Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

218. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State⁰

Paris, July 20, 1959, 7 p.m.

Polto 165. Geneva for USDel. Reference: Topols 141 and 155.¹ Following is our suggestion for text of memo for delivery to Spaak re his memo (Polto 133). We have drafted it having in mind possibility it will get into French hands, as we indicated Polto 125.² Rather than quite properly critical nature of Dept’s talking points (Topol 141), we think this memo would be most effective as objective statement of US position, and it is that line we have tried to take.

[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

Please telegraph us key excerpts July 14 report of JCAE, and pouch us 10 copies thereof, as well as 10 further copies of report of JCAE on last amendments to Atomic Energy Act.³

Begin Verbatim Text.

A. Use of atomic weapons.

On April 23, 1954, in a private session of the Ministers of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary Dulles spoke at some length on this problem. His remarks included the following statements of policy:⁴

“In short, such weapons must now be treated as in fact having become ‘conventional’. As I have said, these weapons are vital to the common defense of us all. Our main effort must be to see that our military capability is used to achieve the greatest deterrent effect. In order to achieve this, it should be our agreed policy, in case of war, to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons against the military assets of the enemy whenever and wherever it would be of advantage to do so, taking account of all relevant factors. These include non-military, as well as military, considerations.

“The United States intends, of course, to consult with its allies and to cooperate with them fully to this end. That is the essence of collective security. Consultation is an important means for insuring that our military strength, in case of any aggression, shall be used to the best advantage for the common defense. By the same token, we must make sure that the methods of consultation serve that common purpose and do not themselves stand in the way of our security. Under certain contingencies, time would not permit consultation without itself endangering the very security we seek to protect. So far as feasible, we must seek understanding in advance on the measures to be taken under various circumstances. In these ways, our joint capacities will be best calculated to deter aggression against any of us and to protect us in case it should occur.”

The North Atlantic Treaty creates a framework within which sovereign nations unite for the common defense. NATO is thus an alliance of sovereign nations, and is not a supra-national organization.

For this very reason, the treaty does not require unanimous consent to the taking of action in response to armed attack. Each member has its own obligations to all other members, and takes its own decision as a sovereign in light of its pledge to consider an armed attack on one as an armed attack on all and to assist, individually and in concert with the other members, the one attacked.

There is no question that, under the treaty, decision is reserved to govts. This is expressly recognized in the political directive and all other NATO doctrine.

Within this essential political framework, it is clear that only common planning and common action can provide a real defense. Modern weapons have introduced a new factor of terrible speed with which an attack can come. This requires the ability to respond with speed.

NATO must thus go as far as possible to plan for speedy collective response. In some cases, such as air defense, a prior delegation of authority may be required because of this factor of speed. Such a delegation of authority is simply a recognition of the fact that in the event of all-out attack, all of NATO will have to be fighting with all it has, and can only hope to prevail if it does so as a unit. This is the sort of “understanding in advance” which Secretary Dulles spoke of.

[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

In cases where time and circumstances permit, it therefore follows that the only way in which the common interest of all members of the Alliance can be taken into account is through consultation in the North Atlantic Council. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

In any cases where circumstances permit of NATO consultation, the decision will depend on a judgment based on knowledge of all of the political and military factors. It is impossible, in advance of the development of an actual situation, to foretell what those political and military factors would be. It is only in light of events as they actually develop that judgments could be made. It is not possible to develop in advance “solutions a tiroir” since the day-to-day aspects of the situation will control. Pre-planned solutions would provide only a Maginot Line procedure.

Moreover, the development of rigid procedures might be compromised and could lead to the destruction of the entire value of the deterrent, which is based upon the ability of the West to respond to Russian actions at the will of the West.

The answer lies within the doctrine of consultation with all NATO members in the North Atlantic Council if circumstances permit. If all govts are kept continually apprised of how the situation is developing, the confidence and unity of the Alliance can be maintained.

In this respect, all of the members of NATO whose forces or territory would be involved in the action proposed to be taken would have equal justification to be consulted.

