16. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 0
5673. Silence of General De Gaulle over past few years plus contradictory and doubtful reliability of numerous self-appointed spokesmen for the General make it particularly difficult estimate in advance character of his regime and policies he will follow. However, several things can perhaps be said with some degree of confidence.
First, the General’s advent to power came surrounded by mixture of popular feelings: relief, hope and resignation. France is still divided and as shouts of “De Gaulle to the Museum” at Place de la Republique one day and “De Gaulle to power” at Etoile the next illustrate, there is no mighty wave of enthusiasm for de Gaulle. However, general contempt, distrust and boredom at endless maneuvering of Assembly make Gaullists out of many French and those who yesterday despised the General today proclaim themselves his staunch supporters and want to see his policies succeed. This state of mind is also appreciably affected by the rise in French prestige accomplished by the “men of Algiers”—the General’s and the Army—and association of this prestige with the name de Gaulle.
Thus high expectations of accomplishment by De Gaulle have been created. Freed of impediments of tangled parliamentary debate and obstruction, the General is now expected to solve quickly such problems as Algeria and constitutional reform.
If De Gaulle goes to Algiers, we imagine he will receive a hero’s reception and in the enthusiasm of the moment may be able to work a miracle. It will however not be easy. As difficulties emerge of reconciling federal system which General presumably supports with [Page 24] integration preached by Soustelle, Moselm disillusionment and discontent may appear. Already there are indications ultras may not be entirely pleased with anticipated actions of General whom they have so loudly proclaimed. At same time if De Gaulle pursues sensible policy toward Tunisia and Morocco, pushing through negotiations on troop withdrawal and other problems, and make consistent effort win over Mohammed and Bourguiba, Algerian solution may be thereby encouraged.
We have been assured from so many sources that De Gaulle will continue policy of supporting NATO and Europe that we may conclude this is true. Nevertheless the General’s character suggests that problems will increase and it is doubtful how well the General grasps and will comprehend complexity of military and political relationships which have grown up since he retired from the political scene. We may expect difficulties here, but there is some evidence that with passing years he has mellowed and may take in his stride things which in the past might have created troubles between us.
Obviously much will depend on the men who will surround the General, and on the influence they are able to exert.
In conclusion, the interests of the United States will be served by de Gaulle’s success. His failure could well bring on crisis even more serious than present one, since there is no one else waiting in the wings. Communists, some of whom hint France is not yet ripe for the popular front, may well believe it ripe after a De Gaulle failure. There will be many non-Communists who unwittingly or even knowingly will work in the direction of a popular front. Then the institutions of the Atlantic community and of Europe will in truth be in danger.
Our interests will be served through development best relations possible with De Gaulle and those who will be his closest collaborators. It is a time when, if ever, our influence and prestige should be brought to bear.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/6–158. Secret. Repeated to London, Rome, Tunis, Algiers, and Rabat.↩