Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

304. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State⁰

Ottawa, August 29, 1959, 9 p.m.

144. Reference Department’s 122 repeated London Tosec 13.¹ Spent two hours with Prime Minister afternoon August 29 explaining every aspect US view on Operation Sky Hawk. Reported shock caused by late date on which Canadian memorandum² received, by complete absence consultation by Canada, and by proximity of notice to proposed date of publicity concerning exercise. Pointed out President had personally reviewed program on August 5 and had approved it because of military importance and because of belief would be in interest free world by strengthening bargaining power in Khrushchev conversations. Also emphasized expenditure in preparation and planning and sought drive home idea that maximum unity and strength of free world behind President vital in present situation.

Prime Minister had already received accurate reports from Ambassador Heeney of our views. Prime Minister was much agitated and it was clear his views had been strongly influenced by two factors. First of these was late date at which he and other high officials heard of project. He stated he did not know of it until August 24 or 25, that Pearkes and Foulkes not until August 11 at time of McElroy visit³ and External not until report from Embassy in Washington August 13. (Explicit information on consultation process in and outside of NORAD would be useful to Embassy if Department has it available.) Second factor is that opposition criticism of NORAD has stressed theme that military people, primarily US, make decisions which are shoved down throats of Canadian civil officials. Record in this case appeared to confirm to him such criticism. Project was being planned for six months but only now came to attention of Prime Minister. This has led him feel Canadian Government not properly consulted on policy basis at sufficiently high level regarding project of more than routine nature.

At outset Prime Minister was adamant, stating that nothing could be more ill-timed in his judgment because it closes commercial airports and therefore attracts wide public attention and is likely to be construed as sabre rattling. He said it would cause storm in press but went on to say that there would be no leakage of a difference of opinion in Ottawa, but that if the matter leaked elsewhere he would have to state that Canada was not consulted. Underlying his views on relationship Sky Hawk to Khrushchev visits appears to be basic feeling shared by many in External Affairs that it is important avoid any action capable being construed by Russians as provocative. This feeling sufficiently strong to obscure concept of importance of negotiation from position of strength.

Toward end of conversation he indicated his high regard and deep affection for President and his appreciation of enormous load President now carrying. He said he would be willing to resubmit project to Cabinet colleagues but no change in view likely unless some compromise could be developed. Specifically he suggested possibility of project without features which now appear require closing civil airports. He wondered if such compromise might be possible (I understand he is instructing Defense Minister examine project for this or alternative modifications).

Believe Prime Minister now in more reasonable frame of mind than earlier but note that he is firmly on record with all Ministers to effect that project is unwise. It is clear he sincerely believes project will make things worse for Khrushchev visits. He did appear to sound more willing to carry out full operation if occurred after visits. Probably his sense of Canadian public opinion in this matter is sound and probably influential journals would echo views he now expresses.

Believe change in his view regarding full-scale project extremely improbable but direct word from President might possibly be effective in persuading him to go along. Such recommendation would have added strength if there was evidence UK concurred in view.

Imperative avoid any public mention Sky Hawk until Canadian Government position clarified and agreement reached on what can be said publicly. Implications for future NORAD could be serious.

Wigglesworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5442/8–2959. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Parsons. Also sent to London.
1. See footnote 5, Document 303.
2. See Document 303 and footnote 1 thereto.
3. McElroy visited Ottawa on August 11 to inspect NORAD facilities. A two-page memorandum, dated August 13, which discusses the results of his talks with Pearkes on this occasion, is in Department of State, EUR/CAN Files: Lot 69 D 302.