Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

VE–10. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 20, 1958.¹

Washington, May 20, 1958

SUBJECT

• Political and Economic Factors in U.S. Relations with Venezuela

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Hector Santaella, Venezuelan Ambassador
• Mr. R. R. Rubottom, Jr. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
• Mr. C. E. Bartoh, Venezuelan Desk Officer

Dr. Santaella made a farewell call this afternoon on Mr. Rubottom, who congratulated him on his important new position as Secretary of the Junta of Government, but expressed regret that he was leaving Washington. The Ambassador said he was sorry to leave, especially on such short notice, but found comfort in the knowledge that he would have an opportunity in his new position to continue to work for even closer relations with the United States, which he said he understands and admires very much. Although Dr. Santaella thought perhaps he should call on President Eisenhower before leaving, he said he would be guided by Mr. Rubottom’s advice. Mr. Rubottom told him he didn’t think a call on the President would be necessary, especially since the Ambassador was calling on the Vice President later today and on the Secretary tomorrow. Moreover, on such short notice it would probably not be possible to arrange an appointment with the President. The Ambassador said in that case he thought he might simply write a letter to the President, and Mr. Rubottom agreed that that would be satisfactory.

Dr. Santaella said he had talked by telephone with President Larrazábal and other members of the Junta of Government, as well as with representatives of the Armed Forces and political leaders. He had been assured of their confidence and support in his new position; he would not have agreed to accept the appointment if such support had not been forthcoming. He said he is not a member of any organized political party. Commenting briefly on the political situation, the Ambassador expressed confidence that, despite temporary setbacks, Venezuela would attain an orderly, democratic form of government. He pointed out that an electoral law, drafted by the multi-partisan Electoral Law Commission, is to be promulgated on May 23, at which time several cabinet changes will be announced. It looked to him as though elections would be convened in November or December of this year, or in January or February of 1959. He thought it likely that if elections were held in 1958, the elected government might be installed in office on January 23, 1959, the one-year anniversary of the revolution which ousted the Perez Jimenez Government, instead of on April 19, the traditional date in Venezuela for presidential inaugurations. He considered it important, as a means of insuring stability and continuity, that the new government take office as soon as possible after the elections. In reply to a question from Mr. Bartch, he stated that he had forgotten to inquire last week in Caracas whether the date for the elections would be announced on May 23.

Mentioning the incidents that had occurred during the Vice President’s visit to Venezuela on May 13 and 14, Dr. Santaella emphasized that they had taken place in a politically effervescent atmosphere resulting from ten years of repressive dictatorship. He recognized that freedom implies responsibility if complete chaos is to be avoided, and thought it imperative that such responsibility be developed. At the same time, however, the Ambassador and the leaders of the political parties were opposed to outlawing the Communist Party; he felt Communist activities would be best held in check by other means. The Government had made a number of arrests as a result of the violence that occurred during the Vice President’s visit, and had launched an investigation of the activities of supporters of Perez Jimenez. Ambassador Santaella expressed great admiration for the Vice President and Mrs. Nixon and the manner in which they had conducted themselves in Caracas. Not only had the Vice President exhibited real courage, he had demonstrated inner qualities of greatness; he had calmly and objectively appraised the situation, revealing a wisdom of judgment and a depth of understanding found only in great men.

Ambassador Santaella characterized the anti-American demonstrations that took place during the Vice President’s visit as the work of a very small minority, not at all representative of the sentiments of the Venezuelan people, whom he described as being unusually friendly to the United States. He said relations between our two countries remained very good, despite the incidents.

Dr. Santaella asked Mr. Rubottom’s opinion on the developments that might be expected in Washington as a result of the Vice President’s visit to South America. Mr. Rubottom told him that he was an eternal optimist; he was gratified by indications that Congressional inquiries into our policies might be constructive rather than in the nature of a post mortem. Mr. Rubottom stated that it is only natural that temporary problems in our relations with Latin America will arise from time to time, just as we as individuals have disagreements with our families and neighbors. But as long as our mutual relations are based upon sound policies, he said, and as long as there is the will on both sides to understand the other’s problems and to work together toward their solution, there is no reason for pessimism.

