Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

77. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

December 4, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Tripartite Talks, December 4

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
• M. Charles Lucet, French Minister
• M. Jean de la Grandville, French Counselor
• Lord Hood, U.K. Chargé
• Mr. Charles Wiggin, First Secretary, UK Embassy
• Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
• Mr. B.E.L. Timmons, RA
• Mr. Robert McBride, WE
• Mr. Robert Donhauser, G
• Mr. L. Dean Brown, WE

After Mr. Murphy opened the meeting, Ambassador Alphand said that the French Government wanted the talks to be informal and exploratory. There were “no commitments”. This would permit free and frank discussion.

Mr. Murphy agreed and said he would like to raise three preliminary points. First, all three should stick to the supplementary press guidance.¹ (M. Alphand and Lord Hood confirmed this was acceptable to their governments.) Second, there was the problem of informing NATO. So far, he noted, this had gone smoothly² but he wondered how it should be handled in the future.

M. Alphand said that a decision on this matter could not be made until we had seen how the talks would go. As the French proposals do not directly concern NATO, the French would oppose informing the Council. If, however, substantive matters are discussed which are of interest to NATO, the same process as was earlier used could be employed again. The French Government wished to avoid NAC discussion of the talks as this could lead to grave difficulties.

Mr. Murphy reserved the U.S. position, stating that it would be necessary to say something to NATO soon.

Lord Hood said that we would have to be more forthcoming with NATO, especially if we had several meetings. He echoed Mr. Murphy’s observation that we would have to inform NATO soon. M. Alphand did not appear to relish the prospect. It was agreed that further discussion of this point would be deferred.

As a third point Mr. Murphy said he wanted to bring up the question of further meetings. He thought it possible to hold one more, perhaps on December 8 or 9, before the NATO Ministerial meeting.

M. Alphand thought there might be time for two meetings before his departure for Paris on December 12. He added that the three Foreign Ministers could pursue the discussions in Paris.

It was agreed that this suggestion would have to be considered further in light of progress made.

Mr. Murphy then offered the floor to M. Alphand.

The Ambassador said this was a delicate subject. The terms of reference of the tripartite group are those laid down in the jointly-agreed communiqué.³ The original memorandum must be studied. The “tripartite group” would then have to consider what recommendations it wishes to make to implement the ideas in the memorandum. Assistance of NATO and military experts might be needed.

The French aim, he said, is to reinforce and make more efficient the alliance. The General’s ideas are inspired by the fact that NATO no longer corresponds to the present day situation in the world. When NATO was created ten years ago as the result of the Prague coup, the Soviet threat was military and European. The threat still exists but has changed directions. It is, as M. Spaak has pointed out, global. It extends to political and economic fields. NATO has become “too narrow”. For example, it does not cover North Africa or the Middle East, yet these areas have become the southern flank for the defense of Europe. In time of war these areas would undoubtedly be areas of operation. There is the problem of Black Africa and Communist infiltration there. There are dangers in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Developments in all these areas affect the three. NATO is like the Maginot Line. It is admirable in its way but doesn’t cover the whole front. It can be outflanked by the Communist threat.

The second consideration, he continued, is the weapons field. There have been great changes therein in the past ten years. All areas are now targets. Long range missiles had made the NATO defense zone militarily meaningless. In 1949 the U.S. had had a monopoly of atomic weapons. Unfortunately (in the sense that the Soviets now have them), this is no longer true. Mr. Dulles had long ago recognized the limitations of NATO. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949, he had said that a shortcoming of NATO was the fact that it was not adapted to the scope of the situation.

Various remedies, Alphand continued, have been tried. Since the report of the three Wisemen⁴ we have expanded political consultation. This is insufficient, as Spaak himself recognized in his recent report.⁵ The French proposals are entirely different but do not mean that any reduction in this consultation is desired. The second remedy tried has been the creation of new pacts. These are useful but leave some danger areas uncovered. Coordination between pacts is lacking and suggested machinery to overcome this deficiency would be cumbersome. The French proposals are simple. They are designed to secure world-wide coordination. France, he said, attaches great importance to the outcome of the talks. The French proposals have two parts. The first is political and strategic. General de Gaulle proposes a U.S./U.K./French organization on this plane which will seek to arrive at common decisions on matters concerning world security. Why three countries? Because their interests are wider than those of the other 12 in NATO. The U.S. and U.K. are atomic powers; France will become one in a few months. Admittedly, the U.S. will remain the major nuclear power but France will possess great destructive capability. This organization would not be a “directorate” a term invented by the press. It could never be that. Instead it would be organized, regular and permanent consultation not just on urgent cases (he mentioned Lebanon, Jordan, Quemoy and Suez) but would also provide for long range planning so that there would be no surprises as the French had experienced in recent cases. Risks thus far taken have been too great not to have been preceded by such consultation. Consultation exists already for Germany and disarmament. This should be extended. Since the proposed organization is not a directorate, no veto by one of the others’ policies is involved. Decisions would not be imposed on fourth powers let alone on NATO, but prior agreement among the three would make the agreement of others easier to obtain. This, he noted, has been true in NATO. The French proposal, he repeated, is general consultation of the three, “outside NATO“, on all matters of importance in the world. NATO, of course, would be kept informed of matters which relate to it.

