Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

172. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Paris, December 18, 1958, 3 a.m.

Polto 1741. From USDel. Subject: NAC discussion of Agenda Item III: Present status of the NATO military effort.

Below is report on NAC Ministerial discussion of Item III, which began 10:15 a.m. December 17 and was recessed at 12:45 p.m.,¹ to be resumed at 3:30 p.m.

Highlights: Statements by SACEUR, SACLANT and SG chairman of military views, with strong appeals for maximum effort on MC–70 and special appeal by SACEUR on integrated air defense and common financing for infrastructure for new weapons. Dutch called for greater coordination and integration of NATO defense effort, with proposal that PermReps prepare specific program by April Ministerial meeting. British laid heavy emphasis on importance nuclear deterrent and proposed using International Staff as agency for civilian “screening” of military requirements before their presentation to NAC. Secretary McElroy made statement of United States position on NATO defense effort, reported fully in separate cable.² Canadians emphasized integrated air defense of North America as contribution to NATO. Norwegians supported Dutch proposal for more integration NATO defense effort. Turks called for additional military aid for Turkey and common financing infrastructure requirements for new weapons.

Spaak opened meeting by statement that military authorities would first be called upon to present situation, with ministerial discussion to follow.

Chairman SG (Admiral Denny)³ led off with oral intelligence briefing, following text contained in SGWM–633–58.⁴

SACEUR began by paying tribute to example of strength and unity given by ministers in firm stand on Berlin. NACNATO military authorities, [sic] Primary basis of NATO military policy is deterrent, which consists three elements: a) strategic retaliatory forces; b) shield forces to hold forward line and contribute to deterrent; and c) will to use our forces so that there will be no danger of war arising from a mistake in judgment by the enemy that we lack the determination to act. Objectives of NATO strategy are three-fold: a) in event of attack, either accidental or deliberate, force enemy to pause for reconsideration; b) take advantage of pause to make enemy take a conscious decision to go to war; c) ensure that aggressor, in making this decision, is fully aware that we would use all our forces. Shield forces especially well-suited for these purposes. Although they have classic task of defending territory, most important function is contribution to deterrent by forcing enemy to pause and make conscious decision in light of all forces, including retaliatory which could be used on our side. Recent threat to Berlin makes very clear importance shield forces. Although we also place heavy reliance on strategic deterrent, most direct and immediate deterrent are shield forces deployed in forward areas.

MC–70 is designed meet these requirements. Have now had first AR submission on MC–70. Whereas some countries have done well, in general results frankly unsatisfactory, not only because forces inadequate, but also because insufficient action indicated to meet goals.

Certain other problems not considered in AR must be mentioned. Introduction new weapons not proceeding at satisfactory rate and help by ministers is essential in moving program forward. Common financing has been recommended for infrastructure requirements of new weapons because a) financial burden is thereby equitably distributed; and b) NATO character of forces equipped new weapons is made [garble]. Defense is second matter of vital importance on which Council’s help is needed. There are many facets to problem. One important aspect, early warning system, has finally gotten under way, after much delay. Forward scatter communications system, although approved two years ago, is only now beginning move ahead after many difficulties. Record has not been good and help of Council is needed in ensuring better rate of progress in future. Necessary to take matter out of hands of technicians and put it in hands of those who are capable of evaluating larger interests involved. Fact today is that individual countries cannot today meet their air defense requirements separately. This recognized by military authorities of all countries. Therefore strongly hope that will be possible for all member countries agree promptly so as to enable moving ahead.

SACEUR said in conclusion that some may feel that military authorities are putting pressure on political authorities. This is true and it is their responsibility to do so. However it is primary responsibility of governments themselves to make effort required to achieve MC–70 goals, upon which security of Alliance depends.

Admiral Wright followed with presentation of SACLANT problems. Began by stressing grave dangers to Alliance of Soviet submarine threat. Virtually entire naval effort of SACLANT directed against this threat. Perfectly natural for European countries to regard Soviet submarine threat to sea lanes as less important than direct threat to European land areas, but must be recalled that Soviet submarine fleet has but one purpose: isolation of Europe from North America and hence destruction of unity of our defenses. Fruitless to try to assess relative priorities; fact is that defense of Europe, of North Atlantic and of North America are interdependent. Modern sophisticated naval weapons required to meet Soviet submarine threat place additional strain on already limited defense budgets. However vitally important that our forces be balanced to deal with various forms of threat and ministers should give fullest consideration in drawing up defense budgets to balanced collective force structure to deal with threat on sea as well as on land and in air.

