Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

334. Memorandum of Discussion at the 461st Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

September 29, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–4.]

5. U.S. Policy Toward Spain (NSC 5710/1; NSC 5911/1, paragraph 37; NSC Action No 2215–c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 17, 1960; NSC 6016; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 28, 1960)¹

Mr. Gray presented to the Council the draft statement of U.S. Policy Toward Spain contained in NSC 6016. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this memorandum.)²

In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray referred to the split in Paragraph 23–c.³ The majority of the Planning Board favors a provision that the U.S. will take discreet advantage of such opportunities as may present themselves to encourage democratic evolution in Spain; while the Defense member of the Planning Board wishes, as feasible and without appearing to interfere in Spanish internal affairs, to encourage the Franco regime to undertake steps toward democratic evolution in Spain.

Secretary Gates said the Department of Defense felt that the U.S. would be in a stronger position for the future in Spain if it had a plan of working for the evolution of democratic processes in the country rather than merely giving lip service to democracy by “taking discreet advantage of opportunities that may present themselves.”

The President expressed concern with respect to Paragraph 23–c. He said it appeared to allow U.S. officials in Spain to encourage the Spanish intelligentsia, academic personnel, and so on to work for an evolution of Spanish government in the direction of democracy. However, such efforts might come to take on the character of revolutionary efforts. The President said he of course favored democratic processes but he was rather reluctant to authorize our officials in Spain to work toward this end.

Secretary Dillon said he was skeptical that, in the present situation in Spain, anything worthwhile could be done to advance the cause of democracy. Such democratic forces as exist in Spain are split into many factions. Before Franco’s access to power, there were, for example eighteen political parties in the Cortes. Any rapid movement toward democracy in Spain appeared to Secretary Dillon to be out of the question at this time. In fact, such a movement might lead to a Communist takeover of the country. The Department of State would not object to deleting both versions of Paragraph 23–c from the paper. State had accepted the majority version of the paragraph because it was in accordance with our overall policy. However, the majority version had the defect of including the phrase “without prejudice to the attainment of the primary U.S. objectives in Spain.” Since the primary U.S. objective was stated in Paragraph 12 to be access to military facilities in Spain, nothing could really be accomplished under Paragraph 23–c. Mr. Dillon also thought that the Defense version of Paragraph 23–c presented certain difficulties. The Defense proposal spoke of encouraging the Franco regime to undertake the steps toward democratic evolution. In Mr. Dillon’s view there is no Franco regime in Spain; there is only Franco himself. If we desire to encourage democratic steps in Spain, we will be obliged to talk with Franco personally. Mr. Dillon felt this would be a very counter-productive exercise.

Secretary Gates said that the Department of Defense in suggesting its version of Paragraph 23–c had only been endeavoring to do some advance planning. The situation in Spain might change at any time and it might be desirable for the U.S. to undertake some planning steps in anticipation of changes in the situation.

Secretary Dillon said that Paragraph 24 dealt with the problem to which Secretary Gates was alluding, that is, the succession process in Spain.⁴ Our Embassy in Spain, on being asked to comment on Paragraph 23–c, had stated the belief that both versions of the paragraph were unrealistic but that the majority version was the least unrealistic.

Governor Hoegh⁵ felt that the U.S. must of necessity deal with the dominant faction among the democratic elements if it wished to encourage democracy in Spain. The U.S. could not deal with intangible elements in Spain. Secretary Dillon said the U.S. had no intention of talking to professors alone in any attempt to encourage democracy in Spain.

Mr. Gray wondered whether the real questions for decision in connection with this sub-paragraph were not (1) whether we should attempt to encourage democracy in Spain by dealing directly with Franco and (2) whether the paper should contain a basis for planning for future contingencies in Spain.

The President suggested that both versions of Paragraph 23–c be deleted and that Paragraph 24 contain an expression of our hope that after the succession process takes place, Spain will have a more democratic government.⁶ [2 lines of source text not declassified] However, in a stable country which did not adopt Khrushchev as its god, he thought it was perhaps the course of wisdom to let the situation alone. Paragraph 24 might refer to our hope that the succession process will evolve toward democracy in Spain.

