Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

UR–9. Despatch from the Ambassador in Uruguay (Woodward) to the Department of State¹

No. 438.

Montevideo, December 5, 1958

SUBJECT

• Comments Concerning Uruguayan Relations with the United States Under New Herrerista Administration

There is still a slight possibility that the final count of votes may change the narrow margin of some 6,000 or 7,000 votes by which the Herreristas have the majority within the Nationalist Party. But it now appears that the Government will almost certainly be led during the four years after March 1, 1959, by the Herreristas.

We are not certain in our predictions of any attitudes of this political group (which has been essentially in opposition for approximately 93 years) except that it is strongly representative of rural interests and will undoubtedly do everything possible to promote agricultural prosperity. The outgoing Administration obviously harmed agricultural productivity by over-zealous efforts to industrialize and to increase the prosperity of city workers. Since agricultural productivity and exportation is the only way in which exchange can be created to permit normal Uruguayan imports, it can be hoped that Herrerista measures may help promote economic recovery.

The Herrerista segment of the Nationalist Party, which has been under the leadership of Luis Alberto HERRERA for over a generation, was essentially friendly toward the United States and very pro-British up until the Terra revolution² in Uruguay in 1933. At that time, the Herreristas supported this Uruguayan version of strong-man government and showed similar enthusiasm for the dictatorships which existed in Italy and Germany. This led to an orientation toward Germany during World War II, and subsequently led to some enthusiasm for Peron’s type of demagogic dictatorship. Now that all of these dictatorships have been thoroughly discredited, there is no current indication of enthusiasm for totalitarian ideas in the Herrerista group.

Up until about ten months ago, the Herrerista newspaper, El Debate, had frequent editorial criticisms and sneering innuendos concerning U.S. policy in a large variety of matters. However, during the last six months of that period, from 18 months ago to 10 months ago, when the Colorado List 15³ newspaper Acción was notably critical of the United States and inclined to accuse the United States of much of the responsibility of Uruguay’s economic ills, particularly the loss of Uruguayan markets for wool, this Colorado criticism was matched by a trend in El Debate toward gradually increasing tolerance of United States policies. In other words, it appears that a large factor in the critical Herrerista attitude toward United States’ policies had been one of opposition to the attitude of the Colorado List 15 Government.

So far as the general orientation of the Herreristas is concerned, a large proportion of their support is probably found among the smaller ranchers and farmers than any other single group; a majority of the largest ranchers and farmers could fairly be said to be supporters of the UBD, and a majority of the industrialists were probably also UBD supporters. Since UBD collaboration will, in essence, be essential to the Herreristas, the combination of Nationalist factors in the new Administration will, therefore, be conservative. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the concentration of property in Uruguay is decidedly limited as compared with most other countries and that extreme conservatism in this country is a minor element. The new Administration may, therefore, not be notably reactionary. It is more likely, by its nature, to be anti-Communist than the List 15 Government, although several Nationalists, while in the opposition, have been notably friendly with the Soviet Legation. However, it is not likely that the Communists will be dealt with sufficiently drastically to give them a phoney “aura of persecution” which would actually help to strengthen them. In general, the broad middle-class element that has been revealed in this election will be a very important bulwark against drastic change in policies in Uruguay—and the unusual governmental system which gives the opposition unique opportunity to influence policies will help this.

Leaders of the Nationalist Party have shown, individually, a courteous and friendly personal attitude in conversations with officers of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. citizens. The 85-year old leader, Herrera, has been very cordial. He made a distinct effort to be friendly in greeting Vice President Nixon during the Vice President’s visit to Uruguay from April 28–30, 1958, and he came to the Embassy residence to a reception for the Vice President. I made it a point to invite him to sit down on the sofa in the National Palace beside Vice President Nixon, as the Vice President was saying goodbye to the National Council, so that he and the Vice President could have their picture taken together, and this obviously greatly pleased the old gentleman. When I made a courtesy call on Herrera a few weeks later, he went out of his way to be exceptionally cordial even though it was obvious that he is almost totally deaf. He gave considerable publicity to this visit in his newspaper. (Amusingly, when I called on another Nationalist Councillor, Viña, the next day, he told me that the Herreristas didn’t have a “ghost of a chance” in the coming elections under “the old man”.)