The second part of the proposal is purely military and “outside NATO.” There is no intention of extending the political guarantees of NATO to other countries. It is not likely that the Scandinavians would agree to this. Furthermore, areas which might naturally be covered (he cited Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) would probably not accept coverage. “Military dispositions” of NATO, however, should be re-organized to take into account other theaters of operation. As an example, thought has to be given to the coordination of African commands with European commands. There has to be blueprint planning of what to do in case of war contingencies or emergency situations in other areas. It was ridiculous that the Standing Group does not consider contiguous areas. Whether this requires a revision of the treaty is a matter for the experts to consider. The French hope their proposals can be carried out without treaty revision.

Mr. Murphy thanked the Ambassador for this clarification. He expressed misgivings at the thought of another institution being established as this could lead to doubt and suspicion among our allies. He asked if the process of day-to-day bilateral consultation could not serve the same purpose. He then emphasized his belief that Europeans tend to overlook the tremendous step taken by the United States in 1949 in ratifying NATO. Other NATO powers, he noted, also share the risks and responsibilities. Perhaps what is called for is an expansion of political consultation within NATO rather than a narrower three-power organization which is bound to cause doubts. While other NATO countries might agree with much of the French analysis, they might not necessarily agree to the suggested cure.

M. Alphand said that political consultation within NAC should be continued but it is insufficient. Additionally, the three powers should go into the Council with common views and not have surprises.

Mr. Murphy commented that the speed of events sometimes makes full prior consultation impracticable.

Lord Hood said that General de Gaulle has put his finger on the problem of the new direction of the threat, a subject which has been of concern to the U.K. for some time. The question is what remedy should be sought. France has proposed its idea of a remedy. The clarification which Ambassador Alphand has provided is helpful. He has said, continued Lord Hood, that there is to be no directorate, that there is no idea of imposing decisions on others, and that there will be no veto. Lord Hood then asked if the French proposal is basically organized and regular consultation.

M. Alphand agreed, adding that the aim of this consultation is to establish common positions and agree on common action.

Lord Hood stated that this poses problems. The Italians and Germans believe they are of comparable stature. The smaller countries will think the three are trying to impose decisions on them. As for the U.K., it has its special relationship with the Commonwealth to consider, and there is indeed the problem of most of the free world, committed or uncommitted.

Lord Hood expressed his belief that if anything were to be undertaken in this field it would have to be kept most informal and institutionalization avoided. He asked if the French had specific proposals as regards machinery.

M. Alphand replied that General de Gaulle has not been specific on this point. As a personal view he said that he believed that the organization should logically be set up in Washington, where the Standing Group and the Military Planners (possibly he meant the Military Committee) are. The talks could be conducted by the Ambassadors and the representative of the Secretary of State with the help of the highest representatives of the military available, e.g. the Standing Group acting in national capacities. This would give the Standing Group people a new hat as advisers. They would concern themselves with the second part (military) of the French proposal in a non-political and purely military context.

Lord Hood asked if a secretariat or staff would be needed. M. Alphand said this did not seem necessary but would really depend on how the organization developed. Lord Hood asked if it would have a name.

M. Alphand said that he did not think this necessary. He repeated that he visualized a system of organized consultation with a regular schedule.

Mr. Murphy asked if the French Government had a written agreement in mind.

M. Alphand said that an exchange of letters might be required.

Mr. Murphy asked if we could consider the past to see how consultation might work. He suggested we consider how we would have handled the Formosa or the Lebanon matter; as these are mentioned in the French memorandum.

M. Alphand digressed to state that in consultation there would have to be a study of all areas, from the economic, political and military view.

Lord Hood commented and Mr. Murphy agreed in terms of volume and scope of work this would be a very large undertaking.

M. Alphand said he could foresee consultation taking place on a series of levels and in other capitals: heads of government, foreign ministers, experts.

M. Alphand here asked to go off the record in order to give some completely personal views. He said that he thought General de Gaulle had very much in mind the wartime relationship of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin from which the General had been excluded. The three leaders had consulted and planned on a world-wide basis. General de Gaulle wants a similar relationship with the President and Prime Minister Macmillan with Khrushchev excluded. It is this thought which seems to constitute the inspiration for the present proposals which are very personal to de Gaulle.