Having expressed the opinion that nothing basically was wrong with relations between Venezuela and the United States, Ambassador Santaella turned to several outstanding problems that had arisen. He repeated his statement that Venezuela was in a difficult period of transition, and would need the firm moral and political support of the United States. He mentioned the problem that had resulted from the admission into the United States of Perez Jimenez and Estrada. Stating that he did not want to get involved in a discussion of the legal aspects of the case, which he understood, he reiterated the depth of feeling in Venezuela against the two men. He said that not even Beria nor the Gestapo had committed greater atrocities than those perpetrated on the people of Venezuela by Perez Jimenez and Estrada. Although the Ambassador had been arrested three times during the Perez Jimenez regime, he did not consider himself a particular victim of it. He recalled that his law partner had been arrested and forced to witness the slow torture and finally the murder of another prisoner by “Bachiller” Castro and other notorious SN inquisitors. In view of these and other equally serious crimes and atrocities, Dr. Santaella said, the Venezuelan people find it hard to understand why the United States, with its democratic traditions, permits Perez Jimenez to live in luxury in Miami and openly flaunt his wealth. He said it would not have been so bad if the two men had gone quietly to live on ranches in North Dakota, but being in Florida, so close to Central and South America, not only made their residence in the United States more conspicuous but had caused many rumors to circulate about their plotting to regain power, with the acquiescence or even the assistance of the United States. He said stories continued to circulate of their connections in high places in the United States Government, and it was known in Venezuela that Perez Jimenez and Estrada had met with their supporters in New York during the Vice President’s visit to Venezuela, ostensibly to engineer a revolt against the Provisional Government.

Mr. Rubottom briefly outlined the reasons why visas were issued to the two men, reiterating that they had both been required to execute statements that while in the United States they would not engage in activities directed against the Venezuelan Government. He emphasized they had no entrée here at all; he said he had no personal sympathy whatsoever for either man; as a matter of fact, he had not even met them. He told the Ambassador that he and others who understood the situation could perform a real service by explaining the facts of the case to those who did not understand. Just as we are attempting to play down in the United States the incidents that occurred during the Vice President’s visit to Venezuela, so should responsible Venezuelans make every effort to play down the fact that we had admitted Perez Jimenez and Estrada. Dr. Santaella agreed that it might be worthwhile to do so, but said it would be political suicide for him or any other prominent person to attempt to explain publicly why Perez Jimenez and Estrada had been admitted to the United States, since everything concerning the two men had political dynamite. Mr. Rubottom recalled the statements made by the Vice President at his press conference in Caracas, pointing out that no request had been received from Venezuela for the extradition of the two men, and that it was up to Venezuela to make the next move. Dr. Santaella replied that he would do all he could to expedite the legal process necessary to transmit a request for extradition.

Although he characterized political problems as being paramount, Dr. Santaella also described the oil import problem as most serious. He had discussed the problem at some length in Venezuela last week; some thought the restrictions the United States had imposed were good for Venezuela, since it enabled her to conserve her oil resources. Mr. Rubottom agreed that there was much validity to that point of view, since oil did not deteriorate if left in the ground, moreover, the program also protected the price Venezuela received for her oil. It would not benefit Venezuela if the flood of oil in the United States market increased to such an extent that a higher level of Venezuelan exports of oil failed, through a decline in price, to produce a comparable increase in the total revenue received by Venezuela.

Although the Ambassador could see the logic of this argument, he did not agree with it. He had talked last week to several leading industrialists in Venezuela, all of whom felt that the Venezuelan Government should provide them with greater protection against imports from the United States to compensate for the protectionist policy implemented by the United States against imports of Venezuelan oil. Mr. Rubottom expressed the hope that nothing would be done to negate the Supplementary Trade Agreement, which benefitted Venezuela no less than the United States. As the head of the United States team which had negotiated the agreement in 1952, Mr. Rubottom said he recalled vividly the difficulties that had to be overcome to obtain permission to go below the peril point to reduce the duty from 10.5 to 5.25 per cent on high gravity oil. With the surge of protectionism in the United States at the present time, he felt that if the agreement were reopened for negotiation it would not be possible to provide an equivalent concession on imports of petroleum. Dr. Santaella seemed to appreciate this, but thought some formula could be evolved under the agreement to provide Venezuela with compensation for the action taken by the United States in restricting oil imports. He admitted that he did not know of any formula that would accomplish this.

In departing, Ambassador Santaella thanked Mr. Rubottom and his associates for their courtesy and assistance during the brief time he was in Washington. Mr. Rubottom told him he would look forward to seeing him again, either in Washington or Caracas; in the meantime, he said, he would be pleased to do anything he could for the Ambassador. Dr. Santaella said he was departing from Washington early Thursday morning, May 22, since President Larrazábal was anxious for him to arrive as soon as possible.

1. Source: Department of State, Rubottom Files, Lot 60 D 553, “Venezuela 1958.” Confidential. Drafted by Bartch on May 29. The source text is an unsigned carbon copy.