The man who will be President of the Council during the first year is Dr. Martin R. ECHEGOYEN. He is quite widely respected in Montevideo as a decent, intelligent and honest lawyer. He is considered to be so loyal to Herrera as probably to be almost subservient to him. While he opposed ratification of the ICA Industrial Productivity Agreement during the discussion on this subject in the Senate, I expect this was more symptomatic of opposition to List 15 than any real indication of feeling with respect to the United States or with respect to the substance of the matter. If he had any motivation other than “politics“, it may have been more a manifestation of nationalistic resistance against taking advice rather than any feeling with respect to the United States.

The man who would be President of the Council during the second year is Señor Benito NARDONE. [text not declassified] it was his demagogic appeal through radio programs over several years which apparently helped greatly to glean a large number of votes from small farmers whom he promised to help. It seems probable that he has no convictions on international matters and will continue to be an opportunist; it can be hoped that he will see the greater “opportunity” of adopting a “statesmanlike attitude” when he is a National Councillor. (A glossary of his views on economic matters is contained in Emodes 436 of December 4, 1958.)⁴

The man who will be President of the Council during the third year, Señor Eduardo Victor HAEDO [text not declassified] has been venomous at times in his criticism of the United States, and it can only be hoped that his attitude will change when he is no longer in opposition and in a position of public responsibility as a Councillor.

The man who will be President during the fourth year is Señor Faustino HARRISON. He has always appeared to be friendly toward the United States, and has a fairly good reputation in Montevideo as a competent escribano.

One of the other two Herrerista members of the Council will be Dr. Justo M. ALONSO, a respected physician who is a member of the Rotary Club of Montevideo where I have talked with him occasionally and have found him very cordial.

Given the unpredictable nature of Herrerista policies and measures, the Council system of government has certain safeguards—in that the two Colorado List 15 Councillors and the one List 14 Councillor will have the same leavening effect that the Nationalist Councillors have had during the present Administration.

The Herrerista and UBD factions together will control a bare majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Representation in the Legislative Branch of the Government. It is too early to surmise concerning the extent of formal cooperation that may be developed between the two factions, but it is obvious that the Herrerista faction will not be able to pass any legislation unless it has the cooperation of some other segment of the legislative bodies which is as large as the UBD segment or the Colorado List 15 segment. Obviously the possibilities of cooperation with the UBD are greater than with the List 15. Therefore, there may be considerable moderation of ideas and policies in the Herrerista leadership when they are in power, if for no other reason than because of the necessity of getting things done.

The only existing program of the United States Government in Uruguay (since we do not have a real ICA program in operation at present) concerning which the Herrerista Government might develop a negative attitude is the Air Force Mission. The principal interest of the Colorado Government in having the Air Force Mission in Uruguay was, first, to obtain the military assistance equipment which we have been giving to Uruguay for “Hemispheric defense”, and probably, second, to have both this equipment and the Mission for the purpose of giving the Governmental leaders a feeling of security with respect to unpredictable developments in Argentina. This latter feeling was, of course, particularly strong during the Peron era, but developments in Argentina continue to inspire a feeling of uncertainty, and it seems likely that the Herrerista Government will have similar motivations. This reassuring defense tie has no doubt been, tacitly, in the minds of leaders of the Uruguayan Government, as powerful a political factor as exists in Uruguayan relations with the United States. We can no doubt thank our defense relationship as well as our fundamental ideological relationship for the Uruguayan measures of cooperation with the United States in international matters, particularly at the United Nations. It can be hoped that this relationship will continue. While the Herreristas, in the opposition, have been unenthusiastic about this “defense cooperation”, their attitude twenty years ago toward the militaristic regimes in Italy and Germany and their subsequent attitude toward the Peron regime in Argentina would not indicate any fundamental antipathy to “militarism” per se.

All indications we have received so far from the Herreristas are to the effect that they intend to adopt a clear policy of cooperation with the United States and the Western world and that they hope to have our friendly assistance.

