Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

151. Memorandum From Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Bonn, January 30, 1959.

The present situation is characterized by the fact that the Soviet Union, now as before, aims at dominating the world by means of communism under the leadership of the Soviet Union. In official Soviet speeches the term “socialist world system” has recently been substituted for the term “socialist camp”. The Soviets regard the United States as their only significant opponent. Germany is not regarded by them as an opponent of importance. This was explicitly stated to Lippmann by Khrushchev in his well-known interview of 24 October 1958.¹

2. Therefore in taking any action in respect of the Soviet Union, including any proposals that might be made shortly concerning pending questions, that objective of Soviet Russian policy must be taken into account. The free world has constantly underestimated the systematic and far-sighted quality of Soviet Russian policy. Ever since the second World War, the Government of the Soviet Union has pursued a policy deliberately aiming at world domination. After the collapse of Germany the Soviet Union was the only country which instead of disarming continuously increased its armed strength. The offer made by the United States in 1946 and subsequent years to subject all nuclear weapons to international control was sabotaged by the Soviet Union although the latter at the time did not possess any nuclear weapons. Since 1945 the Soviets have incorporated into their orbit of power the present satellite countries. After that they initiated political and economic actions of the most different kinds in numerous parts of the world. All these measures accorded with each other, and all of them pursued one and the same objective, namely, to expand the power of communism. Indeed, the Soviets and, in particular, Khrushchev have unambiguously stated again and again that communism would supersede the so-called capitalist States.

To judge the situation now brought about by the Soviets only under the aspect of the partition of Germany, as is done in Britain and particularly in the United States, is incorrect and therefore leads to erroneous conclusions. The partition of Germany is not the cause but the consequence of the tension which originated between the Soviet Union and the United States before that partition. Even if Germany unity were restored in complete freedom, a state of tension between East and West would continue to exist. Germany’s independence from East and West would even be bound to intensify the tension. In view of Germany’s geographical position, both sides would have to make every effort in order to prevent her manpower and her production capacity from coming under the influence of the other side.

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4. In my view the raising of the German problem at this juncture is an attempt by the Soviet Union, to be taken very seriously, to initiate successfully the economic usurpation of Western Europe by first detaching the Federal Republic economically from the European Economic Community and later integrating it into the economic area controlled by the Soviets. The Soviet draft of a so-called peace treaty therefore logically contains provisions to the effect

a) that the Soviet-dominated so-called German Democratic Republic should be recognized as a German State enjoying full sovereignty, and that its territory should be guaranteed;

b) that the Federal Republic should enter into a confederation with that structure built on communist principles; and

c) that the Federal Republic should be forced to renounce any aspirations towards integration with the West.

The intention to detach the Federal Republic from the treaty system of the free nations is clearly borne out by

the prohibition to participate in military alliances, which would mean leaving NATO;

the provisions concerning the recognition of “the full sovereignty of the German people over Germany”, which prohibit the transfer of sovereign rights to European organizations; and

more particularly the clauses concerning most favoured nation treatment to be granted to the Soviet Union, which would preclude the further participation of the Federal Republic in the European Economic Community, the OEEC and the GATT.

The same conditions are to apply later to a reunited Germany.

Ulbricht as well as Grotewohl have clearly and unequivocally stated that it is the purpose of the proposed confederation to establish the rule of communism throughout Germany. In his report during the Fourth Session of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, Ulbricht said that the time has come “for the workers of West Germany to take into their own hands the cause of peace and of the struggle against German militarism”. On 25 January Grotewohl stated in Peking that “the red flag of the working class would one day fly over the whole of Germany”.

5. It results from the above that it is impossible to agree to any proposal, irrespective of where it comes from, which brings the Soviets nearer to their objective of becoming the world’s paramount economic Power. From this follows

a) that the spread of communism in the Federal Republic must not under any circumstances be facilitated;

b) that the present connexion of the Federal Republic with the West must not be weakened in any way under any circumstances. The withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO, or from the European Communities, the abandonment of Berlin or the implementation of isolated disengagement plans would decisively weaken NATO and thus be bound to result in upsetting the military and political equilibrium in favour of the Soviet Union.

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10. It seems to me necessary to resume, within the framework of the United Nations, the disarmament negotiations which at the time almost reached a conclusion in the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission at London, and to link them up with the Soviet Russian move concerning Berlin and Germany.

11. In characterizing the partition of Germany as the most dangerous fact of our time one deflects public attention from the real threat, namely, the expansive urge of the Soviet Union. The activities of all the free nations should, however, be first and foremost directed towards preventing the expansion of communism in the world and more particularly the expansion of the economic and political power of the Soviet Union.

Once the Soviet Union realizes that she can make no further advance in her attempt at world domination, once her fear of being attacked is allayed by controlled disarmament in the field of nuclear and conventional weapons and by simultaneously pointing out to her the prospects of an undisturbed economic development in her own country, facilitated by extensive disarmament, a relaxation of tension is likely to occur throughout the world. In an atmosphere of relaxation other questions, for instance the reunification of Germany, could be negotiated about with some prospect of success. The constant arguments with the “Group of Traitors” gathering round Malenkov, Bulganin, Molotov etc. as well as the discussions of the so-called reform of the school system show that communism, too, is faced with internal problems. A relaxation of tension might promote these quarrels.

In constantly characterizing the reunification of Germany as the most important problem one conjures up the danger of a movement being launched in certain countries to the effect that the world should not be imperilled for the sake of reuniting Germany. Such a movement would be ominous.

Since the time has not yet come to solve this question, the West runs the risk of being defeated in pursuing such a policy. It exposes itself to the danger of suffering a severe loss of prestige and conversely contributes to raising the prestige of the Soviet Union throughout the world.

12. In declarations, correspondence, etc. of the Western allies mention is frequently made of “European security”. Today’s armaments technology, e.g., rockets, as well as the political ties which are becoming ever closer, particularly between the communist countries and Soviet Russia, no longer admit of an isolated European security; there is only one security, namely, the joint security of all the free nations.

13. There will have to be negotiations. In the course of such negotiations consideration might at the suggestion of the United States be given to the establishment of diplomatic relations by the Federal Republic of Germany with Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided that the Berlin question is solved properly. Consideration might also be given to the issue of a carefully formulated statement concerning the Oder–Neisse line, as previously, which might contain such points as the renunciation of the use of force, the maintenance of the right of people to their homeland, and perhaps economic cooperation.

The possibility might also be considered of negotiating an agreement on the maintenance of the status quo of Berlin for a certain period, simultaneously providing that the conditions in the Soviet Zone be improved by means of an agreed form of international control or influence. This might perhaps also benefit the negotiations concerning controlled disarmament.

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0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Attached to a letter from Adenauer to Dulles, January 30, in which he attempted to write down his thoughts on the present world situation for Dulles’ attention only. The letter and memorandum were delivered to Dulles on February 2 by German Minister Krapf. A memorandum of their conversation, which included a brief exploration of the access question and the reply to the Soviet note of January 10 (see Document 124) is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Dulles sent a copy of the translation to President Eisenhower on February 3 and the copy of it in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File, was initialed by Eisenhower. A full text is in Adenauer, Erinnerungen, pp. 467–472.
1. See Walter Lippmann, The Communist World and Ours, Boston, 1959, pp. 11–31.