Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

122. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, January 5, 1959, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list¹

(This meeting was held in pursuance of the agreement of the Three Foreign Ministers in Paris on December 15 [14], 1958² that paragraph D of the U.S. aide-mémoire of December 11, 1958³ should be discussed tripartitely in Washington. Paragraph D reads as follows:

“At this stage of developments [i.e. when Allied surface traffic between Berlin and West Germany is not allowed to transit the Soviet Zone without dealing with East German personnel]⁴ and before considering resort to an airlift, an attempt to reopen access through the use of limited military force should be made in order to demonstrate our determination to maintain surface access. In any case, the Soviets and East Germans should not be allowed to entertain doubts as to our determination to do so if need be. Even if force is not resorted to at once we should continue to assert our rights to resume interrupted traffic and our intention to do so by force.”)

Mr. Murphy opened the discussion by asking the British and French how they thought the matter should be handled. Mr. Alphand replied that he was still without instructions, but that he expected instructions soon. Viscount Hood replied that he would like to hear the United States views on the subject.

After reading and commenting on paragraph D, which he said was quite clear, Mr. Murphy explained that we did not want to make the same mistake we had made at the time of the 1948 blockade. The 1948–49 airlift was, to be sure, a technical success, but it had been very expensive. More important, the airlift had been an evasion of the issue in the face of a Soviet challenge. It had not sufficed to prevent the Korean War, which cost us many casualties.

Mr. Alphand inquired whether it was contemplated that we should use force in the first instance or whether we should only answer force with force. Viscount Hood asked what force we contemplated using in the first instance and what force would be held in reserve.

Mr. Irwin replied that it is difficult to pin down specifically what we would do. The military field commanders must take such decisions in the light of the circumstances obtaining at the time. If we show determination to resist the first attempt to impede our access, the issue may not arise. The extent of force which would be required would depend on what the Soviets did. What we want to do, Mr. Irwin said, is to take the basic decision here; the implementation can be left to the military in the field.

Mr. Murphy added that we simply wanted to state the general principle on which we would operate. We would, he said, be glad to set up a working group for a detailed study of various contingencies, but such a study would take a lot of time.

Viscount Hood referred to the “six months’ notice” which the Soviets have given us and asked what we intended to do in this period, i.e., what action we contemplated first, what action we contemplated on June 1, and what action we contemplated after that. Mr. Alphand asked whether we would consider the turning back of trains and road traffic as force which had to be countered by force.

Mr. Murphy referred to various actions which could be taken to impede our access and stated that we would use such force as we determine to be necessary to prosecute our right of access to Berlin.

Mr.Alphand posed the question whether we really need a “statement of principle” as proposed by the United States or whether we could wait for a further clarification of Soviet intentions. Mr. Murphy replied that the earlier we took the decision the better, and Mr. Kohler added that we have no assurance that the Soviets will not act in less than six months.

In response to Viscount Hood’s observation that the matter affected all the NATO countries, Mr. Kohler stated that we proposed to consult in NATO when our plans are revised but that the tripartite communiqué of December 14⁵ and the NATO communiqué of December 16⁶ implicitly authorize us to undertake such planning. We are in a way only implementing a decision already taken, for our public declarations on Berlin imply our readiness to use force if necessary.

Viscount Hood expressed the view that we must take further preparatory steps if we wish to show the Soviets that our declarations are not empty words. We must, he said, exhaust all peaceful courses and make it clear that any war which might result would not be of our making. Thus we must make the Soviets face the real alternatives of allowing us to pass or of using force to prevent our passage. The British do not think that the Soviets want war, but if war seems to threaten, popular opinion must not have the impression that the Western Powers have done the provoking. Thus we must explore what is involved in the way of preparations, both psychological and military. First, we must show the Soviets our determination. This could be best accomplished by a general mobilization or by what is comparable, i.e., a NATO general alert. Mr. Murphy objected that it would be impossible to make a stand if one described the “horrors of the ultimate” to the people.

Viscount Hood admitted that it was difficult to draw a balance. The basic objective is to maintain access to Berlin, and this, in his opinion, could be done by a variety of methods including a garrison airlift.

Mr. Irwin offered a definition of “force” as contemplated in paragraph D. This would, he said, be such force as is necessary to counter active or “passive” force denying us access. There is an unending series of possibilities. If we are determined to use force, Mr. Irwin continued, we will create two situations. First, the Soviets will not make it necessary for us to use it. Second, if the Soviets oppose us, there would result a situation which could lead to war. If the Soviets oppose our first attempt to pass, both sides will build up their forces and will look toward a resolution of the problem by general war if necessary. Mr. Irwin concurred with Viscount Hood that we must prepare for all eventualities before embarking on the use of force but added that we need a decision on principle before undertaking a discussion of details.

