Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

303. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

August 28, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Operation “Sky Hawk”

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Heeney, Canadian Embassy
• Mr. Rae, Canadian Minister
• Mr. Kohler, EUR
• Mr. Rewinkel, BNA
• Mr. Byrns, BNA

On August 28 the Department received a memorandum from the Canadian Embassy stating that the Canadian Government was of the opinion that “Operation Sky Hawk” was not an appropriate exercise to be held at this time, without however precluding reconsideration at a later date.¹

Mr. Henderson and Mr. Kohler discussed the matter with General Twining and Admiral O’Beirne² and then Mr. Kohler called in the Canadian Ambassador to make our views known to him.

Mr. Kohler told the Canadian Ambassador that the exercise was most necessary as a valid test of the North American defense system; that it was approved personally by the President on August 5, after full consideration of political factors; that canceling Sky Hawk, which we consider a most important defense exercise, would result in frustration of negotiations with Soviets as it would indicate weakness on our part. Mr. Kohler made it unmistakably clear to the Ambassador that we were shocked at the view indicated in the Canadian memorandum that we could relax our defenses merely because Khrushchev was going to visit us.³ Talks between the heads of state and between foreign ministers might go on for a long time, and the United States could not afford to weaken its defenses during this period.

Mr. Kohler referred to a letter of August 5, which Air Vice Marshal Hodson, Operations officer at NORAD, sent to the Chief of the Air Staff in Canada⁴ acting in his capacity as executive agent for NORAD, asking him to obtain Canadian approval of “Operation Sky Hawk”. The letter stated that approval on the United States side was being sought on the highest level.

There had been various consultations between officers of agencies of the two Governments, including FAA and the Canadian Department of Transport. The Pentagon briefed the U.S. transport associations on August 14, and these associations had notices ready to be mailed to their members. A Department of Transport representative was at the August 14 meeting, and it is assumed he would be informing Canadian civil air carriers of the exercise. As numerous people already know of the proposed exercise, a leak would almost certainly occur, with the fact that Canada disapproved the exercise indicating that there was a rift in NORAD. The Ambassador agreed with Mr. Kohler’s view that this would be extremely serious.

The Ambassador held that “Sky Hawk” was not a normal exercise. It required disruption of civil air transport and notification to foreign governments. It differed in kind and degree from previous exercises, and was more likely to cause public comment. The Canadian Government has not committed itself as to whether the exercise should or should not be held, but it questioned the timing. The Ambassador said that the President’s decision to move exercise to a date later than originally suggested indicated political factors involving timing were being taken into account. Mr. Kohler replied that the decision to delay was not political to that extent but that we thought it best not to ground civil transport while Khrushchev was touring the country.

The Ambassador said, in his opinion, the main basis of the memorandum is his Government’s belief that it is most difficult to decide how long one should remain tough in dealing with the Soviets. He believed that nothing should be done, when the United States is making a supreme effort to exploit every avenue of accommodation, to introduce anything to disturb the negotiations. Mr. Kohler said that “toughness” was not the word; we are determined to negotiate with firmness, believing that accomplishments could be made only in an atmosphere of mutual respect. He said that he was certain that if the President were here, he would say that the exercise should go on, that any indication of relaxation would be a terrible set back in what he was trying to accomplish. The Canadian course, if carried to its logical conclusion, would be making concessions, before even coming to negotiations. If Sky Hawk is canceled, not only six months of work and millions of dollars are thrown away, but a leak would very seriously affect the President’s position in his coming talks with Khrushchev.

[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 742.54/8–2859. Secret. Drafted by Byrns.
1. Attached but not printed.
2. Admiral Frank O’Beirne, Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Khrushchev visited the United States September 15–27.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. An extensive summary of this conversation was transmitted to Ottawa on August 28 in telegram 122, which indicated that in a second conversation on August 28 Dillon reiterated the points made by Kohler and that Heeney was seriously concerned by the manner in which the affair had been handled. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5442/8–2859)