Three major problem areas facing SACLANT:

(1) Meeting of MC–70 naval requirements. This most important. Must have national allocations to fill in deficiencies. As long as deficiencies continue unable establish forward naval “defensive shield” at points where Soviet submarines enter North Atlantic area. We are also unable guard against Soviet missile-bearing submarines which is all the more important because Soviet missile-bearing submarines will probably soon be able to threaten coast of Europe. Anti-submarine requirements must also be met to protect vital oil shipments through South Atlantic if Suez Canal and pipelines cut. Therefore absolutely essential countries allocate minimum naval forces called for under MC–70.

(2) Naval infrastructure. Most SACLANT naval forces now have resources only in North America. Absence of resources elsewhere in North Atlantic area greatly inhibits SACLANT operational effectiveness.

(3) Increased stocks. Essential that stockpiles be built up to cover up to time first convoys can arrive in Europe.

Chairman SG (Admiral Denny) summed up for military authorities. Stressed point made by SACEUR that requirements set forth in MC–70 were result of complete cycle of very thorough study by NATO military authorities and in sense are culmination of eight or nine years of continuous study by NATO military authorities. Under no circumstances should MC–70 be considered as providing perfect defense. MC–70 is based on assumption that all forces will be modernized, will be in place and on time, and will be furnished with full logistic support. Even if all these conditions are met, MC–70 still represents maximum acceptable military risk. Short-falls today, themselves not alarming, can however become very serious if there is further slippage. Two main causes of concern are delay in modernization and infrastructure construction lag. Causes of delay are beyond control of military. Individual deficiencies may not be serious, but aggregate is very serious indeed. If some time in 1959 there is not promise of improvement, NATO military authorities will be forced to ask for new guidance.

Dutch (Staf) expressed thanks for “inspiring but alarming” statements by military authorities. Trend toward short-falls in MC–70 is grave situation which must be faced up to. Spaak had written letter to all governments prior to meeting urging consideration of possible further action by governments.⁵ Netherlands Government, for its part, prepared to say that it is prepared to study the recommendations made to it during AR examination and to reconsider positions it adopted.

If we merely hoped to meet MC–70 must assure our parliaments that all waste, inefficiency and duplication have been eliminated. This can only be done through greater coordination and integration of our joint NATO military efforts. Netherlands had called for action along these lines two years ago, but with little result.⁶ Heads of Government meeting last year in final communiqué had again called for progress toward integration and coordination, but without significant result.⁷ The time has now come to take concrete action. Technical developments in such fields as air defense make it imperative. Therefore propose Perm Reps study as matter of urgency what specific programs can be undertaken in such fields as air defense, logistics, balanced collective forces and training. Perm Reps should strive to work out proposals which can be approved at April 1959 Ministerial meeting. Aim should be concrete results by December 1959.

United Kingdom (Sandys) pointed out that in approving MC–70 at April Defense Ministers meeting⁸ British had agreed MC–70 goals were militarily desirable, but were not prepared to say they were minimum goals. United Kingdom had also pointed out MC–70 likely to raise serious financial and economic problems and that, if force plans could not be met, we must set priorities. In deciding priorities we will need assistance military authorities but, as SACEUR had said, decisions cannot be left to military alone. Pointed out that setting up national forces is three-step operation: 1) military draw up requirements; 2) civilian Ministry of Defense screens these requirements; and 3) cabinet decisions are finally taken. Step 2 is missing in NATO procedure. Military authorities’ statements of requirements go direct to NAC, which serves as cabinet. Therefore proposed that International Staff fulfill for NATO job performed by civilian authorities in Ministries of Defense. International Staff could recommend appropriate adjustments in forces before their presentation to NAC. United Kingdom also supported Netherlands proposal for urgent study of integration.

United Kingdom may not be able meet all MC–70 requirements, but will do utmost. Certainly firmly intend do fair share. United Kingdom presently spends 8 per cent GNP on defense, much more than most. Furthermore, United Kingdom has many other obligations, such as SEATO, Baghdad Pact, dependent territories, etc., requiring 100,000 men in Far East and Middle East. These forces vitally important to defense of free world, since cannot defend Europe in Europe alone. Recent United States–United Kingdom actions in Lebanon and Jordan high-light this.

United Kingdom must also take into account heavy drain of its strategic military program, 200,000,000 pounds being spent on research and development of weapons. United Kingdom bomber command also has vital role. In case of all-out war first counter-attack would be United States–United Kingdom planes from bases in Europe and North Africa, with actual majority of first planes from RAF.

