Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

152. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, July 5, 1958, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Report to Mr. Spaak on Conversation with General De Gaulle

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary General, NAC
• Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess, U.S. Representative, NAC
• C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State

Following his conversation with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville earlier in the afternoon,¹ the Secretary received Mr. Spaak at the Embassy residence. At this meeting the Secretary went over much of the ground covered in the morning conference with General De Gaulle with particular reference to De Gaulle’s conception of the role which France should play in world affairs.² He said that we may have some difficulties with General De Gaulle in the future, citing the General’s firm intention of gaining for France a dominant role in world affairs. He said that he had informed the General it was possible in times past for two or three countries to set themselves up to run the world but this was no longer the case. While there is room for France to exert more influence, this can only be done if confidence in France is restored as a result of economic and financial reforms and a settlement of the Algerian problem.

The Secretary said that the General had expressed the thought that the NATO area should be enlarged to include North Africa and the Middle East and that the command structure of NATO should be revised. The Secretary had said that it was not through a revision of the command structure but through increased consultation and persuasion that France should exercise its influence. NATO must be more than a mere military alliance. It is not an easy thing to increase consultation with our NATO partners to the extent which we have in the recent past, particularly because it reduces one’s maneuverability and freedom of action. Nevertheless, the Secretary continued, it is our considered view that consultation of this nature is essential. While he had so informed General De Gaulle, he did not feel that he had made an immediate convert. As for De Gaulle’s emphasis on a “triumvirate” the Secretary had pointed out the dangers of such a course. He thought that De Gaulle was apt to take the Germans, particularly, for granted. Certainly nothing of the nature of “tripartism” should be established as a formal institution.

General De Gaulle had deprecated recent achievements and trends in the supra-national field. However, he had been calm and on the whole the Secretary felt that he had demonstrated great wisdom. He was not in any sense arrogant, but rather inclined to be conciliatory. The Secretary felt that while we may have our awkward moments with the General, on the whole it is very fortunate that he has been called to his present position.

[1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

The Secretary had placed some emphasis in his conversation with De Gaulle on the subject of Germany. He said that he could envisage three roles for Germany: 1) as a part of the Soviet orbit; 2) as a neutral; and 3) as allied with the Western countries. The first is out of the question and the second would leave Germany free to blackmail both sides. Our only course, therefore, is to see that Germany is tied closely to the West and to pursue our objective of achieving German reunification. General De Gaulle, however, had indicated that the continued division of Germany would not bother him particularly.

Spaak said that despite the fact that there may be awkward moments in our dealings with De Gaulle, the General was the only chance for France. He felt that we must be patient while the General “reconciled himself with realities”. Spaak wondered what influence, if any, people like Mollet, Pinay and Pflimlin have on the General. He spoke particularly of the recent reply to Khrushchev’s note.³ The Secretary said that this may put the United States in a difficult position. There are responsible persons in the United States who think that we have advanced to the point where we should suspend testing. If nothing is done on this subject before the United Nations General Assembly meets in the Fall we may be under some pressure at that time. The British are now in favor of suspending testing because of the recent amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.⁴ Spaak said that he supposed that the French would wish to be excluded from any proposals for a suspension in view of their announced intention to proceed with a nuclear program.

Spaak mentioned the new Soviet proposal regarding the technical talks on the question of surprise attack.⁵ The Secretary said this proposal held some promise though there are certain aspects that are unacceptable. For example, the proposal presupposes a summit meeting. We would welcome a study since we felt that there was no other way to bring about a reduction of armaments except through measures that would guard against surprise attack. For one thing, it would save the United States a great deal of money. At the present time the Strategic Air Command is on a 15-minute alert.

Spaak said that the Soviet antics have been extraordinary lately but he failed to understand their motives. The Secretary said that the situation in Eastern Europe obviously worries the Soviet Union which believes that a summit meeting, if it should be held under conditions acceptable to the Soviet, would show that the West accepts the status quo.

With respect to the Lebanon, the Secretary said that there is a probability that the situation may be worked out without Soviet intervention. Intervention, he said, could have disastrous consequences, particularly in peripheral areas such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. He very much hoped, therefore, that an internal solution is possible. The Secretary said that he expected to lunch with Hammarskjold on Monday.⁶ [7 lines of source text not declassified]

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/7–558. Secret. Drafted by Elbrick. The meeting was held in the U.S. Embassy Residence. A chronology of Dulles’ trip indicates the time of the conversation. (ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1036)
1. Dulles was in Paris July 3–5 for talks with French leaders; see Part 2, Document 33.
2. See Part 2, Document 34.
3. Not further identified.
4. See footnote 1, Document 137.
5. This Soviet proposal is contained in Khrushchev’s July 2 letter to President Eisenhower, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1958, pp. 279–281, or Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 1084–1087.
6. Dag Hammarskjöld, U.N. Secretary-General, met with Secretary Dulles at the Department of State on Monday, July 7, 1:20–3:20 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers, Daily Appointment Books)