Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

VE–15. Memorandum of a Conversation¹

Caracas, December 14, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

• Sr. Rómulo Betancourt, President–Elect²
• Ambassador Edward J. Sparks
• Mr. Charles R. Burrows, Minister–Counselor

Following the delayed receipt of the Department’s telegram #350 of December 13 (later reencrypted and received here as #352)³ an appointment was arranged through President-elect Betancourt’s Secretary to meet with Betancourt Sunday evening at the mountain retreat of a friend of the President-elect. Mr. Betancourt had been relaxing at this country home over the weekend. Ambassador Sparks and Mr. Burrows arrived at 9:20 p.m. and the conversation with Mr. Betancourt continued from then until 12:45 a.m. over a wide range of subjects. Betancourt, who was relaxed and easy, spoke with obvious frankness on everything that occurred to him.

Ambassador Sparks opened the conversation by speaking of the possibility of a visit to Caracas by Assistant Secretary Thomas C. Mann for the purpose of discussing the petroleum situation and the problem created by the present excess of supply over demand. The Ambassador spoke of Mr. Mann’s close knowledge of this situation and of the value of conversations between him and President-elect Betancourt as well as appropriate officials of the present Venezuelan Government. Betancourt acknowledged with agreement the Ambassador’s references to Mr. Mann, as well as to Mr. Mann’s long-standing friendship with Mr. Betancourt, but he did not openly express an opinion on the proposed visit. Ambassador Sparks finally asked President-elect Betancourt directly if he thought it was a good idea,⁴ at which point Betancourt assented but without particular enthusiasm.⁵ It was obvious that Mr. Betancourt did not know exactly what the conversations would encompass but it was also obvious that he agreed that conversations would be of value.

Ambassador Sparks then offered his own personal congratulations as well as the congratulations of the Department on Betancourt’s election and also expressed on behalf of the Department its satisfaction over the important contribution of the election to Latin America’s democratic institutions in general. Betancourt was obviously pleased at these statements and in response spoke of his own recognition of the great responsibilities he now has and his serious intentions to carry out those responsibilities to the best of his ability. The Ambassador asked him when the inauguration would be scheduled. Betancourt replied that the inauguration probably would be either late in January or early in February. Ambassador Sparks explained that sometimes the period between the election of a President and his inauguration offers an opportunity for an informal visit to be made to the United States but in view of the shortness of the Venezuelan pre-inaugural period he assumed it would be impractical to attempt to arrange such an informal visit. Ambassador Sparks continued by explaining the procedure for invitations to pay official visits to the United States and that normally two Chiefs of State of Latin America are invited each year for state visits. He said that President Frondizi from Argentina will be paying a state visit to Washington in January of 1959, and President Lemus of Salvador in March. With this background of explanation the Ambassador asked Betancourt what his thoughts on the matter were. President-elect Betancourt replied by making it quite clear that aside from the fact that he could not possibly plan a trip outside Venezuela before his inauguration, he did not feel an informal visit to the United States would be appropriate. He said that he believed the most appropriate procedure to follow would be for an invitation to be issued to him to visit the United States after his inauguration but without specifying any particular date. Betancourt remarked that he felt the United States erred in not having invited Figueres of Costa Rica⁶ to visit the United States during the five-year period of Figueres’ Presidency. He said that Figueres is a good friend of the United States and that he had demonstrated this in La Paz, Bolivia, when he answered an unfriendly speech made by the Mayor of La Paz during the official visit of Figueres to that country prior to his inauguration. Betancourt then turned the conversation more directly to the election and the present political situation.