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President recalled that during his conversation with Franco on his trip to Spain⁷ he had told Franco that a great many Baptists in the U.S. were pressing him to request Franco to allow them to open a church in Spain. The President said he told Franco we had a great many Baptists in the U.S. but Franco replied that 98 per cent of the population in Spain was Catholic and had added, “Let’s be reasonable.”

Mr. Gray resumed his briefing. After Mr. Gray referred to the military paragraphs and the Financial Appendix to NSC 6016, Secretary Gates commented that we had plans to equip two Spanish infantry divisions and one or two mountain divisions and to effect some modernization of the Spanish army. Secretary Gates thought it would be necessary for us to continue our military program in Spain indefinitely.

In response to a question from Mr. Gray, General Twining said that the Spanish army was a well-disciplined force but had no capability for effective military operations outside Spain.

After Mr. Gray concluded his briefing and had referred to the estimate that discussions would probably start in 1962 for extension of the base rights agreement, Secretary Gates commented that in these discussions, we would probably find that we would have to pay for the bases again.

Secretary Dillon reported that the Spanish stabilization program had been an outstanding success. Spain had built up its reserves from practically zero to $500 million in the course of a year, the greatest reserve Spain had held since the civil war. Spanish economic activity was picking up. Spain needed no grant assistance except the assistance given in connection with the bases. However, each year Congress requires the Administration to provide Spain with more grant assistance than the Administration feels is necessary. This year the Administration asked for $25 million for assistance to Spain and Congress said that $35 million should be provided. Next year the Administration will probably suggest $15 million and Congress will probably increase that amount to $25 million.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6016; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 28, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6016, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 11, subparagraph 23–c: Delete both versions of this subparagraph.

(2) Page 11, paragraph 24: Revise to read as follows:

“24. Encourage discreetly the establishment of a practical and acceptable succession in Spain which would:

• “a. Assist in maintaining internal stability.
• “b. Avoid a post-Franco crisis which might jeopardize our access to military facilities and the achievement of related U.S. objectives.
• “c. Hopefully evolve toward more democratic processes in Spain.”

Note: NSC 6016, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the president; circulated as NSC 6016/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies; and referred to the OCB as the coordinating agency.

[Here follow agenda items 6 and 7.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.
1. NSC 5710/1, May 14, 1957, was not declassified. NSC 5911/1, November 4, 1959, “Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria,” is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 615–625. NSC Action No. 2215–c directed that President Eisenhower wanted NSC papers brought up to date for the next administration. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The June 17 memorandum, which circulated NSC Action No. 2215–c, has not been found in Department of State files. NSC 6016 is not printed, but NSC 6016/1 is printed as Document 335. The September 28 memorandum transmitted a three-point memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense supporting the majority position on paragraph 23–c. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6016 Series)
2. Not printed. The briefing note reviewed the development of NSC 6016 and explained the difference between the minority and majority positions on paragraph 23–c.

3. The majority version of paragraph 23–c of NSC 6016 reads:

   “As feasible, and without prejudice to the attainment of the primary U.S. objective in Spain (par. 12), take discreet advantage of such opportunities as may present themselves to encourage democratic evolution in Spain, both in the interest of continued internal stability and Spain’s international influence and prestige.”

   The Defense version reads:

   “As feasible and in a manner designed to preclude the appearance or interpretation of improper interference in the internal affairs of Spain, encourage the Franco regime to undertake steps toward democratic evolution in Spain, seeking to impress upon the regime that such steps are desirable interest of Spain’s international influence and prestige.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 6016 Series)

4. See Document 333.
5. Leo A. Hoegh, former Governor of Iowa and Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

6. Paragraph 24 of NSC 6016 reads:

   “Encourage discreetly the establishment of a practical and acceptable succession process in Spain to assist in maintaining internal stability and in avoiding a post-Franco crisis which might jeopardize our access to military facilities and the achievement of related U.S. objectives.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D1, NSC 6016 Series)

7. See Document 318.
8. Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2312, approved by the President on October 5. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)