Lord Hood said that wartime conditions are necessarily different. The idea of regular tripartite meetings on all levels in peacetime would be most difficult. He then asked if it were the Russian threat these proposals were aimed at or whether, for example, they included political development in Africa.

M. Alphand said that the proposals are directed towards meeting the Soviet threat. He noted that this threat and emerging nations often mingle and the whole matter would need study.

At Mr. Murphy’s suggestion he then reviewed the history of de Gaulle’s proposals. These go back to conversation the General had had with Prime Minister Macmillan and Secretary Dulles. He had promised each one that he would submit his thoughts in writing. This had been done. These were shown to Spaak on a private basis. Unfortunately, they were leaked. The French gave the papers to the Italians and Germans in Paris. De Gaulle saw Adenauer. Couve de Murville had discussed the subject with Lloyd. Joxe had seen Fanfani. Alphand has talked with the Secretary several times. Courcel had discussed the proposals with all the NAC Permanent Representatives in Paris.

Mr. Murphy commented that all these conversations implied that other countries had a legitimate interest in the tripartite talks. One result had been that the impression was left that the talks would have an effect on NATO. He then reverted to the wartime relationship of the three leaders, noting that it had developed in a natural way. At that time, it had not been deliberately brought to the attention of other countries, which does not seem to be the case in the present situation. He questioned whether the injection of the question into NATO was wise.

Lord Hood said that we must be careful not to give the impression that we are trying to fix things up behind the backs of others. Because of the need to avoid so doing, the U.K. Government tends to oppose any formalization or institutionalization of consultation.

Ambassador Alphand said this is probably due to the fact that the English have no written constitution. The French tend to be more legalistic. He could not say what form the organization should take or how it would be established, perhaps by formal written agreement, perhaps by an exchange of letters, or even perhaps by an oral understanding.

Mr. Murphy drew attention to the General’s references to the Middle East and Formosa in the memorandum. He asked how things would have been different if tripartite “agreement” had existed.

M. Alphand said that in the case of Formosa the United States had primary responsibility. The French Government had been unable to express its views as to the possible effect elsewhere of actions taken or contemplated in the Far East. Tripartite consultation would have provided the opportunity.

Lord Hood questioned this, pointing out that the French Government had been at perfect liberty to make known its views through the usual diplomatic channels as indeed the U.K. Government had done.

Mr. Murphy said that the door was always open and he could not understand what prevented the French from discussing such matters bilaterally.

M. Alphand said that the French proposals are not solely concerned with discussing matters on a “crash basis.” They were also looking towards establishment of common views in advance.

Mr. Murphy said that this would imply detailed planning covering every area and every eventuality.

M. Alphand replied affirmatively, adding that one would have to start with obvious threats in obvious areas.

Mr. Murphy asked if, for example, the group would try to make intensive studies and have contingency plans for each country in the Middle East as well as area plans and studies.

M. Alphand said that this is what the French have in mind.

Mr. Murphy said that something more than consultation is clearly involved. The French Government is attempting to set up common policies and common programs of action. It would involve basic strategic planning. It went far beyond the concept of informal consultation. It would call for a large organization with a large staff.

Lord Hood said that the French seem to want military planning which was beyond his competence to discuss. He expressed the hope that there is no intention of tinkering with the text of the North Atlantic treaty. He asked if M. Alphand could elucidate.

M. Alphand said that military planning is definitely a part of the French proposals. For example, the military planning for the defense of Europe should be coordinated with that for the Middle East and for North Africa.

Lord Hood said that in reaching remedies for the problems of the Western alliance, the French Government seems to be discarding not only the report of the Wisemen but also other regional organizations. He asked why the military planners of these groups could not work together.

M. Alphand said it would be much simpler for the three to study such matters and that Mr. Macmillan himself had said the existing organizations were “too cumbersome.”

Reverting to the Lebanon case, Mr. Murphy noted this had happened swiftly.

Lord Hood noted that difficulties which had arisen in the Lebanon crisis did not come from inadequate consultations. There had been a basic difference on policy on this issue with France.

Mr. Murphy asked what procedures the French had in mind if the three discussed matters which concerned other countries; how would they be informed; would there be a tripartite approach to them.

M. Alphand said that first a tripartite approach would have to be established. It could then be tried out on the others.

Mr. Murphy then referred to the text of the de Gaulle memorandum and expressed his apprehensions at the use of the word “subordinate” in Point Three. He asked if this meant that France would not cooperate in certain defense programs presently before NATO. Air defense and the atomic stockpile were cited as examples.