There would seem to be no reason why we should adopt any change of attitude whatever in our relations with Uruguay, as we wait to see what concrete measures the new Administration will undertake and what general attitudes it will adopt. I believe that we should continue the efforts we have been making to resolve the old grievances and work toward new, modest measures of economic and financial cooperation. We should assume that the new Administration will have as much interest as (or more than) the present Administration in such measures as possible Eximbank assistance and possible DLF loans, both for the UTE telephone equipment and possibly to supplement the prospective IBRD loan for rehabilitation. The need is so great for the surplus tobacco and cotton which would be delivered under the PL 480⁵ agreement, that is being negotiated that there can be little question but that this negotiation would receive the unqualified approval of the new Administration.⁶ In any event, the sales transaction should be completed long before the new Administration comes in on March 1, 1959.

The general feeling among businessmen in Montevideo is that it was a great misfortune that the UBD did not quite obtain a majority within the Nationalist Party. At the same time, there is very general relief that the List 15 people are going to be out of the Government. The List 15 leaders, particularly Luis BATLLE Berres, have been widely disliked and feared by responsible citizens because their motivations had become so exclusively those of wardpoliticians who have decided any and every issue on the basis of how many votes the decision would bring in. This narrow, parochial attitude has now been proven to have been mistaken. It seems, in fact, that the Uruguayan people have had a greater and more responsible concern for their long-term interests than their governmental leaders have shown.

[text not declassified]

To my mind, there are a number of very reassuring conclusions to be drawn from the recent elections. First, it has been revealed that the rigidity of party affiliation in Uruguay was not as ossified as had been generally believed, and it has been proved that people will change parties (for the first time in 93 years, for any large majority) when sufficiently dissatisfied; this is reassuring for the future of Uruguayan democracy. Second, it has been revealed that the size of the vote that has been susceptible to the cheap, demagogic, short-term appeal of the present leaders of List 15—even with the help of thousands of Government employees—has not been as large as we had feared; this is a very wholesome indication of the strength of middle-class opinion which has some solid stake in the economy and social system of Uruguay. Third, the former Opposition won the elections by a sufficiently large majority so there is literally no chance of any attempt at a coup or “palace revolution” on the part of List 15 to retain power, even if there had been any such chance with a narrower majority; it is good for the permanency, growth and reputation of Uruguayan democracy that this temptation does not exist. Fourth, it is reassuring to note that, despite the powerful attitude of “protest” that motivated the voting during these elections, the Communist Party—which has had complete freedom of operation in this country and tried emphatically to round up every vote it could—was able to obtain only about 24,000 votes, not enough to increase its present Congressional representation of two Deputies out of 99; this, to my mind, is a very significant revelation of the strength of the democratic convictions of the some 940,000 Uruguayan voters who showed no interest in communism. Fifth, the very close division in the Nationalist vote between Herteristas and UBD—now within about 6,000 of each other—should promote a cooperative working relationship between these two wings with wholesome effects for the country, particularly when combined with the vivid example of the disastrous political results of Sr. Luis BATLLE Berres’ having harbored and nurtured personal animosity between List 15 and List 14 of the Colorado party; this situation offers real hope of further constructive and interesting development of the unique Uruguayan system of elections and Government.

This Embassy, like most other political prognosticators and pundits in Uruguay, was resigned to a continuation of a List 15 Government by a small and unworkable margin, and the Embassy was as surprised as were the Herreristas themselves at their victory. After a few days or reorientation, however, the Embassy is inclined to be optimistic and to believe, for all the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph, that the elections offer much more promising possibilities for Uruguay and for Uruguayan-United States relations than we had expected.

Robert F Woodward

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 733.00/12–558. Confidential.
2. Reference is to Gabriel Terra, President of Uruguay, 1931–1938, who dissolved both the National Council of Administration and the legislature in 1933, and called for a constitutional convention. The new constitution concentrated executive power in the President.
3. Since the 1940s, the two major factions of the Colorado Party were List 14 and List 15, the former lead by the sons of José Battle, President of Uruguay, 1903–1907 and 1911–1915, and the latter by his nephew, Luís Battle Berres.
4. Not printed; 833.00/12–458.
5. For the text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 State 454.
6. Reference is to the Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement effected by an exchange of notes, signed at Montevideo, February 20, 1959, and entered into force the same day. For the text of the agreement, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 10, p. 161.