Office of the Historian

134. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McElroy to Secretary of State Dulles0

Washington, January 15, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • Berlin Situation
1.
Forwarded herewith are comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on actions which might be taken in preparation to meet Soviet or GDR interference with our right of access to Berlin.1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I recognize that for political, budgetary and other reasons, many of the actions listed in the J.C.S. paper, while militarily desirable, cannot be taken on the timetable suggested, and some of the actions cannot be taken short of an actual challenge by the Soviets or the GDR of our right of access to Berlin.
2.
The list of desirable military actions which has been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not be interpreted as essential preconditions which have to be met prior to making a firm political decision, in concert with our allies, to use whatever degree of force is necessary to protect our right of surface and air access to Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with my judgment that a firm political decision is an essential first step which should precede detailed military planning and that this political decision should embody the following principles:
a.
That we will meet a challenge to surface access to Berlin by necessary military action on the ground;
b.
That we will not evade the issue by reacting to a surface blockade by the establishment of an airlift;
c.
That we will meet the challenge where it occurs—either in the air or on the ground or both;
d.
That we will be prepared to follow-up initial actions with increasing measures of military force, if required, and will accept the risk of general war.
3.
In order that achievement of this fundamental agreement with our allies may not be confused with military detail, it is requested that the listing of possible actions in Appendixes “A” and “B” of the J.C.S. study not be provided to the British and the French. This listing of possible actions is forwarded for your information only as an indication of military measures which might be taken on a selective case-by-case basis.
4.
I also agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that US CINCEUR/SACEUR should be responsible for planning and implementing such military actions as would be taken in Europe.
Neil McElroy
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. The source text was initialed by the President and seen by Dulles.↩
  2. JCSM–16–59, January 13, was not attached to the source text, but see footnote 8, Document 122.↩