Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

173. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Paris, December 18, 1958, 3 a.m.

Polto 1742. From USDel. Subject: NAC discussion Agenda Item III: Present status of NATO military effort.

Following is report on NAC Ministerial discussion of Item III resumed at 3:30 pm December 17.¹

Highlights: Council approved, without specific comment on text, resolution on 1958 Annual Review (C–M(58)150 (revised)).² Requested International Staff draft further resolution appropriately based on the debate on future action on NATO defense effort. Latter to be internal and not in communiqué and to be discussed by Ministers Thursday³ prior to action on final communiqué. Statements in afternoon session by Italy, Belgium, Germany, France and Greece.

Spaak summed up discussion stating military situation vis-à-vis USSR certainly has not improved. Must face fact of Soviet military growth. From Annual Review must recognize gap between military requirements and what nations ready to do. Military authorities consider this already serious but hope future efforts of members of Alliance will be greater. If not, military authorities say present unsatisfactory tendency could become very grave. Spaak stated understood economic and financial justifications for failures, but must be noted economic situation in most countries improving. Unlimited defense increases not being requested.

Spaak drew attention great powers to views of smaller countries (on further integration of effort). Stated common infrastructure for atomics, integration of air defense, integration in general, all important and urgent. NAC should do something. It would avoid its responsibility if, having heard these problems, it postponed them another year. This would be bad end for best debate in years.

Spaak then proposed IS draft resolution pulling together ideas presented including resolution prepared by Benelux⁴ not yet seen by all countries.

Italy led off afternoon discussion stating recognized MC–70 figures as minimum NATO military requirements. Stated internal security forces also needed to meet national responsibilities. Latter included five 2nd echelon divisions, 68 small tonnage craft and 58 aircraft. Stated division between NATO and national authority responsibilities should be freely studied as frontiers now artificial. Italy has developed long term plan of reorganization. Made welcome statement that defense expenditures to be increased 4 percent per year for next five years. This together with economies in forces will meet, at least in part, requirements. Expressed hope conventional type equipment still in short supply may yet be provided. Stated 25 billion lire to be spent during next five years for civil defense. Stated hope other countries also do something as this only guarantee of survival.

Belgium, in rambling discourse, said yes, no and maybe. Said gaps and deficiencies outlined in AR are serious concern and worry. Major concern is how and by what method reach goals. Alternatives are either devote more and more of national resources to military or make better use of means at our disposal. Must do both. There are financial and manpower limits; smaller countries can arrive quickly at end of resources. Latest Belgium estimate is that approximately 30–40 percent increase over 1956 budget required to meet MC–70, so Belgium must make better use of resources. Only by organization and rationalization can small country attain sufficient security.

He appealed to allies to mutualize efforts; lack of standardization places heaviest burden on smallest. Urged pooling and integration of efforts in every field possible. If this not done could prevent smaller, and perhaps all, doing what is needed. Welcomed Sandys’ idea;⁵ said agreed must apply political decisions to military requirements. Political control through SecGen is needed. Uncoordinated national efforts too wasteful. Should get report by April what measures necessary to meet MC–70.

Germany (Strauss) stated accepted MC–70, approved 1958 AR report⁶ and would examine recommendations with greatest care. Welcomed proposal by Sandys to check implications and consequences in detail. Recited difficulties, in build-up of forces, of land acquisition, obtaining personnel, provision of training, selection of types of equipment, etc.; stated incredible delays involved in infrastructure procedures; welcomed review of bidding procedure; international competitive bidding could be eliminated in interest of speed.

Cited problem of providing airfield infrastructure requirements. NATO standards called for one squadron per field. Germany must assign two squadrons for next 4 or 5 years, hence additional infrastructure a German responsibility. This involved not only financial burden but many procedural delays. Urged allocation of lump sum for certain categories of infrastructure in line of individual screening of project authorization.

Re new weapons systems, said needed from allies good cost estimates and opportunity study data on all future and present systems. Weapons so costly can’t afford bet on wrong horse. Strauss urged full integration of NATO air defense (both high and low level) immediately in peacetime. Referring to GFR need of space to train airmen, urged SACEUR coordinate use of all training areas. Favored joint production of certain weapons. Hoped Hawk experiment might be model.⁷ Armaments Committee should harmonize bilateral and multilateral efforts of members. Must have jointly established military requirements. Said new committee for military requirements essential to permit coordinated production of equipment. Suggested should be within Military Committee framework.

