Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

111. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

May 5, 1959.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-French Relations

The French attitude towards NATO and towards US-French relations, as reflected in Debré’s espousal of de Gaulle’s views in the talk with you, poses the problem of how to ensure continued French solidarity on Berlin and basic East-West issues and at the same time convince the French that hard bargaining with the U.S. or sabotage of NATO will neither help them attain their national objectives or establish a profitable US-French relationship.

One of our principal concerns on the return of de Gaulle to power was that he might act independently and perhaps against our interests on East-West issues. Since his return to power he has not reverted to these tactics. On the contrary, he has been absolutely solid on East-West issues. This is a cardinal point on the positive side of the ledger but there is no guarantee that at some moment of his choice he might not decide on independent action with regard to East-West issues.

In addition there is the fact that almost every political group in France would support recognition of Communist China if de Gaulle wished to extend it, provided that Communist China aid to the Algerian rebellion had not become a reality in the meantime. De Gaulle has not taken this action, primarily because of his acceptance of the fact that the US has the major responsibility for the peace in the Far East. But, he believes that France has the same sort of major responsibility for North Africa. It is in our interests to keep him solid on these two subjects.

At the same time we cannot let him bargain with us, particularly where NATO is concerned. First, however, we must recognize de Gaulle’s policy towards NATO for what it is. His basic objective is to put France back on the map as a great power. To so do he wants to establish a triumvirate of Western leadership in which France would participate as an equal and in world political and military strategy and decisions. Some aspects of NATO as now set up are distasteful to de Gaulle, because he has the feeling that France is completely boxed in by NATO and classified with the other continental powers, large and small, whereas the UK is somewhat removed and the US dominates NATO. He resents the fact that SAC and the UK bomber command do not even come under NATO and might in fact operate independently of it. Even though France is not now a nuclear power and will not be one until long after it has exploded its Sahara bomb, de Gaulle wants to get into the nuclear club now on the basis of future expectations. Moreover, de Gaulle is obviously greatly concerned about African developments and feels that in concentrating on European continental defenses, the West either ignores France’s African interests or is prepared to sacrifice them. Finally he is convinced, as we are when it comes to US interests, that the Western allies, particularly the UK and ourselves, should support France where its vital interests are at stake.

De Gaulle’s demands for his country are readily understandable, even if unrealistic. He knows that if we wanted to, we could give him far greater satisfaction than we have to date in meeting his requests. If we were willing to give France a status of real partnership in formulating world policies and military strategy, the other problems might be more readily solved. He undoubtedly realizes we are unwilling to do this and has therefore embarked in rough poker-playing tactics with us. The difficulty is that his decisions on NATO matters are due partly to use of these tactics and partly to his basic concepts.

We have before us three alternatives: (1) Full acceptance of de Gaulle’s demands; (2) complete disengagement from de Gaulle; (3) a middle course.

Acceptance of all of de Gaulle’s demands is not possible or even practicable. Neither the US nor the UK is willing to concede to France a special partnership or to set up the regular, permanent tripartite political and military structure he wants to coordinate global policies and strategy. Both countries are pragmatists and see the danger such an organization would pose to their own policies and the problems it would cause with other allies, friends, and even neutrals. We do not have, moreover, the legislative authority to give him the nuclear cooperation he wants and it is doubtful we could obtain it at this time, even if we decided to push hard for it. He wants, however, more than cooperation from us; his aim is tripartite control of the nuclear deterrent and a veto power on its use. The US is not ready to compromise its national security to this extent. De Gaulle wants US/UK recognition of France’s preeminent role in Africa. We cannot give him this and maintain our interests in North Africa, which are important today and possibly of even greater value at some future date. The UK is also not ready to extend such recognition.

A complete or even partial disengagement from France would not be in the US interest, particularly at this juncture. It would undoubtedly lead to de Gaulle starting a whole series of actions eventually collapsing NATO. It could lead to independent de Gaulle actions in the East-West arena. It cannot be taken for granted that other NATO countries would side with the US if there should be such a disengagement.

We are left, therefore, with the middle course. This is not the compromise of US interests in order to obtain temporary relief from de Gaulle. It is a combination of firmness on basic matters and a certain amount of flexibility on others which seem somewhat responsive to de Gaulle’s more reasonable desires and needs. To this end we make the following recommendations:¹

1. Close tripartite consultation on East-West matters, especially Berlin and Germany, should of course be continued. Due consideration should be given to any French ideas proposed. This would obviously make it more difficult for France to take independent actions.