(The discussion became confused at this moment with M. Alphand making a series of statements, some actually contradictory.) M. Alphand said that the French Government believes it absolutely necessary to “organize cooperation.” If this is not possible France would want to freeze things as they are, as NATO is no longer adapted to the present situation.

M. Alphand admitted that he did not know how revision of NATO could be achieved. But if France can’t get the tripartite consultation it seeks and NATO remains unchanged, then France has no interest in NATO in its present form. In short, France has to reserve its right to “denounce” NATO or seek a revision of the treaty.

Lord Hood said that it surely could not be the French intention to destroy NATO.

Mr. Murphy said that the French would not want to paralyze NATO or reduce its effectiveness. He said that he did not understand how this French position on subordination and revision related to tripartite consultation. Lord Hood and he agreed that the French seem to be confusing two completely separate issues.

Ambassador Alphand started to retreat. He said the French do not propose to take no active role in NATO. Essentially the French reserve their position on their right to seek revision of the treaty pending these consultations. If it should turn out that a tripartite group cannot be established without revision (so as to take care of theaters of operation, etc.) then it might be necessary to revise NATO. The French intention, he stressed, is to reinforce the defense of the West. NATO seems to be inadequate for this aim. If it can be achieved without revision, fine; if not then revision is necessary.

Mr. Murphy said that NATO is a regional grouping as contemplated by Article 52 of the U.N. [Charter].⁶ It is not intended to be a universal organization.

Ambassador Alphand argued that experts might discover that we could not coordinate NATO and North Africa militarily without changing the treaty.

Lord Hood said tentatively that it might be possible to implement the second part of the General’s proposal without treaty revision. He wondered if the French were thinking in terms of establishing joint command structures outside the NATO area, as, for example, in North Africa, for planning in case of war. (M. Alphand did not comment on this.)

Mr. Murphy noted the risks we run in letting the NATO treaty be opened to revision. The Soviets have long aimed at breaking up NATO. We should not give them opportunities.

Mr. Murphy then pointed out that there are some fears that certain NATO defense programs are being held up. General Norstad seemed to be worried by this. The LOC had just been settled, however, and he felt sure no “freeze” existed. There are the problems of the atomic stockpile and air defense. There was no reason to be suspicious but he wanted to draw these matters to M. Alphand’s attention.

M. Alphand said that there is no connection between these matters and the de Gaulle proposals. While he was not informed in detail.on them, he felt sure that they are military problems which can be treated on their merits. If there is uneasiness, he added, it should be expressed by the State Department in Paris.

Lord Hood summed up by saying that he was sure that the U.K. Government would feel that it was being asked to enter a “vast enterprise.” London would not be antagonistic to the development of tripartite consultation but would want to see a pragmatic approach, discussing appropriate subjects ad hoc. While the discussion had clarified some points, it would be helpful if the French could define more precisely the fields where they want to see a start made.

M. Alphand said that he would seek further instructions. As de Gaulle is handling the matter personally, he might be unable to get any reaction until after the General had returned from his Algeria visit on December 8.⁷

It was agreed that another meeting would be held before M. Alphand’s departure for Paris next week if French reactions are available before he leaves.

0. Source: Department of State, WE Files: Lot 72 D 441, de Gaulle Memos, Nov. 1–Dec. 31, 1958. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brown. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 2041 to Paris, December 4. (Ibid., Central Files, 740.5/12–458)
1. A copy of the press guidance that provided statements to be used by press spokesmen in answer to possible questions about the tripartite talks is attached to the December 2 memorandum from Merchant to Murphy. (Ibid., WE Files: Lot 72 D 441, de Gaulle Memos, Nov. 1–Dec. 31, 1958)
2. On December 1, the Italian and German Embassies were informed of the plan to have these talks. On December 2, the matter was discussed with Spaak, and on December 3, the three Permanent Representatives informed the other twelve on an individual basis. (Memorandum from Merchant to Dulles, December 3; ibid.) The French Government agreed to this method of informing the members of the NAC 24 hours before the tripartite talks, a proposal made by Merchant. (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Merchant and Alphand, November 27; ibid., Central Files, 740.5/11–2758)
3. See footnote 3, Document 70.
4. For text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO released by NATO on December 14, 1956, see Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1957, pp. 17–28.
5. Reference is to Spaak’s Report on Political Consultation, which was discussed at the NAC meeting on December 17. See Part 1, Documents 169 and 170. No copy of the report has been found.
6. Article 52 of the U.N. Charter states that nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements for dealing with the maintenance of international peace, provided such arrangements and their activities are consistent with the purpose of the United Nations.
7. De Gaulle visited Algeria December 3–7.