Mr. Irwin further defined the United States position by saying that, if our access were challenged in the air, we would respond by the use of limited force in the air. He assumed, however, that the first challenge would come on the ground. In this case it would be preferable to have our road rather than our rail traffic challenged, because it would be easier to respond on the road. The important thing, Mr. Irwin concluded, was to test the first challenge of our access.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the principle was now clear, and, if so, whether the British and French would be prepared to explore means of implementing this principle. Viscount Hood stated that he accepted the principle but that we need not necessarily respond on the ground. He also observed that the action proposed by the United States involved great risks for which we are not yet prepared.

Mr. Irwin replied that an airlift would only amount to a postponement. We will never be in an ideal position for general war, he said, but we faced this possibility in the Lebanon and Quemoy crises⁷ and our NATO position is no less good at this time. While we should make preparations, we do not require a specific degree of preparedness for the test contemplated in paragraph D. Mr.Murphy added that our Berlin stockpiles would permit us to wait as long as three months before making bur test.

Mr. Murphy then went into the subject of the motivation of the recent Soviet threat against Berlin. The United States, he said, evaluates this threat as just another in a series of probes and believes that the Soviets are not prepared to risk a war. It is, therefore, important for us to show initially that we will not evade the issue. The Soviets have left themselves some elbowroom. They have a dozen pretexts for a general war if they wish one; they did not have to provoke a crisis over Berlin. If the Soviets are convinced we are just as determined as they, Mr. Murphy said, they have until May to find a way out of the problem they have created for themselves. In 1948 we had to resort to an airlift because we were completely unprepared for war; we are in a better position today.

Viscount Hood said that he would like to have the answers to three questions before assenting to any land operation: how does one define “limited military force;” second, what defense preparations would have to be made in advance to put us in a proper posture for a use of force; and third, what sort of timetable would be followed?

Mr. Murphy replied that a study of these questions could take weeks, and Mr. Irwin added that USAREUR and USCOB would have to be consulted. General Johnson offered purely illustrative comments on the type of military preparedness steps which might be taken in conjunction with a use of limited military force. General Norstad might, he thought, consider recommending a speed-up in the procurement of equipment, reinforcement to bring units up to strength, an increase in the size of our forces of [by] an increase in the draft, the stopping of movement of dependents to Europe, and the stopping of tourist travel. General Johnson was not, however, aware that General Norstad had already taken any measures of this sort.

With reference to the “timetable,” Mr. Kohler said that we viewed agreement on paragraph D as a “subdecision” implementing our public pronouncements which we would send to the field to “staff out” and that the study prepared in the field would come back to Washington for approval. Mr. Alphand concurred that the political decision had to be taken first. Mr. Murphy warned of the psychological pressures which we would face if we deferred a decision until the six months’ period fixed by the Soviets was nearing its end.

Viscount Hood stated that where the British and the Americans diverged was conceivably on method. The British wished to have military plans approved by this political-military group now meeting in Washington. Mr. Alphand agreed that details should be requested from the field commanders and should be given further study in Washington.

Mr. Irwin suggested, and the British and French agreed, that each group should ascertain its own national plans and meet again to co-ordinate them later in the week or early in the following week. It was agreed that it would be useful to know what paragraph D meant in military terms.

Viscount Hood referred to the “political exercise” and asked how we convey our ideas to the Soviets. Mr. Murphy suggested that we could take advantage of Mr. Mikoyan’s visit.

Mr. Murphy, Mr. Irwin, and Mr. Kohler reiterated the view that an airlift would not be a suitable response to a stoppage of surface traffic. Mr. Murphy said that the talk about an airlift which had already taken place had had a bad psychological effect, for the Soviets will take a tougher position on ground access if they believe we are ready to resort to an airlift. On the other hand, they will backtrack if we stand firm. In any case, Mr. Murphy said, we have no intention to mount a new airlift, and even a “garrison airlift” would be a start in this direction.

Admiral Denny said that it was important to work out a timetable of actions which we would take to demonstrate to the Soviets that we mean business and are ready. Mr. Irwin commented that the state of readiness of our forces in Europe was not all. One had to consider SAC and our over-all deterrent in persuading the Soviets.

Mr. Murphy, after consultation with the Department of Defense, said, in reply to a suggestion of Admiral Denny that a joint working party be set immediately, that we would prefer to study this first ourselves.

In conclusion, it was agreed that another meeting would be held as soon as Mr. Alphand received his instructions, which he expected before the middle of the following week.⁸

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–559. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan and initialed by Kohler and Murphy.
1. Not printed.
2. See Document 108.
3. See Document 98 and footnote 5 thereto.
4. Brackets in the source text.
5. For text of this communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, p. 600; Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 559; or Department of State Bulletin, December 29, 1958, pp. 1041–1042.
6. For text of the NATO declaration on Berlin, see ibid., January 5, 1959, p. 4; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 602–603; or Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 560.
7. Documentation on the landing of U.S. troops in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, is in volume XI. Documentation on the bombing of Quemoy in the late summer and fall of 1958 is in volume XIX.
8. In light of the discussion at this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a statement of the military preparations, courses of action, and their method and timing that might be necessary to meet the Berlin situation. Copies of this paper, JCSM–16–59 with appendices, were transmitted to the Secretary of Defense on January 13 and to Dulles 2 days later. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Germany)