Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

VE–28. Memorandum of a Conversation, Caracas, Venezuela, April 27, 1959¹

Caracas, April 27, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• President Rómulo Betancourt
• Ambassador Edward J. Sparks
• Minister-Counselor Charles R. Burrows

Ambassador Sparks told the President that he had brought Mr. Burrows along as he was going to be absent next week in Chile to attend the Chiefs of Mission Conference and he felt Mr. Burrows should be completely informed on the subjects of today’s conversation. President Betancourt expressed his understanding.

The President was 15 minutes late for the appointment, which had been arranged at Ambassador Sparks’ request, and it became obvious immediately that the reason for his delay had been a telephone call from Ambassador Falcon Briceño in Washington. Before Ambassador Sparks had an opportunity to indicate the purpose of his visit, the President said that he was concerned and worried by a report which he had received with reference to a decision by the United States to exempt Canada from the petroleum import control restrictions. He said that Falcon Briceño had told him that a draft letter has been prepared in Washington for President Eisenhower to send Betancourt simultaneously with the announcement of the exemption, explaining the reasons for the action and making clear that conversations would continue in an effort to find a satisfactory hemispheric solution to the general problem.² Ambassador Sparks said that this had been one of the reasons he had asked for an audience, and then explained the detailed reasoning behind the exemption for Canada. The Ambassador placed primary stress on the integrated defense position of the United States and Canada, and on the impossibility of satisfying Canada that she should be subject to petroleum import restrictions at the same time that our security plans are so completely and indistinguishably intertwined. Ambassador Sparks also gave particular attention to the thesis that in taking this step the United States is actually protecting Venezuela’s market for petroleum in Canada, since we will hope that as a result pressure will be lessened in the Canadian Parliament to authorize the construction of a pipeline from Alberta to Montreal thus excluding imports of Venezuelan petroleum. President Betancourt accepted the logic of these explanations and also said he appreciated the fact that Venezuela’s sales of petroleum in the United States will probably not suffer much because of the exemption for Canada, but he said that this action puts him in a very difficult position public opinion-wise. As long as the dictatorship was in power, Venezuela had protested the imposition of import controls by the United States, had encouraged delegations like that of the American Chamber of Commerce to go to the United States in protest, and had even threatened retaliation in the form of iron ore export controls. In contrast, Betancourt has not protested the obligatory import control system but on the other hand has adopted a very understanding position. At the same time Canada made public its protestations and now Canada is being granted an exemption from the controls. This, says the President, will make him look to his people as being entirely too weak or even cowardly to protect his country’s best interests. Ambassador Sparks expressed understanding of the President’s problem and asked him if he had any suggestions as to how the matter might best be presented to the Venezuelan public. The President said that he has a radio-television address scheduled for the night of April 30 and he hopes he may be able at that time to tell the Venezuelan people of the Canadian exemption and that he has received assurances from the United States Government that there will be no untoward effect on importations into the United States of Venezuelan petroleum. The Ambassador said he would report immediately to the Department the President’s thoughts on this matter. The President was not bitter in his conversation but he was obviously very concerned.

The President then discussed somewhat the Venezuelan economic situation and said that he feels confident about it. He said that a group of Venezuelan banks have assured the Government that they can handle an internal credit of 500,000,000 Bolivares. He recognized also that there will have to be some foreign loans but the President said that he is thinking of this in terms of an Export-Import Bank loan for electrification development, and also an overall IBRD loan based on fundamental economic studies of what the country needs in the way of really basic development. He said that the Government’s employment program is going along quite well and that the excitement over unemployment is very much reduced. He pointed out, for example, that the threatened unemployment demonstration a few days ago was never held.

President Betancourt said that in the Government’s budget planning he is thinking in terms of an operating Budget and a Public Works Budget. He is anxious also to do a few things for the Armed Forces and he repeated what he had said on a previous occasion about the deplorable conditions in many of the barracks. He wants to take corrective action but this work will not fit into his budget unless he can somehow economize on other expenditures. The President said that expenditures for military materiel will total Bs. 45,000, 000 next year unless arrangements can be made to make token payments” to the United States as he understands Uruguay and Brazil do. The Ambassador recalled that the President had spoken of this before but had not set forth his ideas in any detail. The President said he would send the Ambassador a memorandum on this subject and he hoped something could be done about it.