Must stress importance nuclear deterrent. Yesterday Council adopted firm position on Berlin.⁹ This could never have been done without immense nuclear power of United States. Only two ways in which nuclear deterrent could be undermined: 1) Soviet ability to destroy United States strategic retaliatory force by surprise attack; and 2) indication of lack of will to use deterrent by United States. Soviet ability to destroy retaliatory force by surprise attack likely to be eliminated by new underground missile installations. United States will to use nuclear weapons made movingly clear by Secretary Dulles yesterday.¹⁰ In spite statements by certain politicians, Generals and Admirals, there should be no question of United States determination to use its retaliatory power. However, irresponsible talk questioning credibility of deterrent may cause Soviets to make fatal mistake. Therefore believe NATO communiqué should reaffirm NATO willingness use deterrent.

Coordinated production of weapons is field in which NATO should now make real effort to move ahead. There has been too little progress to date. Must be realized by all concerned that cooperation in this field is two-way street, with sacrifices required by all. Quite likely that United Kingdom, with biggest armaments industry in Europe, will have to make heavy sacrifices.

Sandys concluded by saying that disruption of NATO remains one of principal Soviet aims. United Kingdom will continue to play its full part in strengthening NATO.

Secretary McElroy, after complimenting SG, SACEUR and SACLANT on their excellent presentations, gave statement reported separate cable.

Canada (Pearkes) pointed out that Canadian contribution to NATO defense is of dual nature: contribution to shield in Europe and contribution to North American defense. Latter is vital part of over-all NATO defense, especially now that direct attack against North America possible.

United States and Canada have developed integrated air defense system, consisting three early warning chains, with seaward extensions. Eventually intended to link this system with SACEUR’s. This whole system jointly controlled, manned and operated by Canada and United States. Integrated air defense is important question in Europe; Canada and United States have already in being highly successfully integrated air defense system. Canada’s general defense situation difficult at moment because of uncertainty as to types of weapons to be used: ie, manned aircraft or missiles. Canadian policy towards its forces in Europe is to meet MC–70 force goals. Re-equipment and modernization of forces are major problem, however, with difficult decisions in process of being taken. Defense expenditure next year will remain at same level as 1958. Unable predict beyond that largely because of uncertainties as to type of armament. Canada will make every effort reach MC–70 goals.

Norway (Handal)¹¹ noted that Annual Review had indicated considerable further effort in defense was required. Increasing resources for defense virtually impossible and changing Political Directive undesirable.¹² Best solution therefore for every country to ensure maximum efficiency in its effort. Norway has shifted some of its forces, having found that some were not contributing to NATO purposes. Norway shares view of Dutch that greater coordination for integration required.

Turkey (Zorlu) emphasized gravity of Soviet threat. Stressed importance not relying on nuclear deterrent alone. MC–70 force goals are not ideal but merely bare minimum. He pointed out that military authorities have recognized need for additional Turkish forces but hesitated to recommend increases because of financial limitations. Turkey therefore hopes that other countries, acting in spirit of Alliance, will be able provide financial support. Turkey strongly supports new common financing of infrastructure for new weapons. National financing contrary to NATO “spirit” and imposes unfair financial burdens on certain countries where majority of installations are located.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–1858. Top Secret. Transmitted in three sections. Pouched to the other NATO capitals.
1. The verbatim (C–VR(58)63) and summary (C–R(58)63) records of this session, both dated December 17, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1168.
2. The full text of McElroy’s statement was transmitted in Polto 1743 from Paris, December 18. McElroy voiced his concern that “national and multinational modernization and equipment of NATO forces are not in all cases going forward fast enough,” and he emphasized that because “an increasing proportion of future U.S. military assistance must go into modern weapons,” a “progressively greater proportion of support of the more conventional forces must be assumed by the individual nations concerned.” He also supported broadening the scope of multilateral financing of new weapons and support facilities and coordinating U.S. and European production programs. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1858)
3. Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny, Chairman of the Standing Group of the NATO Military Committee.
4. Not found.
5. Not found.
6. The Dutch call for greater coordination and integration of the NATO military effort at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1956, was reported in Polto 1398 from Paris, December 12, 1956; see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. IV, p. 116.
7. See Document 131.
8. See Document 133.
9. See footnote 1, Document 170.
10. See Document 169.
11. Nils K. Handal, Norwegian Minister of Defense.
12. The Political Directive to the NATO Military Authorities from the North Atlantic Council was approved by the NAC on December 13, 1956. A copy of the Directive (C–M(56)138(Final)) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 822.