17. Editorial Note

At the 368th Meeting of the National Security Council on June 3, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed France during his briefing on significant world developments. That portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason reads:

“The Director of Central Intelligence observed that the first chapter in the saga of General de Gaulle had ended last night with the grant to [Page 25] [him of full powers by the Chamber of Deputies. Ever since the crisis had started by the insurrection in Algiers, the General had played his hand skillfully and with very little by way of histrionics. There was no evidence to suggest that General de Gaulle had had any advance knowledge of the Army’s actions in Algiers or had played any part in it. We felt that our people in Algiers were very well informed on this subject. On the other hand, General de Gaulle had neither ever condemned or adopted the platform of the Algerian insurrectionists. There was every reason to believe that the French Army authorities in Algiers were ready to send paratroops to Paris if the investiture of General de Gaulle had been blocked.

“Much as he has always professed to despise the maneuverings of French political parties, De Gaulle had inevitably found himself involved in such maneuvers just as soon as he started on the task of forming a government. The government he did form had come as a surprise to almost all Frenchmen and as a shock to his old followers as well as to the Algerian leaders. But since General de Gaulle had indicated that he would only come to power in accordance with legal procedures, he had found himself obliged to seek the support of various political parties, particularly the Socialists. The French Socialist leader, Guy Mollet, had for some time been quite close to de Gaulle, and had worked very hard for his investiture. Even so, he had only been able to obtain 42 Socialist votes out of a total of 101 in the Chamber for de Gaulle’s investiture.

“While De Gaulle had been obliged to make certain concessions to his opponents, he was adamant on his demand for six months of full decree power, as well as on his mandate to revise the Constitution without benefit of the Assembly’s help but to be submitted to a popular referendum. He had won out on these two vital planks in his platform.

The Cabinet contained only two Gaullists, although there were others who had been leaders in the original French Resistance movement. The acceptance of Pflimlin into the Cabinet had proved a bitter pill for the Army and civilian leaders in Algiers.

“In concluding his remarks on this subject, Mr. Dulles stated his belief that if all went well with General de Gaulle, there was more hope for the future of France than had been visible for a long time. The President expressed agreement with this judgment.

“Secretary Anderson warned the Council that this Government must consider very carefully what we are prepared to do to assist France in its present financial crisis. As soon as De Gaulle had taken over, the position of the French franc on the black market had notably improved, Nevertheless, the long-term French financial outlook was still very serious, and Secretary Anderson prophesied that the French Government would not be able to meet its next balance of payments. Under the circumstances, the French were likely to find themselves obliged to postpone plans for implementing the Common Market. Accordingly, the problem was something more than merely financial.

“Mr. Dulles commented that the seriousness of the French financial situation might explain why De Gaulle had appointed Pinay, a Conservative, to the Ministry of Finance.

“The President inquired as to whether the French Government was trying to do anything to prevent the flight of capital from France. Secretary Anderson explained that while there were laws designed to prevent the flight of capital, they had not proved very effective in the past. [Page 26] Indeed, $100 million had gone out of France during the recent crisis. It was accordingly quite certain that the French would presently seek financial assistance from the United States. To make matters worse, the Treasury estimated that there was something between $3.5 and $4 billion worth of gold hidden in France. If the French could succeed in surfacing this hidden gold, the position of France’s reserves would be better even than that of the Federal Republic of Germany. General Cutler asked whether it would not be desirable for the Council to request a report by the Secretaries of State and the Treasury in a couple of weeks with respect to U.S. policy regarding the French financial position. The President thought that such a formal report to the Council was not necessary, although he and Secretary Anderson emphasized the need for keeping the situation under continuous review.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)