2. Tripartite discussion of Africa should continue as it provides a forum for France to make known its views. In the African talks we could be more explicit. We could say:

a. We see no reason for a tripartite military command arrangement in Central Africa. We do believe that the powers now involved in the area should coordinate their defensive plans and note that naval Planning for the area has been initiated among South Africa, France, Portugal, Belgium and the UK. This could be expanded to cover planning for lines of communication across Africa. We would welcome being informed of such planning.

b. We agree that new arrangements more appropriate to the nature of the Soviet threat may be required in the Mediterranean Basin. Defensive arrangements involving the countries of North Africa and of Southern Europe, with the US and UK associated, is a possibility but only after the problem of Algeria is resolved. In the meantime it is in the Western interest to keep its influence strong in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.

c. A re-arrangement of Mediterranean naval commands could be considered, in the first instance through appropriate NATO military channels. The French fleet has grown in strength and importance since those commands were first distributed.

3. We should recognize that de Gaulle will continue to pose thorny problems in NATO. We can expect that he may continue to give us difficulties on such matters as integrated air defense, certain aspects of cost sharing, and command arrangements which imply the subordination of French units to foreign command. This will perhaps result in some changes to NATO as we have known it.

4. In the nuclear field we should:

a. Cooperate on the submarine only when convinced it is in the interests of the alliance and so tell the French rather than falling back on the Congressional alibi, which is largely ineffectual with de Gaulle anyway.

b. Inform the French that modern weapons require advance agreement on warhead storage.

c. Consider—once again—the idea of letting de Gaulle in on what it means to be a nuclear power: the responsibilities, the cost, and the range of weapons and delivery systems needed. This could only be done successfully by sending to him privately and secretly a competent military man.

5. We have the Debré letter² to consider. It would probably be best to answer it, after we have received Ambassador Houghton’s suggestions, in a quiet tone, taking issue with the central contention that we are betraying France by somehow placating the FLN. Alternatively, we could simply acknowledge the letter and suggest the subject be raised in the tripartite talks.

6. In other fields we should continue to act as if the situation is normal. We should do nothing drastic or precipitous. We should cooperate with France on a case-by-case basis, examining each issue on its merits. In each case we should let the French know that we are so doing, that we cannot be blackmailed by having other unrelated subjects raised, and that Levantine tactics neither pay off nor increase France’s prestige. As an example, we should make up our mind well in advance of what position we will take in the General Assembly when the Algerian issue arises next fall, we should tell the French of this decision, and then we should stick to it.

7. We should maintain our insistence on NATO remaining in a high state of readiness. In this connection we should be prepared to redeploy elsewhere in Europe our nine squadrons presently in France. No decision on this movement should be reached until we learn the results of Debré’s attempt to get General de Gaulle to reconsider his attitude on storing nuclear weapons in France. If Debré’s attempt fails, it is recommended that we approach a letter from the President to General de Gaulle through the following steps:

a. Notification to General Ely by General Norstad that the military situation requires him to redeploy the nine squadrons outside of France and that this movement will begin by redeploying three squadrons within thirty days.

b. This movement should be presented as an urgent military necessity which would not be related publicly to political considerations. This line should be scrupulously followed by all concerned.

c. General de Gaulle’s reactions to General Norstad’s notification to General Ely should be awaited prior to taking the final step to

d. If General de Gaulle’s attitude is still negative, a letter from President Eisenhower should be sent to him before the actual movement of these squadrons, explaining the reasons for these measures. (A draft is attached as Tab A.)³

8. We should concert our actions most closely and in advance with the British. Britain, like it or not, is involved on the continent. Its future is bound up in the future of Europe and therefore of France even more closely than is ours. We cannot afford to be separated from the British on this subject and must from the outset seek their advice and support for policies which we are currently contemplating towards France. We should also review with the British any additional actions or revisions of the above-cited courses of action that might subsequently appear to us to be required in the light of further developments in de Gaulle’s policies. We should concert with the British on keeping Spaak appropriately informed.

9. The above courses are not without their dangers. They must be continually kept under review in the light of the requirements of the East-West situation.

10. With respect to paragraph 7 above concurrence by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is obviously required. They should be kept informed from the outset of the development of our thinking and plans if you approve the general approach contained in this memorandum.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Secret. Drafted by Turner C. Cameron, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Brown, and Looram; concurred in by Timmons, Farley, and Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; sent through Calhoun and Murphy; and initialed by Merchant, Calhoun, and Murphy. At Herter’s request, it was sent to Goodpaster by Calhoun under cover of a May 7 memorandum. Calhoun wrote that the Secretary had designated Murphy to coordinate the successive stages of action set forth in the memorandum and stated:

   “Because the Secretary will not be able to discuss the matter with the President before his departure for Geneva, I would appreciate it if you would brief the President orally on the successive actions we contemplate vis-à-vis the French. Concerning the draft letter to President de Gaulle, the Secretary believes it will have to be revised further in light of developments which take place during the first phases of the proposed action program.” (Ibid.)

1. Herter initialed approval of recommendations 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, and 10 on May 6.
2. See footnote 8, Document 109.
3. Not printed. This letter about France’s refusal to grant atomic storage rights for the U.S. Air Force squadrons stationed in France under NATO was not sent.