Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

163. Despatch From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

No. 1603

Paris, April 14, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Meeting AEC Chairman McCone with French Atomic Energy Officials, April 11, 1960¹

On April 11 at 10:45 a.m. at the Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique, Chairman McCone of the Atomic Energy Commission, accompanied by Dr. Johnson, Chairman of the AEC Scientific Advisory Committee, and Messrs. Wells (AEC), Stabler (AEC), Rouleau (AEC, Paris), and the reporting officer met with MM. Perrin, Goldschmidt, Renou and Falquet of the Commissariat. M. Couture participated in the second half of the meeting.

After a few words of welcome, M. Perrin explained that the Commissariat would soon need at least two (and preferably three to four) 50-kilogram charges of highly enriched (up to 50) uranium for Rapsodie, a fast neutron breeder reactor, on which construction is to begin this year. Fulfillment of this request would call for amendment of the United States-French bilateral agreement,² because, although the aggregate of enriched uranium provided for in that agreement is large enough to include the material for Rapsodie, the provision permitting transfer of highly enriched uranium applies only to laboratory amounts.

Mr. McCone saw no insuperable obstacles to accomplishing the necessary amendment of the bilateral agreement. He suggested that the Commissariat write to the AEC without delay, because unless the 30-day waiting period before the Joint Committee were to start soon, the early adjournment of the Congress expected this year might keep the matter from being concluded before 1961.

M. Perrin said that the Commissariat would also like to have plutonium for Rapsodie from the AEC as well, if possible. He said that plutonium of military quality would not be needed for this purpose, i.e., that material containing a large percentage of P 240 would be acceptable, and that the amount required would be from 40 to 80 kilograms for each charge. In response to Mr. McCone’s question, M. Perrin said that the Commissariat would not have to drop the Rapsodie project if the United States were not to supply the plutonium, since [it was] expected to have the necessary amount of plutonium by the time the making up of fuel elements would begin, i.e., 1962. M. Perrin said that the main reason for wanting the plutonium from the United States was that this would greatly simplify reprocessing.

Mr. McCone stated that the amount of plutonium involved is vastly greater than the United States has ever before supplied to another country. He thought that it would be better for the Commissariat to handle the requests for enriched uranium separately, and to wait until next year to raise the more difficult problem of whether we could supply the needed plutonium.

In response to a question from Mr. Wells, M. Perrin said that the Commissariat would want the materials for Rapsodie obtained in the United States to come to the Commissariat directly, not via Euratom. M. Renou said that this did not mean that the Commissariat would object to Euratom’s keeping records of the transactions and applying its system of safeguards. He added that he had recently returned from Washington where he had been told by American officials that as far as the United States was concerned, the relationship between Euratom and France in this matter was up to them to decide.

M. Perrin then referred to EL 4, a heavy water moderated, compressed air cooled, natural (or slightly enriched) uranium reactor to be built by the French as a prototype power reactor (100 megawatts). He referred to discussions under way on the possibilities of our selling or lending 100 tons of heavy water to the French for EL 4, but did not do more than mention this subject. M. Renou suggested that a joint study project on this type of reactor might be of help both to France and the United States, and asked whether this could be arranged by exchange of letters or whether it required an agreement that would have to lie before the Joint Committee.

Mr. McCone stated that the AEC has not firmly decided to go ahead with the construction of this type of power reactor, but added that a negative decision would not necessarily exclude our participating in a joint study project.

In connection with the United States-French agreement under which the United States will supply highly enriched uranium for France’s land based prototype submarine reactor experiment, M. Perrin asked whether irradiation-testing of the fuel elements could be carried out in the United States. The only French facility at which such testing could be carried out cannot be used “to further any military purpose” because it is involved in the bilateral agreement with the United States on peaceful uses. Since development of a submarine must be considered as a military use, the French find themselves in a difficult situation.

Mr. McCone stated that the solutions which suggest themselves would involve difficulties, but he believed that an acceptable solution could be found.

M. Perrin then summarized the agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy entered into by France and the USSR on April 2, 1960.³ Mr. McCone pointed out the similarities and differences between this agreement and the one recently entered into by the United States and the USSR.⁴ In subsequent private discussion with MM. Couture and Goldschmidt, Mr. McCone asked whether the French had made any agreement with the Russians other than the one described by M. Perrin. The answer was unqualifiedly no. Also in response to a question by Mr. McCone, M. Couture said that Mr. Khrushchev’s statement in Moscow that the new French-Soviet agreement was the most comprehensive with any Western power is explainable on the ground that this amendment calls for longer periods of residence, i.e., from six to twelve months, by the exchanged scientists.⁵

At this point M. Couture joined the meeting. He began by stating his appreciation for a recent letter from the AEC saying that it would interpose no objection to the Commissariat’s ordering from American firms unclassified parts for the gaseous diffusion plant under construction in France. He added that an answer as soon as possible to the Commissariat’s letter asking what parts are in the unclassified category would also be greatly appreciated.