In discussing the defeat of Larrazábal, Betancourt demonstrated very little respect for him as a politician although he said that he likes Larrazábal personally. He said that with the elections over, Larrazábal has no further stomach for politics. Betancourt said that he intends to appoint Larrazábal as Ambassador to Chile, although Betancourt said he had not exerted any pressure on Larrazábal to accept the assignment. Betancourt, almost negating his denial that any pressure had been exerted on Larrazábal, said that although Larrazábal has no further interest in politics, as a military man in the recent election and as a popular figure in Venezuela, he might even against his will become a symbol in the country for those who might want to use him. To demonstrate the naïveté of Larrazábal, Betancourt said that Larrazábal in conversation with him, had asked why he had been so badly defeated and why he had not even carried the town where he was born. Betancourt’s reply to Larrazábal had been that AD had been actively organized in Larrazábal’s home town for the past 20 years.

Betancourt expressed respect for Caldera⁷ and said that he would expect him to take an important part in the future political affairs of Venezuela. He said he is honest, sincere and intelligent. He attributed Caldera’s small vote to the facts that the Venezuelan people are non-clerical and that the vote in the recent election was polarized between Betancourt and Larrazábal. In other words, many people who might otherwise have voted for Caldera voted for Betancourt or for Larrazábal simply because they felt Caldera had no chance of winning.

With reference to Villalba⁸ it was obvious that Betancourt has little respect for him and his party. He said that if URD had not had Larrazábal as a candidate the party would have received very few votes. With the elections over, Betancourt obviously expects URD to sink into an insignificant position.

Betancourt spoke of his heavy responsibilities in assuming the Presidency of Venezuela and made clear that he intends to give everything he can of himself to those responsibilities. As far as his own political situation and that of his party is concerned, he demonstrated complete confidence. He said with reference to the Armed Forces that some of the younger officers represent a problem in that for 10 years now they have been indoctrinated with the idea that Accion Democratic did everything possible before to disrupt the Army and that if AD should return to power it would follow the same course again. He said that after his inauguration he will give immediate attention to this situation and that he feels he can correct it without difficulty. Speaking to the situation in Caracas, the large vote against him here, and the demonstrations which had already occurred, Betancourt said that he did not feel at all hopeless about it, he said that the great majority Larrazábal had received in Caracas represented a pro-Larrazábal vote but not necessarily an anti-AD vote. He is very cognizant of the problems in Caracas, particularly of unemployment and poverty, as well as the popular devotion to Larrazábal as a democratic symbol, but he said that within the first four or five months of his administration he felt that he could correct many of the unemployment problems and swing much of the popular sentiment toward him and his party.

Ambassador Sparks asked Dr. Betancourt if the young and more leftist wing of his party were a cause of concern to him. Betancourt replied that with the demonstration of AD organization and support for him throughout the country outside the capital, there was no question in his mind as to who controlled the party and commanded its respect. He said that it had been assumed from the beginning that Larrazábal would win in Caracas but that the younger wing of AD had been permitted to assume the primary responsibility for keeping Larrazábal’s plurality in Caracas as low as possible. These younger members of AD had obviously failed in their responsibility and as a result had lost standing in the party. He said that they spent too much of their time talking and writing and not enough in direct contact with the people.

Speaking again of the problems which his administration will face, he said that he considers unemployment perhaps the greatest one. He spoke also of the educational problem and of the necessity for agrarian reform. He by no means seemed overwhelmed by the problems which he will face however, saying that the wealth of the country should make it easy to face and handle these problems. Venezuela is not like Bolivia, Betancourt said. With reference to increasing the income of the government Betancourt made specific reference to the income from the petroleum industry; he mentioned also in passing Venezuela’s iron ore but his emphasis was primarily on petroleum. He made it clear that there will be a revision of the arrangement for the sharing of income between the petroleum industry and the Venezuelan Government, but he said that this revision will be on the basis of bi-lateral negotiations and not by government fiat. Likewise, he said the Government would not enter into negotiations on the basis of a prior commitment to any fixed ratio (such as 65–35 or anything like that) but would, rather, begin the discussions with a completely open mind as to what the final outcome might be.

