularly anxious to know whether Secretary had any formula which went beyond merely satisfying public and contained possibility of approaching solution to German problem.

Secretary explained that he had not at this juncture and that while most people paid lip service to unification, he was not certain how many really wanted it, including Federal Republic itself. Secretary indicated that when he had met President de Gaulle in 1947⁵ President had not been strong advocate for German reunification.

De Gaulle said that this was the case in 1947 and it was so today, first because of the situation in France, and second because of the fear which would be created among all people, not governments, people of Eastern Europe, Poles, Czechs, etc., at unified Germany.

Secretary indicated that he did think Federal Republic, which was more vigorous and had greater attraction for German people as flow of refugees from East indicated, could establish contacts with GDR and take other steps which would generally render GDR more healthy place, but that Federal Republic had for one reason or another acted rather stuffily in this matter.

President de Gaulle concurred and thought that it might be possible to push forward in matters of transport, post, telegraph, railroads, canals, etc. which would bring about slight changes and closer rapprochement between East and West Germany. He next inquired what the Secretary’s views were on the Oder–Neisse frontier.

Secretary indicated that in Adenauer letter referred to above, Chancellor had indicated that he was prepared to make statement on that subject, though he did not know precisely what the Chancellor had in mind.

When Foreign Minister raised question of March preparatory meeting of Foreign Ministers taking place to prepare for conference, President de Gaulle indicated he would welcome such meeting here and counseled that it should not be a hurried meeting; plenty of time should be allowed for deliberation and even if it were necessary to interrupt it, it should be renewed and the subjects should be studied in calmness and without pressure.

Debre proposed that prior meeting be held between US, UK and France and that Germans should be invited following that to consult. This would in his opinion make our position stronger as the nations responsible for Germany in the public mind.

Secretary indicated he accepted this procedure, particularly on matters dealing with Berlin inasmuch as we had reserved our rights on Berlin matters when we had transferred to Federal Republic other attributes of sovereignty.

Ambassador Whitney authorized in his discretion to convey appropriate portions of foregoing to Lloyd.

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/2–659. Secret; Priority. Transmitted in two sections. Dulles was accompanied by Houghton, Merchant, and Lyon. President de Gaulle and Dulles also discussed French naval forces in the Mediterranean and tripartite consultations. (Sectos 16 and 26, February 6 and 8; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1203)
1. See Document 161.
2. See Document 158.
3. Document 151.
4. See footnote 2, Document 43.
5. For a report on Dulles’ conversation with de Gaulle on December 6, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. II, pp. 793–794.