Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

VE–20. Memorandum of a Conversation, Caracas, Venezuela, February 14, 1959¹

Caracas, February 14, 1959

SUBJECT

• President Betancourt of Venezuela

PARTICIPANTS

• President Betancourt; Mrs. Betancourt
• Governor Dewey, Head of United States Delegation to Inauguration of President Betancourt
• Ambassador Sparks
• ARA—Mr. Rubottom
• Ambassador Falcón Briceño

Governor Dewey, Ambassador Sparks, and called on President Betancourt by appointment at 8 a.m., February 14. We waited 5 or 10 minutes on the porch of the residence, along with Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, Sr. Marcos Falcón Briceño, and then were greeted by the President and Mrs. Betancourt, who escorted the group² into the dining room for breakfast.

The President wasted no time in getting down to business. Addressing himself to me in Spanish, he said that Venezuela intended to raise in the OAS the question of expelling the dictatorship countries. He declared that communism profited by the continuation of the dictatorships and that their fall would deal the communists a mortal blow. He began to refer by name to Trujillo, with noticeable feeling, and aimed most of his thrusts directly at him.

I stated our policy of supporting the basic principles of the OAS, including non intervention, and my conviction that this was fully compatible with the encouragement and growth of democracy. I questioned whether a majority of countries in America would support his position of expelling members which had not yet arrived at democratic systems. I reminded him of the risk, in tolerating any kind of intervention, that “bad” governments would feel justified in intervening just as much as “good” governments. Governor Dewey, who followed the discussion through Ambassador Sparks’ running translation, asked who would judge when direct intervention was called for.

The President reasserted his position. He would consult with Colombia and Argentina. He acknowledged that Mexico was strongly against any kind of intervention. If the OAS would not join Venezuela in expelling the Trujillo Government, then Venezuela would withdraw from the OAS. They would continue to adhere to the Río Treaty³ and the Caracas Resolution.⁴ He had favored our stand against Arbenz.⁵

The President said he had learned much in 10 years. Things were now different in Venezuela. He would no longer tolerate the constant insults against him personally and his country. Venezuela would take economic sanctions such as not allowing Pan American Airways to stop in Venezuela if it continued stopping in Ciudad Trujillo; the same with the Grace Line. He recalled Mr. Mann’s call on him 10 years ago to warn him of possible air attacks on Venezuela by Trujillo backed planes.⁶ He reminded me of the recent reports of possible bombing of Venezuelan oil fields by Dominican planes. He kept referring to the “aggressive” tone of the Dominican Republic reply to Venezuela’s invitation to his inauguration, sending Mrs. Betancourt upstairs to try to find a newspaper with the text of the “offensive” document. (Her mission was unsuccessful but he promised to send me a copy to the Embassy.) The President said that he would tolerate no Dominican attempt against Venezuela, and would reply with force if attacked. On the other hand, he was categoric in stating that he would not permit any revolt against the Trujillo Government or any other to be staged from Venezuela. (Later I was informed that he had made a similar declaration to OAS Secretary General Mora.)

I reentered the discussion on a different tack. I told the President of Haiti’s problem which was really a hemisphere one but for which the United States was paying the cost. I asked him what he thought of the Haitian exiles’ open call from Habana for the overthrow of Duvalier who, whether or not a “good” President, had been freely elected by the Haitian people after a year of chaos. Here was Cuba, in the first flush of victory over a tyrant, permitting attacks on a nearby government. Did he approve?

The President didn’t know about this situation but would look into it.

Then I said that he could count on the OAS for absolute protection of Venezuela against any outside attack. He was reminded of the Río Treaty which had proved its effectiveness. With reliance on the OAS, Venezuela need have no concern about aggression; it could concentrate on its internal affairs without fear. The United States would join with others to defend Venezuela before any serious ill could fall on his country. The President seemed to listen carefully, but he did not respond in any detail to my statement. Our host mentioned the reference to revision of the trade agreement in his inaugural speech. He described it as an “escape valve” to ease pressure on him from affected Venezuelan interests. I said we would discuss the subject through regular channels if he wished, but added that the agreement was carefully balanced and would have to continue to offer advantages to both parties. With the slack in demand for petroleum, and with the new crisis in the coal industry in the United States as result of reduced market in Germany, the time was not the most propitious. He did not press his point.

