Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

248. Letter From President Eisenhower to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad)⁰

January 11, 1960.

Dear Larry: Thank you very much for your letter of the seventh.¹ I think that in replying I can do no better than to give you a brief record of the impressions I formed after my talk with General De Gaulle on the subjects that your letter brings up.²

The item that the General and I discussed at greatest length was that of coordinating the air defense in the NATO area. I told him that, as far back as World War II, I found it was necessary to develop a system for effective coordination in this field. I pointed out that with the improvement of weapon systems, both interceptors as well as the ground to air weapons, and with the reduction of the time element, single control was far more important than ever before. I said that unless we had a single control in this vital field, it would be impossible to concentrate available defensive forces at the point of greatest danger; for example, if France were the principal target, we could not, without pre-arranged defense plans under single control, concentrate available forces from other nations to help in the battle.

To this kind of presentation he countered with the hypothetical case that Italy might be attacked, and then all of the French aircraft would be sent to that place, leaving the whole of France defenseless. I argued that a commander responsible for operations along a great front had two things to do: to keep in place those formations that would always be necessary for local defense, particularly his short-range interceptors and air defense missiles, and secondly, to keep abreast of all intelligence so as to concentrate in timely fashion at the point most seriously threatened.

Beyond all this, I talked to him about the great need for coordination between the missile and the interceptor. I think that as far as technique is concerned, he knows that the theory of a single command is correct; he commented that operation conducted under the authority of a “Council of War” had always been inefficient.

His great preoccupation is the glory and prestige of France. He argued, among other things, that no man in uniform can develop real enthusiasm for serving in any such amorphous organization as an “Allied command.” He said that patriotism and morale are built around nationalistic considerations. Because of this he said that the “defense of France is a French responsibility.” Finally, he argued that what you were asking in what he called your “new” plan of air organization was something in addition to what you already had. He said that he was quite ready to let the matter stand as it is now arranged; he was objecting, however, to any further integration of French forces into NATO.

In this matter as well as in that of the Fleet, I argued that all nations and forces should be on an equal footing. I pointed out that American forces were in Europe as a result of a multilateral treaty providing for common defense. Unless we had a coordinated defense system, it was rather silly for American forces to be in Europe.

I urged that France take action tending to solidify NATO’s determination, morale and organization, and should, by no means, do anything that would tend to set up centrifugal forces, which would inevitably work toward the weakening or even the destruction of the alliance.

I asked him to see you personally. He said that this he could not do until some time around the middle of January because of a very heavy schedule involving different types of work. Debre told me the same.³

In any event, I hope you can make some impression on him but I must admit that he seems to be singularly blind to the fact that if each nation is going its own way, this automatically destroys NATO. I am quite sure he would not want that—at least he says he does not so desire. He is, on the other hand, very keen on promoting the closer union and ties with Germany. It is possible that his objective in this line may be diminishing his respect for NATO. In any event, good luck.

Give my warm greeting to Isabelle,⁴ and, of course, all the best to yourself.

As ever,⁵

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diary. Secret.
1. Document 247.
2. See Part 2, Document 150.
3. See Document 244.
4. Norstad’s wife.
5. Printed from an unsigned copy.