Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

VE–45. Telegram from the Ambassador in Venezuela (Sparks) to the Secretary of State¹

Caracas, July 8, 1960, 1 p.m.

25. In requesting appointment with President Betancourt I told his private secretary I would require at least an hours time (to permit his perusal of Chafardet documents authorized Departments’ A–2, July 1).² Secretary replied President under doctor’s orders had had no conversations that long but he later gave me appointment yesterday 5 p.m. without condition. I talked with President for over one hour.

I was shocked at President’s appearance. His hands are still heavily bandaged while his face is discolored and with large burn scabs. However, he was completely composed and relaxed. He assured me his ear and eye injuries had completely cleared up. Doctors have subjected him to rigorous diet and rest and he happily reported his blood pressure was down to 130 (I had been reliably informed it had been as high as 220). President told me details of his horrifying experience following explosion and then related details of Dominican involvement in attempt against his life.

Since it was impossible for President to read three Chafardet documents due to condition of his hands, he requested me to do so. However, I first read him carefully prepared statements in Spanish giving substance Department’s A–2 stating in effect we considered it undesirable release actual documents at this time. President made no comment on this and asked me read documents. I read about ten pages of Chafardet’s letter July 24 to Perez Jimenez when President became utterly bored and requested me to read Trujillo’s letter of September 20. I did so and showed him document with signature. He made no direct comment on this document. He immediately launched into virtual harangue on Trujillo’s nefarious operations over years. He asserted Trujillo is completely ruthless and capable of anything. He said his immediate concern and apprehension is Trujillo may attempt drop bombs on Caracas and oil fields or mount new attempt against his life. He told me precautions had been taken to defend against air raid and showed me anti-aircraft battery set up just outside Palacio Miraflores. He said were Trujillo to be so foolhardy Venezuela must retaliate immediately. He admitted Venezuelan air capabilities are very limited and he actually inquired if U.S. would permit Venezuelan planes refuel in Puerto Rico.

I then referred to Allan Stewart’s conversation with Oropeza Castillo.³ After assuring President we welcome his constructive efforts, I gave him substance DEPTEL 1114.⁴ President expressed deep and serious concern over recent developments in U.S.-Cuban relations and was acutely apprehensive U.S. might deem it necessary engage in some military operation against Cuba. He virtually pleaded that under no circumstances should U.S. be drawn into such move. He made it clear U.S. position vis-a-vis Cuba is good, that it has been provoked to an extreme, that Castro is menace to Western Hemisphere, that his actions are those bordering on a mad man, but that U.S. must restrain itself. He said were U.S. to engage in military action, directly or indirectly, it would immediately lose understanding and support of majority of American Republics. In such case, he said, his first act would have to be to send battalion of Venezuelan troops to protect American Ambassador.

President again said Venezuela and many American Republics are not prepared to take action required against Castro until problem of Trujillo is definitively resolved. This is an oft-repeated Betancourt position but Department will wish consider Betancourt has contemplated this situation for days and recognize that his conviction was not hastily reached. Betancourt wants and is prepared to do those things vis-a-vis Castro in line with U.S. objectives—difference between his and U.S. position is one of timing and method.

I informed President of measures being taken re Cuban sugar quota pursuant to the new sugar legislation and I stressed unanimity opinion in U.S. Congress. President recognized this U.S. action as inevitable and even appropriate in circumstances. Again he repeated his plea that U.S. not take direct or indirect military action which would alienate from U.S. support of American Republics.

As President was obviously wearying, I broke off conversation and said I would return at later date.

Sparks

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 731.00/7–860. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
2. Not printed; 731.00/7–160.
3. Reference is to Presidential adviser, Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, who had been asked to propose a plan, which Betancourt was interested in sponsoring, that would allow Latin American countries to offer guaranteed payment of property expropriated by Cuba in order to relax Cuban-U.S. tensions. (737.00/6–2060)
4. The referenced telegram, June 27, 1960, authorized the Ambassador to indicate that the United States welcomed Betancourt’s constructive efforts as suggested by Oropeza in his conversation with Stewart. (737.00/6–2060)