Strauss said agreed with Sandys and McElroy that nuclear deterrent necessary. Two parts are: 1) strategic, 2) tactical to make “gapless” shield.

Said for second year urged IS take up question of psychological defense.⁸

German Finance Minister Etzel outlined financial burdens stemming from Berlin, refugee problem, other social expenditures resulting from special German position. Stated must maintain good economic condition and internal stability. Germany had given cautious response to IS request for increased defense expenditures. Too early to assess cost and not possible to forecast for long period. Felt Germany would do all it can within financial possibilities to reach MC–70 goals.

France (Guillaumat) stated government must remain uncertain re MC–70 commitments because of recent situation, especially Algeria. Said any failure in North Africa would permit Soviet influence to spread over Mediterranean to Atlantic.

France to undertake reorganization plan providing new army units more mobile and equipped to deal with subversive attacks; air force to be missile equipped and mobility increased; navy to be provided new weapons and nuclear propulsion. Also referred to research efforts. Timing of reorganization depends on many things, especially financial. Stated government devoting 9 percent of GNP to defense; second highest in Alliance. Said taxes now high and likely to be higher in toto. Had to balance obligations within and outside Alliance. This led to choices and priorities, but France not disregarding NATO but following path of sacrifice and hardship.

Greece repeated previous suggestion that wide publicity be given SGN facts and figures to counteract Soviet propaganda and gain needed greater monetary support from parliaments.⁹ Stated obsolescence and replacement requirements coupled with introduction new weapons created heavy burden. Said would do best possible with outside help but in view of weak economy must be careful. Urged that coordinated production plans utilize industrial capacity of all small countries.

After Spaak summary, General Norstad reported on progress on IRBM and atomic stockpile plans. SACEUR activity re IRBM’s had been in two areas: 1) deployment, and 2) determining military requirements for second generation IRBM having solid fuel and advanced performance. With respect to presently available Thors and Jupiters, there had been discussions and broad agreement on principles between NATO authorities and Italy, followed by Italian-US technical discussions. Result was expected operational capability one squadron Thors by early summer. Said would not refer by name to other countries where deployment under negotiation. On second area of activity, desired future development military characteristics had within month been circulated to appropriate authorities, including Meili.¹⁰ Briefly outlined characteristics. Expressed hope second generation could be operationally available not later than 1963.

On atomic requirements, Norstad said Ace Plan dated 12 September 1958¹¹ had been distributed concurrently within NATO and to MOD’s. This plan gave requirements to mid-1960 and studies now being made to carry it to 1963. Hoped to develop minimum number of stockpiles to support delivery units of forces and in accordance MC–70 requirements. Would keep to minimum by doubling up and sharing use among several units. Summed up general yearly requirements estimated. He stated Admiral Wright had developed phased requirements thru 1963 for SACLANT and CHANCOM. SHAPE would act as agent for SACLANT required sites in Europe.

No questions were addressed to Norstad.

Spaak then raised question of adoption of AR resolution (CM(58) 150S (Revised)) and, in absence anyone desiring to comment, stated it adopted. Sandys commented hoped future resolutions could be drafted in simpler form. Stated was sure he in agreement but couldn’t entirely follow meaning.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–1858. Top Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London and pouched to the other NATO capitals.
1. The verbatim (C–VR(58)64) and summary (C–R(58)64) records of this session, both dated December 17, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1177.
2. See Document 174.
3. December 18.
4. Not found.
5. See Document 172.
6. A copy of the Report of the 1958 Annual Review, C–M(58)141, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1161.
7. See footnote 4, Document 168.
8. Reference may be to Strauss’ statement at the NATO Defense Ministers Conference on April 16 in which he emphasized the danger of gradually growing neutralism and the psychological effort to convince the citizenry of the need for vigilance and preparedness. (Polto Circular 24 from Paris, April 16; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1658)
9. Presumably a reference to the Greek statement on strengthening economic resources of NATO at the December 16 session; see Document 170.
10. Ernest Meili, Assistant Secretary-General for Production and Logistics, International Staff/Secretariat, NATO.
11. Not found.