The President talked also about Communism in Venezuela and although he recognized quite readily that the Communists are active, and that they infiltrated very successfully during the Provisional Government regime, he said that steps have been taken and will be continued to keep them under control. He pointed out that there are no Communists at high levels in the Government, that the Communist Party has not been included in any political conferences sponsored by the Government and that they themselves have been protesting their exclusion. He recognized that in the University the Communists are active and dangerous but said (very confidentially) that plans are being made now to have another person elected Rector in July of this year who will take a much stronger stand against the Communists than has the present Rector. The President expressed satisfaction with the change in the newspaper field and pointed out that the Capriles publications are now carrying anti-Communist articles. He said that the Communist Youth Conference which has been discussed will not be held in Caracas; he has issued instructions that no visas be given to any prospective delegates. He said also however that he has issued instructions that the so-called Anti-Communist Conference under the leadership of Prieto Laurens not be permitted to be held. Betancourt has known Prieto Laurens for many years and he considers him an adventurer who has seized upon the anti-Communism banner for his own self-serving purposes, He recalled that on one occasion when he was passing through Mexico, while he was in exile, Prieto Laurens said that he would bring Lombardo Toledano³ to the airport to see Betancourt. Toledano did not come to the airport. Betancourt’s inference seemed to be that at the time Prieto Laurens was trying, unsuccessfully, to build himself up in Toledano’s eyes.

Ambassador Sparks mentioned that he had heard rumors of a possible meeting here on May 1 of Latin American labor leaders interested in organizing a labor federation from which the United States and Canada would be excluded. The President indicated that he also had heard these reports, but he said nothing of this kind was going to happen here. He said the AD labor leaders have no intention of leaving CRIT.

Ambassador Sparks reviewed for President Betancourt the contents of Embtel 625 concerning the Venezuelan position on Trujillo as described by the Foreign Minister,⁴ and Deptel 698 outlining the Department’s reaction to the conversation with the Foreign Minister.⁵ President Betancourt made clear in no uncertain terms that the Foreign Minister had stated accurately the Venezuelan position with reference to Trujillo. The President also confirmed that if he did not react immediately to an attack on Venezuela by attacking Trujillo he would be overthrown by the Armed Forces. In reply to a question the President confirmed that Gonzalo Barrios is going to Washington within the very near future and that his mission will be not that of Permanent Representative to the OAS but the very special one of introducing into the OAS a suggestion for action against Trujillo. He also made it clear that what Venezuela has in mind is not just a general anti-dictatorship resolution but a very definitely pin-pointed anti-Trujillo position. The President said that Trujillo is the one threat to hemispheric peace and every country in the Hemisphere should realize this. The President said that he is being subjected to great pressure to break relations with the Dominican Republic but he has opposed this action. He hopes to handle Trujillo through the OAS. He also said he is not concerned over Somoza or Stroessner; Trujillo is the enemy. With Batista, Peron and many Perezjiministas in the Dominican Republic certainly Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia can never feel secure and he feels that even Argentina should be concerned. He confirmed that one of the missions of the Foreign Minister on his trip to Buenos Aires for the Meeting of the 21 will be to discuss this anti-Trujillo move in the OAS with the Argentine, Uruguayan and Brazilian Governments. The President said that Castro will certainly not restrain himself long from an all-out attack on Trujillo. Betancourt is convinced that unless Trujillo is made to leave by what he called “diplomatic means”, there will be an international war in the Caribbean - between Cuba, and the Dominican Republic - within two months.

The President said that he would prepare and give Ambassador Sparks a copy of a memorandum outlining the basis for his accusations against Trujillo and for the Venezuelan position toward the Trujillo Government; the President suggested that Ambassador Sparks might take this memorandum along with him to Santiago to discuss it with Mr. Rubottom. One of the main complaints the President will include in this memorandum, it seemed apparent from the conversation, will be a detailed reference to the daily radio broadcasts from the Dominican Republic attacking Betancourt. Every morning at 6:30 a.m. the official Dominican Station carries a vitriolic diatribe, in insulting terms, against the Venezuelan Government and Betancourt personally. This program is monitored by the Venezuelan Armed Forces, the President says, and transcripts are furnished him immediately. The President said the Venezuelan Government radio never broadcasts propaganda of this nature. The President also said that he would suggest to Gonzalo Barrios that he talk to Mr. Burrows before he goes to Washington and explain to Mr. Burrows what he intends to do in the OAS.