Mr. McCone pointed out that the field of gaseous diffusion is very sensitive, adding that, within the unclassified part of it, we want to be as helpful as possible.

M. Couture then turned to general problems of military cooperation. He asked: (1) what effect the two French tests would have on France’s eligibility as a nation which has made “substantial progress;” (2) what were the prospects of help from the United States on organizing underground tests; (3) whether the United States would like to send a mission over to France to find out more about French “progress” in the sense of the Atomic Energy Act.

Mr. McCone answered that the questions raised by M. Couture are largely governed by a federal law, the interpretation of which is spelled out in the Joint Committee’s report.⁶ Another fundamental factor in the answer to these questions is the consideration being given to disarmament at Geneva⁷ and to be given at the Summit. Specifically, he responded to M. Couture’s questions as follows:

1. The statute and the committee report bar the conclusion that France has made enough “progress” to be eligible for help in the field of weapons design and the like.

2. For the time being, there would seem to be no advantage for France in receiving a mission from the United States to look into the progress made.

3. We do not feel that a French mission to the United States to seek help on underground testing would be propitious at this time. Any help on testing would not be consistent with our approach at Geneva, and would bring our sincerity into question. Moreover, we believe that from published unclassified reports on our underground testing, it would be possible to derive all the essential information which could be made available to a mission.

M. Perrin said that if France received help from the United States for underground tests, France might be able, much sooner than otherwise possible, to go along with any agreement on cessation of tests reached by the United States, the U.K. and the USSR. He added, however, after an intervention by Mr. Goldschmidt, that the French Government had not taken an official position on this question and that he was expressing his personal opinion only.

M. Goldschmidt said that even agreement on cessation of tests in Geneva need not necessarily bar the United States from going ahead with its military agreement with the U.K. If this were so, he continued, agreement at Geneva would not foreclose the possibility of agreement on military applications with France.

Mr. McCone said that Mr. Goldschmidt’s observation could prove to be correct, but that prediction is difficult since the terms of an agreement on cessation of tests are still under discussion and since any progress toward disarmament in Geneva would fundamentally affect the situation.

M. Goldschmidt then asked whether the prospect of getting enriched uranium for use in weapons was any better than the prospect of getting information on fabrication. In this connection he emphasized how costly the French gaseous diffusion plant would be.

Mr. McCone responded that there was a possibility of distinguishing between enriched uranium for weapons and technical information on weapons development. He said that he was, of course, in no position to make promises or even to predict the climate which might develop in the next few months. Conceivably, next year, there might be a sufficient change to permit the possibility of favorable reaction to a French request for enriched uranium for weapons, but in any event, in his opinion, there would be no occasion for taking any formal steps before the end of the year.

In response to a question by the reporting officer, M. Perrin said that already “very sizeable” sums had been spent on the construction of the French gaseous diffusion plant, but that the “really heavy commitments” would not be made until late this year.

For the Chargé d’Affaires a.i.:

Max Isenbergh
Attaché

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.5145/4–1460. Confidential. Drafted by Max Isenbergh.
1. McCone left Washington for Paris on April 8 to discuss the question of cooperation with France on atomic and nuclear matters.
2. See Document 112.
3. Reference is to the agreement on Franco-Soviet cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy signed at Paris April 2, 1960, which provided for exchange of specialists and research workers in 1960–1961, exchanges of information on non-classified subjects, and mutual publication of scientific information in technical journals of both countries.
4. For text of the Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on Co-operation in Exchanges in the Fields of Science, Technology, Education, and Culture in 1960–1961, signed at Moscow November 21, 1959, see 10 UST 1934. Section II, 3, provided for cooperation in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
5. Reference is to Khrushchev’s speech delivered at the Lenin Stadium in Moscow on April 4 where he reported on his trip to France and his talks with de Gaulle. (Department of State, INR Files)
6. See footnote 3, Document 39.
7. The 10-nation disarmament conference opened at Geneva on March 15 and adjourned at the end of April to await the discussion at the summit. It resumed on June 7 but was terminated on June 27 when the Soviet bloc delegates walked out.