Finally, he turned to the subject of military equipment. The country had been left deeply in debt by Perez Jimenez. The military would be loyal to him. They need new equipment, especially for the armored forces. They hope to buy it from the United States at “token” prices. This would be one tangible way of helping and supporting his government.

I asked whether he was talking about additional equipment, or that included in the purchase agreement of 1957.⁷ His reply was not clear, but he seemed to mean a revision of the terms of the 1957 purchase agreement, and he again referred to the need to buy it for token prices.

As we left the table, I told the President of the United States’ effort to meet the Junta Government’s request for an early date to inaugurate the Boliver Statue in Washington.⁸ We wanted President Eisenhower to participate because of the event’s importance, and we were cognizant of the plan of Venezuela to send Admiral Larrazábal for the ceremonies. I had received his messages via Ambassador Falcón, Assistant Secretary Mann, and Mr. Proudfit. The problem of setting the date had been difficult, all the more so because of the uncertainty of the Venezuelan inaugural date which had been changed twice. He laughed and said that this had been hard on him, too, and that it was the fault of the Venezuelan Congress.

The President said that the date of February 27 was all right. They would send a fitting delegation, possibly headed by the Foreign Minister, or maybe the President of the Congress, Dr. Leoni. He reassured me that our problem was understood. He made no reference whatever to Admiral Larrazábal.

Ambassador Sparks asked the President to tell us how he felt about the presence of Perez Jimenez in the United States. The President said he understood the technical and legal points involved – that the man had a Venezuelan diplomatic passport, and that the Junta Government had requested a visa. Nevertheless, he said, United States relations with the people of Venezuela would remain “below zero” as long as he stays in our country. The man has no future anywhere; he is no problem in Venezuela to the President, but he is an impediment to good relations. I asked whether, at this time, he would prefer to see Perez Jimenez in the Dominican Republic. The President replied affirmatively. I said I would look into the matter. He didn’t mention extradition and I didn’t suggest it.

After expressing our appreciation to the President and Mrs. Betancourt and Ambassador Falcón, we departed at 9:40.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 731.11/2–1659. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Rubottom on February 16.
2. President-elect Betancourt was inaugurated on February 13, 1959. The U.S. delegation to attend the inauguration included the following: former N.Y. Governor Thomas E. Dewey; Rubottom; John M. Budinger, Vice President of the Rankers Trust Company; Harry Darby, Chairman of the Board of Darby Corp. and former U.S. Senator from Kansas; General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; and Serafino Romualdi, AFL–CIO Representative for Latin America (who replaced AFL–CIO President George Meany, who was ill).
3. Reference is to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on September 2, 1947, and entered into force on December 3, 1948. For text of the Treaty, see 62 State 1681.
4. A reference to Resolution XCIII, titled “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against the Intervention of International Communism,” approved on March 28, 1954, at the Tenth Inter-American Conference which met at Caracas, March 1–28, 1954. For the text of the resolution, see Tenth Inter-American Conference: Report of the Delegation of the United States of America with Related Documents (Department of State Publication 5692, Washington, 1955), pp. 156–158. For pertinent documentation regarding the resolution, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IV, The American Republics.
5. For documentation on U.S. policy toward Guatemala during the presidency of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1951–1954) see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IV, The American Republics.
6. Documentation on the subject of Dominican revolutionary activity on Venezuela is printed on Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. VIII, The American Republics, Chapter 77.
7. In note no. 179 of February 5, 1957, the Government of Venezuela accepted the credit facilities offered by the United States in its note of December 6, 1956, for the purchase of U.S. military equipment to implement the defense objectives assigned to Venezuela by the Military Planning Talks concluded at Caracas, March 13, 1956. (731.5/2–557) Documentation concerning the extension of credit for military equipment is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VII, American Republics: Central and South America, Chapter 17.
8. President Eisenhower accepted the statue on behalf of the U.S. Government on February 27, 1959. Documentation concerning the matter is contained in decimal file 831.442.