The President then turned to the matter of anti-Betancourt and anti Venezuelan propaganda which has been “flooding” the country from the Dominican Republic. He referred specifically to the American ship SS NANCY LYKES which is being held in Puerto La Cruz and said that he is going to issue definite instructions that any ship or airplane coming to Venezuela from the Dominican Republic be subjected to a thorough inspection before any cargo or passengers can be discharged. The land of inspection he envisaged will result in costly delays, but he is satisfied that the only answer for the shipping lines or the airlines will be not to have any ships or planes attempt to enter Venezuela after having stopped in the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Sparks observed that this was a very strong measure to take and the President agreed that it was but he made quite clear that as far as he is concerned there is no alternative.

President Betancourt at this point also referred to the numerous bombs that are being found around the city. So far they have been found before explosion and he trusts the police will continue to be successful in this. He is satisfied they are being placed by Dominican agents; certainly he thinks no Venezuelan would be capable of manufacturing one. Venezuelans, he said, have had no experience as terrorists.

The President said that his military people advise him that members of the American military missions have been expressing to Venezuelan military officers their concern about the inroads of the Communists in Venezuela. The President made it very clear that he did not think these matters fell within the purview of the American military missions and that he did not consider that remarks of this kind made his job any easier. He said that he is not ingenuous about the position of the Communists and he repeated that appropriate attention is being paid them; he said further that the Armed Forces are solidly with and behind him. Ambassador Sparks agreed that our military mission people should not engage in conversations of this kind and said that he would look into it.

The President, in speaking of his position with regard to the Communists and the Armed Forces, also said that reports concerning division among the three major parties are very much exaggerated. He said that, as a matter of fact, he was having lunch that day with leaders of the three parties in order to discuss important current problems.

At the end of the conversation Ambassador Sparks asked President Betancourt if the matter of PAA jet landings at Palo Negro pending the completion of the Maiquetia airstrip is a closed issue. The President said that the one experimental landing presents no problem, but the Armed Forces are very much opposed to continuing landings on a commercial basis until the airstrip at Maiquetia is finished and the President did not see how he could properly override this objection. The President said that in any case the work on the Maiquetia airstrip will be completed in October.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 731.11/4–2859. Confidential. Drafted by Burrows and transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch 957 from Caracas, April 28, 1959.
2. There were two drafts of the letter. One prepared by Carl Bartch, dated April 24, 1959, which was not sent, and the draft, dated April 27, 1959, prepared by Craig M. Stark of the Bureau of Economic Affairs, which ultimately was used. (ARA Files, Lot 61 D 319, “Petroleum Policy.”)
   The version which was finally sent, dated April 28, 1958 for delivery April 29, was transmitted to the Embassy in telegram 724. It stated that the forthcoming amendment to the mandatory program would, “improve the operation of the program and serve the interests of the Western Hemisphere. While the relatively small amount of Canadian oil sold in the North Central and Northwestern part of the United States does not compete with Venezuelan oil, this amendment will, we hope, reduce the serious risk of a permanent loss to Venezuela of ts Montreal market. (831.2553/4–2959)
3. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Mexican labor leader and unsuccessful popular party presidential candidate in 1952.
4. The referenced telegram, April 19, 1959, reported that the Foreign Minister stated that the Venezuelan Cabinet had reached the conclusion that the U.S. was supporting Trujillo and the Foreign Minister implied that if Trujillo attacked Venezuela, Venezuela would reciprocate. The telegram also reported that the Embassy denied emphatically the Cabinet’s conclusion about the U.S. position, and stressed that the U.S. position was to support OAS and Inter-American treaty commitments on non-intervention and the rights and duties of American states. (713.00/4–1959)
5. The referenced telegram, April 20, 1959, reported that the Department was convinced there would be strong, unfavorable reaction throughout the American states if Venezuela launched an attack against another American republic without adequate evidence that the latter attacked Venezuela, and without at the same time taking the the matter to the OAS. (738.00/4–1959)