153. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • Secretary’s Meeting with De Gaulle—Nuclear Stockpiles and NATO

PARTICIPANTS

  • M. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office
  • Mr. Matthew Looram, WE

At the Embassy Residence before dinner on the evening of July 5, Mr. Looram raised with M. Joxe two of the questions that had arisen during the Secretary’s meeting with General De Gaulle that morning.1 [Page 355] Mr. Looram stated that as he had understood the conversation, General De Gaulle had made it clear he would insist on the French having control over the custody and disposition of all nuclear weapons located on French soil and that this would apply to weapons that might be stored in France for the NATO stockpile or to weapons possibly stored in France for the use of United States forces. The U.S. would share in the control, but our role would presumably be secondary. M. Joxe confirmed this understanding; he said it was perhaps better to say France would insist on “primary responsibility” for custodianship and disposition of the weapons. Under these circumstances, Mr. Looram pointed out, given the limitations of U.S. legislation which precluded us from turning over weapons to foreign powers,2 it would be absolutely impossible to have any nuclear weapons stored in France. He hoped that this was fully understood by the French authorities. M. Joxe stated that he understood this, however, he thought that the important thing was to make General De Gaulle feel that France was playing a significant role in world strategy. If he had this feeling, M. Joxe thought that other matters, such as this nuclear problem, could probably be satisfactorily resolved.

Mr. Looram asked what General De Gaulle had in mind when he talked of extending the NATO area to the Middle East. It was difficult to conceive just how this could be done, given the many problems, to name Egypt but one. M. Joxe admitted that it was difficult to explain De Gaulle’s concept in detail and how it could be put into effect, but he thought that the over-all concept had merit.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/7–558. Secret. Drafted by Looram.
  2. See Part 2, Document 34.
  3. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended on July 2, 1958, permitted the transfer of special nuclear materials to foreign nations that had made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons but prohibited the transfer or export of actual atomic weapons to foreign nations. (72 Stat. 276)