Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

78. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

December 10, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Second Tripartite Meeting, December 10

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
• M. Charles Lucet, French Minister
• Sir Harold Caccia, U.K. Ambassador
• Lord Hood, U.K. Minister
• Mr. Charles Wiggin, First Secretary, U.K. Embassy
• Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
• Mr. Robert McBride, WE
• Mr. Russell Fessenden, RA
• Mr. Robert Donhauser, G
• Mr. L. Dean Brown, WE

Mr. Murphy opened the meeting by stating we were anxious to hear the replies of Paris to the questions asked at the December 4 meeting.¹

M. Alphand said that he had no answers but rather more “preliminary” questions on which the French Government wanted our views. In response to a query he said General de Gaulle had seen our questions and had personally studied the matter. The French counter questions were, in fact, General de Gaulle’s own.

Ambassador Alphand read the questions, first in English and then in French. (As they were couched in the first person form, it was obvious that de Gaulle had, in fact, taken a hand in the drafting of Alphand’s latest instructions.)

The questions were:

(1) Is it possible or not to establish a program of common action related to world problems (citing Berlin, Iran, Communist infiltration in Africa, the Middle and Far East) with such a program to be so constructed as to restore the initiative to the West and not let it be or appear to be a prerogative of the East? For example, could there not be common economic and social planning for underdeveloped countries and a common political policy towards them instead of always finding ourselves in a position of having to counter Communist moves ad hoc.

(2) Is it possible or not on the military level for the three to act strategically in common in case of military conflict anywhere in the world? This would entail advance planning taking into account our other allies. An example would be the decision whether or not to use nuclear weapons.

Continuing to read from his instructions, M. Alphand said that the aim is to establish a “permanent and organized agreement” among the three. This aim and the questions, he continued, should be studied before we go into such details as to where the organization should be or who would take part.

Lord Hood asked M. Alphand to explain his ideas on what the first question meant.

M. Alphand said that the Soviets always take the initiative or we react to what they are doing. The West should have its own plans so that it can take the initiative. The General certainly wanted to establish a program of common action and he believed we tend to act in a disorderly manner and occasionally get in each other’s way.

Lord Hood asked if this meant that the three should draw up plans and then, when they are to be executed, bring in others.

M. Alphand replied affirmatively.

Mr. Murphy asked if this would mean specific plans for all countries and areas or an overall plan for all.

M. Alphand said that it would have to be a series of plans. Some would be drawn up now, others later. There should be a harmonization of our positions on aid to underdeveloped countries. This is but an example.

Sir Harold asked if it were the French proposal that the first action under the proposed formula would be to list all the problems. After these were identified, a study could be made of how they were to be treated. It is not as if the question of aid to underdeveloped areas has not been studied at length; it has. It is additionally a question whether this is really a subject the three could deal with. There are many organizations already in the field. The UN, the Colombo plan,² unilateral programs, the Bank, and the Fund³ are but examples. Would it be the thought that all these should be taken into account and a master plan drawn up?

Mr. Murphy asked if it would rather be ad hoc, such as a special study of a problem as Indonesia.

M. Alphand said that it was not just the General’s intention to draw up a list of problems. It was more to set up a program of action throughout the world and to study the means of solving the problems.

Mr. Murphy said that this is being done, as, for instance, with the Colombo plan.

M. Alphand agreed but said that there are problems to which insufficient attention has been paid. Two of these, for example, are Sudanese cotton and Icelandic fish.

Mr. Murphy questioned this, saying that in the case of Iceland there has been multilateral consideration through the OEEC and there has been considerable consultation on the problem bilaterally as well as multilaterally. Solutions, he noted, are not easy to work out.

Mr. McBride pointed out that the Soviet economic threat has been studied and discussed by NATO political advisers for at least eighteen months.

Mr. Caccia said that the General’s idea on the economic side seems to be that we should study what is being done, then ask if it conforms to a pattern, and finally assess whether it is good enough.

M. Alphand replied that the general idea is to draw up common plans for areas where there is a Soviet menace. In the past there have been differences among the three. There was no desire to destroy that which exists. The objective is to achieve, at least, some degree of advance tripartite agreement.

Mr. Murphy asked if the French mean to draw up a list of problems not covered satisfactorily by existing arrangement and then for the three to meet and formally to thrash them out.

Mr. Caccia pointed out that what had been done would have to be taken into account. If the proposals were as he understood them, we would need a large research staff.

M. Alphand said he wanted to repeat what he had stated during the last meeting: France does not oppose NATO consultation. It believes that it would be easier to get solutions if the three have an advance agreement.

