PM–48. Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the President1
SUBJECT
- Diplomatic Considerations in Negotiating An Isthmian Sea Level Canal Route (CP-60-108)
With reference to your request at the Cabinet meeting of April 29 that you be advised of diplomatic considerations involved in negotiating a route for an Isthmian sea level canal to be constructed by nuclear excavation techniques outside the Canal Zone, I present some conclusions for your consideration.
Mexico: While it is difficult to predict accurately what the state of our relations with any of those countries will be a decade hence, Mexico has made it clear that it would require complete control over a Tehuantepec canal free from any foreign influence, including the United States. Mexico’s well-known sensitivity on sovereignty matters and its extreme reluctance to cooperate in common defense problems are other factors which must be considered. Its present policy of friendship toward us is relatively recent and not necessarily permanent.
Colombia would almost certainly want sovereignty over a new canal, a substantial share of the profits, and a strong voice in its operation, with the defense responsibility primarily ours.
Nicaragua: We have treaty rights in Nicaragua but negotiations for a canal route would be required not only with that country but also with one or more of the neighboring states of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras concerning any rights they may have in the area of the selected route. This was specified in the United States Senate’s consent to the ratification of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in 1916.2 It is therefore clear that acquiring the right of way for a Nicaraguan Canal would involve very complex negotiations affecting four countries—a most difficult undertaking.
Panama: Based on our half-century experience with Panama, it is clear that we will never be granted the same broad rights we now have in the Canal Zone. Additionally some mutually satisfactory arrangement would be required [Facsimile Page 2] to permit abrogation of our present treaty structure with that country. This should preferably be an economic assistance program to assist Panama toward political and economic stability and to reduce its dependence on canal revenues. Such is clearly within our capabilities, if undertaken and pursued with resolution and adequate resources.
[Typeset Page 968]Further diplomatic consideration common to all potential sites is the reaction to the employment of nuclear explosives for construction. The problem of creating the proper psycho-political atmosphere will require an exhaustive testing and development program in the continental United States to prove that no harmful effects would be suffered by local populations. Moreover, our commitments under any future international agreements on nuclear controls would have to be considered.
In the light of these considerations, I believe it is premature to attempt within the near future to select a location for a sea level canal replacement of the Panama Canal. The Report of the Panama Canal Company which the Cabinet has considered estimates that if its recommendations are accepted we have approximately ten years to prepare the way for negotiations on a location of our own selection. While I believe there are strong advantages in your making a decision in principle in favor of a sea level canal—should the National Security Council so recommend—I believe the location should be deferred until we have had an opportunity to formulate and implement policies which might considerably improve the prospects of long-range stability within both Panama and Colombia.
Acting Secretary
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.19/5–2060. Secret; Cabinet Paper-Privileged. Drafted by Sharp.↩
- For the text of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty signed at Washington on August 5, 1914, ratified, with amendments, by the United States Senate on February 18, 1916; and entered into force on June 22, 1916, see 10 Bevans 379.↩