At various points during the conversation Betancourt made clear his position with reference to the Communists and to Communism in general. He recognized the danger and the threat which the Communists represent in Venezuela but he showed full confidence that he could meet and defeat that threat. He said emphatically the Communists will have no part in his Government and he said also that when he says no he means no, and when he says yes he means yes - as any of his American friends know. With reference to the recognition of the Soviet Government he said this is a matter which will receive very careful study. He said it is not an easy matter to resolve, particularly when one remembers that a number of American nations have relations with the Soviet, such as the United States, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, etc., but that no urgent decision is necessary, and that in any event it will be given very careful study before action is taken.

Betancourt emphasized that he is a friend of the United States and that he has always been treated well by the Department of State. He said he has not always agreed with Department of State policies but he has no complaint as to his treatment by the Department. He said that one of the decisions with which he disagreed was the decision by the United States to support Caracas as the site for the 1954 Inter-American Conference. By insisting so strongly that this Conference be held in Caracas, he said that the United States had estranged several of its best democratic friends in Latin America.

With reference to Trujillo and the Dominican Republic, he said that if Trujillo does not throw his weight around too much as a dictator and against democratic elements outside his own country, Betancourt will continue normal but cool relations. If Trujillo continues his exaggerated actions however, Betancourt will not hesitate to break relations and to impose economic sanctions. When asked about his attitude toward the situation in Cuba, it was evident that Betancourt had not given the matter any particular thought. However, he did say that he felt the OAS should go into this Cuban situation or if not the OAS as a body, at least a number of the more important countries of the Hemisphere, such as United States, Argentina, Mexico, should demonstrate multi-lateral interest.

With reference to the Presidential inauguration Betancourt indicated that there would be no attempt to build the ceremony into a tremendous occasion, but he did mention names of various Latin American personalities who would be coming to his inauguration as members of the delegations of their respective countries.

In answer to a question about his Cabinet, Betancourt said that he had mentally pretty well formed his Cabinet but he had not discussed it with anyone as yet. He said that probably two or three of the more technical present Cabinet members would be kept on in the new Cabinet.

At one point in the conversation Betancourt made a disparaging reference to Robert Brinsmade as the kind of American who gets involved in political matters in Venezuela which are no concern of his. This was only a passing remark and there was no indication what Betancourt might have in mind doing, if anything, but it was obvious that he has very little respect for Brinsmade.

Betancourt said that the Petroquimica, the steel mill and the Caroni project would be continued under his administration. He also said there will be no more 40-year concessions nor as a matter of fact will there be any concessions immediately since the companies already have 6,000,000 hectares and are actually utilizing only 600,000 for exploration and exploitation; he spoke of the nation taking a more direct part in the development of the industry as well as in a tanker fleet. He said that nationalism is a very strong motivating force in any country of the world today and that due regard must be taken of it in Venezuela.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.31/12–1658. Confidential. Drafted by Burrows, and transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 490 from Caracas, December 16, 1958.
2. Betancourt was the victor in the presidential elections held December 7, 1958.
3. The referenced telegram instructed the Ambassador to express the Department’s congratulations on Betancourt’s election and to explain that an informal visit to the United States by Betancourt was not feasible in the pre-inaugural period due to time limitations. (731.00/12–1158)
4. A typewritten marginal notation reads: “On Monday and again on Tuesday, however, Betancourt himself and then his Secretary called to inquire as to the exact date of Mr. Mann’s arrival. Betancourt on the occasion of the first call said that he wanted to call his ‘petroleum expert’ back from Mexico to participate in the conversations (Perez Alfonso?).” Jan Pablo Perez Alfonso had been Minister of Production, 1945–1948.
5. A handwritten marginal notation reads: “Probably knew impending tax ‘coup’!”
6. Jose Figueres, President of Costa Rica, 1953-1958.
7. Raphael Caldera, presidential candidate of Venezuela’s Christian Socialist party, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI).
8. Jóvito Villalba, presidential candidate of Unión Republicana Democrática (URO).