Mr. Murphy said that the French proposals go far beyond NATO. Perhaps it had been unfortunate that so much emphasis had been placed on NATO in earlier discussions and in the memorandum itself. Other organizations exist and are as much concerned. The OAS and SEATO are but examples.

M. Alphand said that NATO had been cited only as an example of an organization which is not sufficient. But the questions put to him have been about machinery. The French Government wants to know the reaction to the questions of principle. If our reply is along the line that de Gaulle’s plans are “too big” or that there is “too much else in the field” then there is little point in talking about details or, in fact, in continuing the discussion.

Sir Harold said that he believed that one had to get down to details before one could decide if the French proposals are practicable. This would be true in any study of the under-developed countries. In such a study one would have to know who the other donors might be; there are, of course, lots of recipients. It would be difficult not to bring other donors into the discussions at an early stage.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the United States already has a large Mutual Assistance program. Would this be subject to discussion and debate among the three? Would the French-proposed organization pass on United States plans?

M. Alphand said that France too has a large program in relation to its national product. It gives as much in francs as the United States does in dollars. Programs should be concerted. Consultation would not interfere with unilateral programs but would ensure that they are adapted to each other.

Sir Harold noted that most countries giving aid are already committed.

M. Alphand repeated that it is not the French idea to abandon present programs. The French understand Commonwealth commitments.

M. Alphand then said that on the political level there must be better coordination and consultation. The French do not want to be surprised as they had been several times in the past few months.

Mr. Murphy and Sir Harold both said that surprises sometimes cannot be avoided. The coup in Iraq had taken even Nuri Pasha by surprise.⁴ It is not reasonable to blame the West for not having uncovered in time the plot in Iraq.

Mr. Murphy asked if the French had in mind a sort of international military staff to prepare contingency plans for every eventuality in every country.

M. Alphand said that if he understood his instructions correctly this was the case.

Sir Harold, emphasizing that he was asking questions in order to explore and not making any commitments, repeated again his early question as to whether or not it would be better to start with an assessment of the more critical areas and problems to see what was being done and who was concerned. If Berlin is taken as such a problem, the three are not the only ones concerned.

Mr. Murphy said that he could not agree that the West had never taken the initiative. There had been the establishment of the German Federal Republic, the Marshall Plan, NATO itself (although this had admittedly been a reaction to the Prague coup), and the U.S. Military Aid Program.

Sir Harold then took the case of Iran, cited by General de Gaulle. He pointed out that there would have to be basic research into Iran’s problems, resources, and prospects. (M. Alphand agreed that the past would have to be considered.) Once this was done one would have to see if there were solutions and to whom they would be suggested.

Mr. Murphy recalled that the United States has a large aid program for Iran. (Sir Harold commented that the International Bank also assists.) Mr. Murphy continued that there is the matter of military aid to Iran which involves questions as to what forces Iran should have. Iran is a member of the Baghdad Pact where such matters are discussed in appropriate committees. The Pact itself seems to be the place to continue these discussions.

Mr. Caccia asked how country X would feel if it knew that the three had estimated that it was exposed to a Soviet threat and that the three were studying ways and means of keeping it propped up.

M. Alphand said that coordination of our actions will make it easier for others to come along. The country in question need not know what we were doing; in each case we would have to take the “way of thinking into account”.

Mr. Caccia said that this brings up the question of machinery and form of agreement.

M. Alphand replied that he could not respond to this. He had been asked to discuss the “two questions of principles”. The French want us to study these.

Mr. Caccia remarked that thus far we had only looked at the political and economic aspects of the two French “principles.” Could a look be taken at the second?

M. Alphand read again the second point. He said it provides for military planning in case of attack in one part or another of the world.

Mr. Caccia noted that the use of atomic weapons is a highly political question.

M. Alphand said he knows that it is a decision for the President to make with regard to use outside the NATO area. Within the area there are the rules of the Anglo-American agreement⁵ and NATO itself.

M. Alphand said that in the military field one must consider again what exists. There are plans for Europe but none for Africa and the Middle East where the threat exists. In case of war in Europe these areas would become theaters of operation. There is no coordination at present.

Mr. Caccia asked if these two were the primary areas in French eyes.

M. Alphand said this is his view.

Mr. Murphy said that it is natural to discuss all these matters bilaterally. He is puzzled as to why an organization or institutionalization is needed. It may be true that the three have great responsibilities; this is reflected in the association we have, as represented by the present meeting or the Bonn discussions. Why does it need a formalized institution?