[1 line of source text not declassified]

The US, for its part, is always ready to consult in NATO on our policies and actions to the maximum extent which circumstances permit. The North Atlantic Council itself has already been used as the forum for consultation on crises in other parts of the world. It is the Council itself which should remain the forum for that consultation. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

C. Assistance to the French military atomic production program.

The Congress of the United States in 1958, fully appreciating the growing Soviet strength in nuclear weapons, relaxed the previous law and permitted the transfer of info of this nature to countries which already had a “substantial” atomic capability. Even so, such agreements could be disapproved by the Congress when submitted to it.

The Congress made it perfectly clear that the purpose of this provision was to prevent additional countries, friendly or otherwise, from obtaining an independent nuclear capability. The Congress, which reflects the opinion of the American people, thus gave expression to the profound belief of the United States of the grave risks for the world which could stem from the increase in the number of nuclear powers.

US policy and congressional attitudes on this are clear and were repeated in the recently concluded hearings before the Congress on the supply of enriched fuel to France. In its July 14 report on the NATO atomic info agreements, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy reaffirmed its strict definition of “substantial progress” and its deep concern over the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons capability.

It will be recalled that Secretary Dulles in an exchange with Foreign Minister Pineau spoke at length on the seriousness of this risk at the Ministerial meeting at Bonn in April 1957. He pointed out that the risk involved lay not only with the question of a “fourth” country, but with the question of still other countries that might be involved.⁵

On this very important issue, as to which there admittedly are conflicting considerations, it is the belief throughout the United States that the course chosen by Congress is wise. It is believed that this is a conviction shared by a number of peoples and govts elsewhere in the world. It is our view that this national attitude is not likely to change.

D. Global strategy.

[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] NATO consultation on serious situations in other areas is a matter which the US has not only supported but in which it has taken the lead. We think it important to keep the Alliance fully informed of problems outside the NATO area, to obtain a better mutual understanding of each other’s policies and thinking, and to harmonize these policies to the maximum extent possible. This is of course doubly true in cases where hostilities outside the NATO area could lead to involving other NATO members. This was done last year in both the Middle East and Far East.

But insistence upon common NATO action would not only be impracticable in light of the great varying degrees of interest of the NATO countries in these areas, but would risk arousing serious hostility in the areas affected.

It is therefore considered that the continuing exchange of views within NATO, in order that all NATO members be kept fully informed of developments in the world which affect them, is the way to proceed. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] which is contemplated by Article IV of the treaty.⁶

End Verbatim Text.

Burgess

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7–2059. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Geneva.
1. Topol 141 is printed as Document 217. Topol 155 to Paris concerns an unrelated subject; reference may be to Topol 144 to Paris, July 19, in which the Department agreed to wait for USRO comments on Spaak’s memorandum to De Gaulle before presenting further U.S. views to Spaak. (Department of State, Central Files, 640.5/7–1959)
2. Polto 125 from Paris concerns an unrelated subject; reference may be to Polto 155 from Paris, July 19, which noted that in drafting a memorandum for Spaak “we will need to bear in mind our thoughts will get to French in one form or another.” (ibid., 740.5/7–1959)
3. See footnote 4, Document 217.
4. For full text of Dulles’ statement, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, pp. 509–514.
5. Pineau’s statement on atomic weapons for NATO forces at the NAC Ministerial Meeting in Bonn in May (not April) 1957 is summarized in Secto 10 from Bonn, May 3, 1957. Text of Dulles’ response was transmitted in Secto 22 from Bonn, May 3, 1957. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/5–357)
6. In Topol 170 to Paris, July 22, the Department of State reported that Polto 165 was a generally useful and objective statement of the U.S. position and wanted Burgess to draw on it in his follow-up discussion with Spaak, but the response to Spaak should remain informal and oral. Burgess should “avoid being drawn into using Spaak as channel of communication with De Gaulle or French officials on substantive issues such as those raised in his memorandum.” (ibid., 740.5/7–2059)