Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

May 15, 1959, 9:17 p.m.

4425. Paris pass USRO and Thurston. Murphy discussed May 14 with Caccia broad range of future relations with France.¹ Following subjects covered:

1. Nine US squadrons: Murphy said US believes it must redeploy squadrons if unable obtain French agreement to necessary weapons storage. US would probably redeploy in groups of three to other bases in NATO area. This would require SACEUR recommendations, notification of Standing Group, Military Committee and, eventually, NAC. Final decision will be taken after May 16 French High Defense Committee meeting. If French attitude still negative, US will notify Ely of planned redeployment. It also planned recommend to President he write to de Gaulle after above notification made.

Caccia said he understood US thinking and reasons behind decision to redeploy if necessary. Said that in his eyes would be error not to move squadrons after having informed French of belief squadrons must be moved if storage rights unobtainable. Caccia asked if there would be redeployment to UK. Was told military thinking on this question not finalized but it possible several squadrons would go to UK; others perhaps to Turkey and Italy but probably not to Germany. Caccia said he would report this to his Govt, adding that he expected UK would be formally requested through normal NATO military channels.

2. Tripartite Talks: Murphy said French inaction on storage possibly attributable to de Gaulle dissatisfaction with progress tripartite talks. Caccia said African talks were peculiar in that French had left impression they wanted make series of changes in command structure for Africa and Mediterranean and had thereafter seemed to have veered away towards creation purely national French commands for area plus desire for coordination rather than unification military activities in these areas.²

Caccia said it UK view we should proceed with tripartite military talks on fact-finding basis. Did not believe these would cover any more territory than during tripartite ambassadorial talks but would indicate responsiveness to French requests. Murphy informed him we have not taken decision on this matter but see certain advantages in holding such talks.

3. Nuclear cooperation: Caccia inquired if French pressing on role in decisions on employment nuclear weapons (this was point stressed by Debre to Macmillan).³ Was told we have had no specific recent pressures on this subject, which was part of original de Gaulle memorandum, but rather general request for nuclear cooperation. US has, of course, legal restrictions on types of cooperation which can be offered; as for advance consultations with French on use weapons anywhere, US cannot bind its hands.

4. French Mediterranean Fleet: It was noted that neither government has recent information on status discussion between French and NATO military authorities on this subject. Agreed it would be advantageous in further consideration relations with France to have knowledge how these discussions proceeding.

5. Attitude towards France: Agreed it would be unwise permit spread of actions or policies inimicable to our relations with France. Problems should best be handled on case-by-case, pragmatic basis taking into account factors such as French nationalism and sensitivity and apparent willingness French officials accept awkwardness within NATO rather than face up to de Gaulle.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56351 /5–1559. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Brown, cleared by McBride and the Executive Secretariat, and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Geneva and London and pouched to Tunis, Rabat, and Algiers.
1. No memorandum of this conversation has been found.
2. See Document 107.
3. Debré and Couve de Murville visited London April 13–14 for discussions with Macmillan and Lloyd. In a memorandum to Merchant, May 14, Cameron wrote that Hood had recently described to Department officials part of the Debré-Macmillan conversation, but no memorandum summarizing Hood’s remarks has been found. (Department of State, WE Files: Lot 61 D 30, Debre Government—1959)