M. Alphand said that it is General de Gaulle’s view that the three must coordinate their ideas before discussing them with others.

Mr. Murphy noted that we do get together to consult.

M. Alphand admitted this is true so far as Germany and disarmament are concerned. It doesn’t apply to all things. He said that he thought the US/UK reactions to the French proposals could be summarized in questions we had put to the French: First, would what already exists be dropped? The answer to this is “certainly not.” Second, would a catalog of what exists need to be drawn up? (Sir Harold interjected that there would have to be two catalogs: one of problems and a second of what is being done.) M. Alphand continued, saying that the third question concerned other countries; for example, Iran. If the three discussed it, how and when would Iran and the Baghdad Pact be brought in. (Sir Harold said he doubted if it would be helpful for Iran to learn that its problems had been discussed tripartitely.)

The fourth question, M. Alphand said, is whether the French proposals imply the establishment of an organization so large as to be impracticable and, if so, should there not be a priority list.

Sir Harold said that the problems mentioned in this meeting alone would entail a major operation. He would be unable to operate with his present staff and on the basis of such information as he receives.

Mr. Murphy agreed, stating that the French seem to be proposing a tripartite machinery roughly comparable to the policy-making machinery which already exists within the United States Government, that is to say a tripartite “inter-agency” machine.

Sir Harold said that this is why he believes that the question of machinery and agreement is important. The objective and the means to attain it must be studied at the same time.

M. Alphand reverted to his earlier arguments. If liaison between pacts is too “cumbersome” as Prime Minister Macmillan has said, is not coordination among the three much simpler?

Sir Harold said that the French proposal seems to be that the three should identify all the world’s problems be they military or economic. So having done, and plans drawn up how to meet these problems, then the three would consider how to bring in others, either individually or in groups.

As an example, said Mr. Murphy, we could take Japan with which the United States is negotiating a security treaty. If this were discussed tripartitely we would have to bring in the Japanese at some stage and other Asiatic countries as well. The South Koreans would be greatly interested.

To Sir Harold Caccia’s question as to whether General de Gaulle had a considerable and continuing operation in mind, M. Alphand replied affirmatively. In answer to Mr. Murphy’s questions, he said that he did not know whether General de Gaulle or Couve de Murville would raise the matter during the Paris meetings. He thought there might be some discussions and suggested that the Secretary be informed of the present meeting.

In reply to a question, M. Alphand said that his instructions were that the subject of the tripartite talks should not be raised in NAC.

Mr. Murphy said that someone, perhaps the Italians, might raise it anyway.

Mr. McBride commented that the problem did not seem a very pressing one and it might be possible to answer inquiries in a general way.

M. Alphand suggested that the three Permanent Representatives might get together and take a common line. It should be that the talks are “very exploratory” and that there is nothing of substance to report.

Mr. Murphy did not comment on this. Sir Harold Caccia said that the Canadians for one were likely to show great interest.

It was agreed that there should be nothing said to the press. The date of the next meeting was left open to be decided after M. Alphand’s return from Paris about the first of the year.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–1058. Secret. Drafted by Brown.
1. See Document 77.
2. The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in Southeast Asia, established by the United Kingdom in 1950, included Ceylon, India, Pakistan, and the British territories of Malaya and Borneo.
3. Reference is to the Export-Import Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
4. A military coup in Iraq on July 14, 1958, toppled the government of King Faisal and led to the deaths of members of the royal family and Premier Nuri Said.
5. For text of the atomic energy agreement for mutual defense purposes between the United States and the United Kingdom signed at Washington July 3, 1958, and entered into force August 4, 1958, see Department of State Bulletin, July 28, 1958, pp. 157–164.

6. In a December 10 memorandum to Dulles, Murphy reported that Alphand had no answers to the questions Hood and he had raised on December 4 but had instead two questions from de Gaulle. After stating the questions, Murphy wrote that the French aim, according to Alphand, was to establish permanent and organized agreement among the three powers. Murphy noted that as Alphand had no further instructions, “we essentially went over the same ground as we did last week.” Murphy concluded:

   “It is difficult to tell where we go next on this problem. It is evident that de Gaulle, by asking additional questions, is seeking our approval to the broad principle of advance consultation on a plane which would be almost all-inclusive before he will respond to our questions on how such an organization would function and how it could be made acceptable to other nations. Alphand told me that you will undoubtedly be seized of this matter in Paris, probably by both Couve de Murville and de Gaulle. There will be no further Washington meetings until Alphand returns around January 1 from Paris with answers to our questions.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/12–1058)