Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

250. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

PSV/MC/10

October 1, 1959.

SEGNI VISIT

SUBJECT

• Berlin

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 248.]

The Prime Minister said that the President yesterday had made some very important statements regarding Berlin and he would like to ask for certain additional details regarding the U.S. position. He noted that the Berlin situation had repercussions on the German situation as a whole and throughout all Europe. Segni noted that NATO commitments in connection with the Berlin situation had been made in April 1959¹ when it was agreed at the NATO meeting in Washington that occupation troops should be retained in Berlin. In December 1957 NATO had stated that an attack on the occupation forces in Berlin would be considered as an attack on NATO as a whole.² Therefore he concluded that occupation forces could not be withdrawn from Berlin without NATO approval. Thus, he assumed that any developments along this line would be discussed in the NATO Council before any action was taken.

The Secretary said that the President yesterday had been talking in terms of the rather distant future. There would not be any quick changes in policy. We visualized that any negotiations involving Berlin would take a considerable time and would meet the criteria of the communiqué issued following the Khrushchev talks. That is, that any solution must be acceptable to all parties. In this context we had in mind not only the West Germans and the West Berliners, but also NATO as a whole, and, for that matter, the satellite countries, while obviously the Soviet Union and the other occupying powers must also accept the solution. The Secretary did not think that we could achieve any agreement acceptable to all concerned in a brief period. The President yesterday had merely intended to point out that the occupation regime should not be continued indefinitely. We certainly did not mean to give up any of our occupation rights unless a permanent solution were agreed to.

The Secretary continued, stating that the three Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva had stated that the Berlin situation was an abnormal one so the President’s recent remark to this effect was not breaking new ground on this subject. He noted that Chancellor Adenauer likewise agreed with this estimate. The Secretary said we agreed with the Italian analysis as to the nature of NATO guarantees for the Berlin situation. He agreed that it was important we attempt to give to Berlin greater security than that arising from the wartime four-power obligations. He said that no agreements had been reached with Khrushchev as to when negotiations would begin again on Berlin. Segni said that the President had spoken yesterday with regard to the possibility of a Soviet-East German peace treaty, which we could not prevent, and following which the East Germans would be able to block the access routes to Berlin by a series of unilateral actions. He wondered if this would not constitute aggression and expressed the view that perhaps the Soviets and East Germans would resort to such measures. The Secretary pointed out that the President had stated his belief also that we could not prevent the Soviets from signing an agreement with the East Germans but that we would consider any transfer of Soviet obligations to East Germany as a result thereof as invalid.

Straneo said that the point was that the Soviets would not force the issue in Berlin if they knew it meant war. The Secretary agreed that any unilateral action in the Berlin situation was dangerous and that a transfer of Soviet rights to East Germany would appear to violate the agreement on continuing negotiations. He noted that the Soviet commitments to East Germany were embodied in the Zorin–Bolz exchange of letters.

Segni said that he agreed with the President that the Soviet Union does not want to risk war to achieve a limited objective. He said that the Soviets appeared to be looking around for credits now and have even asked for credits from Italy. He took this to indicate their peaceful intentions. The Secretary said that the President had felt that Khrushchev’s desire to avoid war was sincere. Segni agreed with this and said that this was the deduction of Italians who had visited the Soviet Union. He thought that the Soviets wished to concentrate on the production of consumer goods and wished to raise the standard of living. Segni added that in order to maintain power Khrushchev wished to avoid war. He said he thought that in this situation it was extremely important to maintain the NATO guarantees on Berlin and to retain occupation troops in that city. If we appeared ready to cede we will merely invite greater Soviet pressure. He thought that the firm attitude of NATO to date had been useful and might eventually constitute sufficient pressure on the Soviets to lead to a more flexible position on their part.

Segni said that it was difficult to maintain the status quo in Berlin but that it was dangerous to change it. He knew that our proposal of an all-Berlin free city had been rejected by the Soviets. The Secretary noted that we had tried this in Geneva but the Soviets had said that it was not even negotiable. Segni repeated that if there were no new agreement on Berlin it was important to keep the status quo in the city. The Secretary agreed. Segni noted that NATO was committed to defend this status quo.

The Secretary said that we had at one time discussed an interim agreement on Berlin but that this had proved unfeasible since it was unclear where we would be at the end of such a negotiation. Segni said he thought that the status quo was preferable to an interim agreement with an unknown conclusion. Therefore he agreed that we should maintain the present situation until an agreement was reached in which all concerned would concur. He thought a temporary agreement would be worse than the present situation. The Secretary noted that, originally we had thought of the interim agreement as an arrangement to bide time, but that now the Soviets had lifted the time limit, we have additional time.

With regard to German reunification, Segni said that the Soviet Union certainly does not wish this now but that it might arise far in the future. He inquired what the Secretary’s view was on this situation.

The Secretary said that the Soviets paid lip service to the concept of German reunification and then imposed unacceptable conditions stating that only East German-West German negotiations could work out a satisfactory solution. He noted there was not even any existing mechanism for the West Germans to undertake direct discussions with the Soviet-controlled East German regime. The Secretary added that at Geneva we had thought of inviting Germans to discuss these problems through the four powers but the Soviets had refused this formula. The Secretary and Segni had concluded that the Soviets do not wish reunification and that there are elements in other countries also opposing reunification. Segni concluded on this subject that the division of Germany, nevertheless, remained a focus of danger of war and that Italy, being close to the situation, remained concerned.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1490. Secret. Drafted by McBride and approved in S on October 14. See also Documents 248–249 and 251.
1. See Part 1, Documents 208 ff.
2. Apparently a reference to the December 16, 1957, NATO statement on Berlin. Text is in Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 367.