Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State⁰

Madrid, September 28, 1960, 9 a.m.

333. Deptel 263.¹NSC policy paper alternative proposals seem out of touch with present day realities.

In minds of many Spaniards nowadays, in and out of regime, democracy as we know it is on trial. While Spaniards realize that Western ideas of democracy work well for instance in US, UK and Scandinavia, they see few other places where it is functioning successfully and somewhere it has lately been abandoned (e.g., Pakistan) for authoritarian regimes. Lack of stability in Africa and Latin America, spectacular achievements scientific and otherwise of USSR, trend towards one-man rule in France, further reinforce thinking here, if not in favor of authoritarianism at least in doubt about experimenting with Western democracy in Spain at this critical juncture in world affairs. Moreover, Spaniards, like many other people, have different ideas as to what “democracy” means.

There are of course many abuses under present regime. These however, it is pointed out, existed long before Franco and are unlikely to disappear suddenly with change of regime. As Woodrow Wilson said: “You cannot in human experience rush into the light”. Many Spaniards, including some of Franco’s own supporters hope for liberalization of present regime in many ways and disapprove of much that has been going on. Some want more freedom to form public opinion (although few advocate “freedom of press” in our sense or term; majority of Spaniards in and out of regime regard many free press attacks on Franco as irresponsible and unfair); some want more freedom to elect representatives to Cortes (although not so many advocate return to pre-Civil War multiple party system which saw 18 parties in 1936 Cortes); many want higher wages, better living conditions, extension of social security benefits, but through institutions adapted to Spanish not US needs. Many Spaniards are tired of Franco but many, even of these, doubt feasibility of change at present. Many ardent monarchists and liberals though un-enthusiastic about regime see no constructive alternative and hope Franco lasts a long time.

Spanish politics are unfortunately still split up among many irreconcilable groups. Basque and Catalan nationalists (themselves divided between leftists and rightists); socialists, some of whom follow Nenni, others British Labor Party (itself badly divided) in addition to socialist exiles still fighting civil war; “Christian democrats” some of whom collaborate with Franco and some who don’t; monarchists, some of whom are liberal and others extremely conservative; et cetera. Judging by Spain’s bloody experiences of the recent past and by the present Spanish temper, attempts at this time to install democracy in Spain would run grave risks of opening Pandora’s Box with chaotic results which would give Communists long sought-for opportunity.

Communism has demonstrated in Cuba within less than two years of Castro’s accession ease with which it can inject itself into disordered situation and it could similarly easily exploit present hatreds here and, by judicious use of Communist tactics infiltrate infant Spanish democracy.

In our view alternative (1) is quite unthinkable and if raised with Franco would be fiercely resented. Operative words in alternative (2) appear to be “without prejudice to the attainment of primary US objective in Spain”. We have for years been taking and expect to continue to take “discreet advantage of such opportunities as may present themselves to encourage” with influential groups and individuals more representative forms and institutions. On many occasions I have personally pointed out to the Foreign Minister and other top officials that certain moves would be helpful with US opinion. As far as “internal stability” is concerned, GOS quite naturally is alert.

Accordingly, it is recommended that best policy for US to follow is:

(1) Continue including Spain more and more in Western family (including NATO), thus exposing the Spaniards increasingly to influences which it is widely conceded are beginning bring about gradual liberalization of regime along Western patterns;

(2) Help to raise living standards and improve economic health and outlook of country and especially continue to press for further economic liberalization, so that in long run extremist elements of both left and right will be weakened and moderates in and out of government can build for orderly transition after Franco toward a stable more representative form of government still friendly to the US;

(3) Encourage certain steps towards other liberalization for example to permit emergence of responsible loyal opposition which would prepare Spanish people better for what follows Franco;

(4) Raise with Foreign Minister if and when appropriate occasion arises question of arrangements for orderly practical and acceptable succession.

It should also be borne in mind, as far as US objectives in Spain are concerned, that our relations with Franco’s government are excellent, that there is no guarantee or likelihood that Spanish-US relations would be improved by a successor government no matter how liberal it might be; and finally, that it would seem most unwise to interfere in the manner suggested in alternative (1) in the internal affairs of a country from the government of which we have been obtaining wholehearted cooperation at the UN and in many other places and from which we shall in the near future probably desire further important base concessions.

Lodge

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/9–2860. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
1. Telegram 263 to Madrid, September 20, transmitted the texts of alternative language for paragraphs 23–c and 24 of NSC 6016. (Ibid., 611.00/9–2060) See footnotes 3 and 6, Document 334. NSC 6016/1 is printed as Document 335.