Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

UR–17. Memorandum of the Conversation¹

Washington, September 20, 1960

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between Sr. Haedo, Member of the National Council of Uruguay and Forthcoming President of that country² and President Eisenhower, September 20, 1960.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • President Dwight D. Eisenhower
  • Ambassador Robert F. Woodward
  • Mr. C. A. Boonstra, ARA
  • Mr. F. vanReigersburg, LS

• Uruguay

  • National Councilor Haedo
  • Ambassador Carlos A. Clulow

The President at 11 a.m. welcomed Councilor Haedo and mentioned the painting, on a chair in the office, by Manuel Rosé entitled, “Sunset in the Sierra de Minas” which the Councilor had sent as a gift to the President.

After being seated, Councilor Haedo opened the conversation by remarking jocularly about Uruguay’s reputation as a country in which all sorts of radical movements flourished such as Castroism, Peronism, and Communism. In fact, he said, this is not the case. Uruguay is a small and stable country, but in common with other countries it has a need for improved internal security. To enhance this, he suggested that it may be a good idea to hold a meeting of police experts from all of the Latin American countries in Montevideo, “something like an Interpol meeting”. This could provide an opportunity for a discussion of police measures needed to improve internal security. To the extent possible such a meeting should be without publicity. At the same time it is becoming necessary to consider in Uruguay the provision of small arms for the police. In this connection he referred to the program of military assistance and suggested that present regulations both for military assistance and for the Uruguayan military forces should be interpreted more broadly so that the necessary small arms could be provided to the police. Even above these conditions, however, the Councilor said that he wished to emphasize the basic importance of financial security. Means must be found to provide the type of financial and economic arrangements on which there could be established an internally secure situation.

The President asked about the existing Uruguayan situation in other respects. The Councilor replied that everything is fine and that “with Bogotá, the arrangements with the International Monetary Fund—that have been very helpful—and financial assistance from the United States” there will be no problems. He said that his reports from the Uruguayan delegation to the Bogotá Conference were that the conference was very successful. The President remarked that the success of the Bogotá Conference was most pleasing to him.

The President the said that he would like to mention a situation which is giving him a great deal of worry. He recognizes the need for economic growth in Latin America and he is convinced that private investment for this purpose is more useful than public investment. During his trip earlier this year to South America, leaders in the various countries agreed that private investment is urgently needed. The excesses of Castro in Cuba, however, are now establishing a situation which deters investors from making investments in other countries of Latin America. This has been brought to the President’s personal attention of late in conversations with individuals who would normally be making such investments.

The President said that there may be a lack of realization in Latin America of the extent to which Cuba now is an obstacle to private investment. He said that he would like to see the American governments undertake the kind of programs needed to support a greater flow of capital in spite of Castro. The ridiculous demand of Castro for $30 billion dollars is illustrative of the wrong way to go about this. He then invited the Councilor to make known his views on the problem.

The Councilor responded with lengthy remarks respecting Castro and what he termed the United States problem with Castro. He said that obviously much violence and misunderstanding has taken place and that in his opinion it has become necessary to seek means for clarifying the situation. He does not think that this can be done by the United States or within the framework of the United Nations. Instead it is a problem which must be taken up by countries in Latin America which are less directly involved, particularly Uruguay which is a country above suspicion of domination by any foreign power. Direct or unilateral action by the United States would be misunderstood and would cause hostility among the American Republics.

The President responded by stating that violence would appear to be unilateral on the part of the Castro Government, and that the United States has been very patient. It is difficult to understand why Castro behaves the way he does. Cuba’s prosperity depends on its friendship with the United States and there is no quarrel at all between the Cuban and the United States peoples. Castro has behaved as a wild man, contrary to the interests of Cuba and of the hemisphere; and now has become linked to the Soviet bloc. The irresponsible seizure of property is having a direct impact upon investments in the other American Republics and the latter should be gravely concerned. The President recognized the appeal of the initial Castro revolutionary program then as agrarian reform, particularly the students and related groups throughout the hemisphere, but [illegible in the original] that [illegible in the original] groups should be [illegible in the original] equally at least with the need for private investment as a means for economic growth. Also the President said that the direct Cuban-United States problem can be considered a small one, and although small problems can be much more of a nuisance than big ones, his principal concern is with the broader implications which originate from it.

The Councilor interrupted frequently during the course of the President’s [illegible in the original] in order to present his views. In essence, the Councilor [illegible in the original] must be found to push Castro against the wall and [illegible in the original] him to state his position, clearly once and for all, on his attitude toward the United States and toward the other American Republics [illegible in the original] what it is that he wants. This can be achieved, he said by [illegible in the original] a committee of four or five nations, including Uruguay, to discuss these matters directly with Castro. The Committee should express the concern of all of the American Republics regarding U.S.-Cuban relations and ask Castro where he stands, if he [illegible in the original] a solution, what can be done, and [illegible in the original] to solve the present crisis. A final objective would be to make him choose between the American Republics and the Soviet bloc. In response to the President’s remarks to the effect that Castro may already [illegible in the original] quite clear where he stands, the Councilor insisted that Castro’s [illegible in the original] may be clear to the United States and perhaps to some other [illegible in the original] groups but that it is not clear to the Latin American peoples. The Councilor continued to stress the need for a committee of nations which could force Castro into a final declaration, to be understood by everyone.

Toward the close of the conversation, the President referred to his faith and confidence in the United Nations but indicated that he had as much or more regard for the Organization of American States as a regional entity of fundamental importance to the United States and to all of the American Republics. The President said that he hoped, before leaving office, that he would be able to take actions demonstrating further the importance which he attaches to the OAS. He has made plans to visit the United Nations and, during his visit there, he hopes to invite the Chiefs of Delegations of the other American Republics to a luncheon, taking advantage of this opportunity to express his high regard for the OAS countries. The Councilor applauded enthusiastically these remarks.

At this point, while photographers came in to take pictures, the conversation turned to the 9-man National Council of Government in Uruguay and Mr. Haedo jokingly suggested a similar system for the United States so that all of the candidates could become President for a year, as he himself would be doing next March 1.

Upon leaving at 11:30 a.m., the Councilor mentioned again his hopes that the President would enjoy the painting which he presented and he added that he would be most gratified if the President might find it possible to send him an autographed photograph and one of his own paintings. He reiterated his admiration for the President and his satisfaction at having been received by him. The President thanked him for making his friendly visit.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 733.00/9–2060. Confidential. Co-drafted by Clarence A. Boenstra, Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs, and Fernando A. Van [illegible in the original] of the Division of language Services. Information on the [illegible in the original] was approved in the White House on September 23.
2. Councilor Haedo visited Washington before traveling to New York to head the Uruguayan delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, scheduled to begin its fifteenth regular session on September 29, 1960.