Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

164. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

April 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Atomic Cooperation and Missiles

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary of State
• M. Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister¹
• M. Alphand, French Ambassador
• Mr. Foy Kohler, Assistant Secretary

The Secretary brought up the subject of safeguards relating to peaceful atomic reactors. He said this matter had been discussed in the tripartite meeting on Tuesday² but that the discussion had seemed inconclusive and he did not quite know where the French stood. The Secretary said that this was a matter of considerable concern to us and one in which the President took a real personal interest. It seemed very important to have a common front on the application of safeguards if we were to prevent the spread of dangerous possibilities for the production of plutonium which could be converted to military uses.

In reply M. Couve de Murville said that he was familiar with this problem and had been considering it. He referred to the proposed supply of an atomic reactor to the Indians and observed that this transaction was very important from the commercial point of view, involving tens of millions of dollars to the supplier. He went on to say that he understood that the Soviets do not apply safeguards and suggested that it would be difficult to restrain our own manufacturers if the purchasing countries turned to the Soviets for such equipment. He then said he understood that the British and ourselves had an agreement on this subject.

The Secretary and Mr. Kohler promptly denied that there was any bilateral agreement between the British and ourselves relating to the question of safeguards for peaceful uses. They explained that our bilateral atomic cooperation agreements with the British had nothing to do with this question and were quite separate and distinct.³ The Secretary said that he was very surprised at the Indian attitude in opposing safeguards as this seemed so contrary to their proclaimed policies against the dispersion of atomic capabilities. Whatever the explanation, we did not specifically fear that India desired to undertake atomic weapons development but rather were very concerned that a precedent should not be set of supplying atomic equipment without requiring agreement to safeguards. The Secretary emphasized that we were continuing to work on the Soviets to bring them into line on this question and made it clear that if the Soviets persisted in trying to sell reactors without applying safeguards, the United States would have to consider seriously terminating its cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that soon almost everyone would have atomic facilities of some kind since production and utilization of atomic energy had become quite easy. He then turned to the question of the United States position on atomic cooperation in the military field and asked whether this was a question of general policy or if it was related to the Geneva negotiations.

The Secretary replied that this was really a question of legislation and of the history behind that legislation. Ambassador Alphand said he was familiar with the legislation and wondered whether France with its two atomic explosions and industrial capabilities could not be considered to be qualified within the terms of the law. The Secretary said he thought it was clear from the legislative history that the Congress would not consider that France would be qualified.

The Foreign Minister at this point said he wanted to make it clear that he was not making any proposal or any request. He was just seeking to understand the basis of the U.S. position. In recent months he had had the impression that considerations relating to the Geneva negotiations were perhaps the main factor.

The Secretary replied that this was not the case. He explained that even before the Geneva negotiations had been undertaken we had tried to make it clear to the French that the term “substantial progress” in the law meant considerably more development than just a few explosions. There had been no change in this position and the Geneva conference as such had not exercised any direct influence on this position. It was true that the President was very impatient with the atomic energy law as it now stands. This was partly because of the unfortunate existing division between the executive and legislative branches. The effect of the feud between Senator Anderson and the former Director of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss, continued. Congress was being very difficult and taking a very narrow interpretation as to what the Executive could do under the act.

Couve de Murville commented that as he understood it our general policy was against the dispersion of atomic know-how. It would seem to be inconsistent with this general policy if we explained our position as being just based on the provisions of the law itself or if we should contemplate a change in that law for the purpose of allowing the Executive a freer hand.

The Secretary confirmed that we were apprehensive about a dispersion of atomic know-how but at the same time said we were concerned about the tremendous waste of time, effort, manpower and money on the part of our allies in endeavoring to build up independent nuclear capabilities.

The Foreign Minister commented that it was really basically only a question of money. If enough money were devoted to the purpose then the time factor could be reduced. However, he continued, if it were our general policy not to encourage the dispersion of atomic capabilities then presumably we would not change the law and he did not anticipate that we would.

The Secretary replied that he would much rather that the French be able to qualify under the terms of the law as it exists than that we should change the law in such a way that it would open the field and lead to requests for atomic help from the Germans and others. He added though that he thought Ambassador Alphand was optimistic as to the prospects of France being able to qualify under the present law.

The Foreign Minister then turned to the subject of the proposals we had submitted to NATO as respects the MRBM program, particularly Polaris, and inquired about our intentions.⁴ The Secretary outlined the plan which had been presented to the recent Defense Ministers Meeting by Defense Secretary Gates, stressing our preference for the first alternative of providing Polaris to NATO by sales from American production. He said that as yet we had received no specific reaction to our proposal. In response to the Minister’s inquiry, the Secretary said that the Polaris has been thoroughly tested and is now operational for submarine purposes though it is not as yet operational as a land-based missile since launchers and other equipment have not yet been designed. However he thought this would be fairly simple to do.

M. Couve de Murville reiterated that he would like to know our basic position. He understood we were ready to sell Polaris to NATO but was that all? To this the Secretary replied affirmatively. Ambassador Alphand then asked whether this meant there would be no bilateral sales or deals. To this Secretary again replied affirmatively.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the Office of the Secretary of State on April 20.
1. Couve de Murville was in Washington for a tripartite meeting of Foreign Ministers on summit preparations April 12–14. On April 15, he also discussed Africa with Secretary Herter; for text of the memorandum of conversation, see vol. XIV, pp. 128–136.
2. A copy of the memorandum of conversation, April 12, which summarized the tripartite discussion of the Foreign Ministers about nuclear safeguards is in Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–1260.
3. For text of the agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes, signed at Washington July 3, 1958, and entered into force August 4, 1958, see 6 UST 1028. For the May 7, 1959, amendment, see 10 UST 1028. For text of the agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom for cooperation on civil uses of atomic energy, signed at Washington June 15, 1955, and entered into force July 21, 1955, see 6 UST 2709. For the July 3, 1958, amendment, see 9 UST 1028.
4. At the morning session of the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting on April 1, Secretary of Defense Gates outlined two alternative U.S. proposals on MRBMs for NATO for the 1963–1965 period. The first called for U.S. production of MRBMs for deployment under SACEUR control and the second envisioned U.S. assistance to European multilateral production of MRBMs under NATO aegis to meet SACEUR requirements. The text of Gates’ statement is summarized in Part 1, Document 254, footnote 6.