Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

PE–25. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Peruvian Affairs (Poole)¹

Washington, August 7, 1959

SUBJECT

• Peruvian Request for Military Aircraft

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Berckemeyer, Embassy of Peru
• Maj. Gen. Guillermo Van Oordt, Air Attaché, Embassy of Peru
• ARA—Mr. Rubottom
• WST/P—Mr. Poole

Ambassador Berckemeyer and General Van Oordt called at the Ambassador’s request to discuss further the Peruvian Government’s request to purchase military aircraft. The Ambassador apologized to Mr. Rubottom for disturbing him when the latter was about to leave for the Santiago Conference² but explained that he felt it was urgent to inform Mr. Rubottom of the replies he had received from Lima on the matter. In addition, he said General Van Oordt was being transferred to Lima to become Chief-of-Staff (i.e. Commander) of the Peruvian Air Force and he wanted the General to explain the Peruvian position to Mr. Rubottom and to convey the latter’s reactions to Lima. General Van Oordt said he planned to leave for Lima on or about August 11. Mr. Rubottom congratulated the General on his important assignment.

Ambassador Berckemeyer said that some time ago, through his Air Attaché, he had asked his Government to review its request for aircraft. Immediately after his conversation with Mr. Rubottom of August 4,³ he had again asked for a review of the matter, and he and his Air Attaché had just received replies – the latter from the Air Ministry – asking them to press the existing request without any reduction. The Ambassador then asked General Van Oordt to explain the matter more fully.

General Van Oordt expressed the opinion that this request was not extravagant. He argued that the planes were necessary to keep the Peruvian Air Force in existence and that they were the minimum needed for defending Peru’s frontiers, not to speak of hemispheric defense. He claimed that this request conformed to the views of the U.S. Air mission to Peru. He then went into the details of the request as follows:

12 T–37’s—These jet trainers were needed to replace obsolete T-34’s which were uneconomical to maintain, and to provide necessary jet training for Peruvian pilots. General Van Oordt estimated that the planes would cost about $1.5 million. (While the General did not make this clear in his talk with Mr. Rubottom, he explained to Mr. Poole afterwards that the Peruvian Government’s request for T–34’s in its note of June 9⁴ was incorrect and that it should have read T–37’s. He said that on his return to Lima he would see to it that Ambassador Berckemeyer received the necessary amending instructions. Thus, he said, the total cost of the Peruvian Government’s request was actually considerable higher than originally estimated. He stated that the Peruvian Government wished to purchase these T–37’s on three-years credit.)

Eight F-86-F’s—These would be strictly replacements. The Peruvian Air Force originally had 14 F–86–F’s, of which eight had been wrecked. General Van Oordt said that these were nearly obsolete in the U.S. and hence available. He estimated the total cost at $200,000. When Mr. Rubottom asked for a clarification of the June 9 Aide Memoire which simply said “acquire” without specifying terms, General Van Oordt said this should have read purchase for cash. (Afterwards, however, he told Mr. Poole that he should have said purchase on three-years credit.)⁵

18 B–26’s—These would be used unarmed for training, thus releasing for active duty the Peruvian Air Force’s present armed B-26’s which were now being used for training. These too, General Van Oordt said, were nearly obsolete in the U.S. and available. He estimated the total cost at $140,000. (He told Mr. Poole that these were to be purchased for cash as stated in the Aide Memoire of June 9.)

Six C–46’s—(General Van Oordt did not mention the earlier request for six C–46’s in his talk with Mr. Rubottom, but he confirmed to Mr. Poole afterwards that this request was postponed although not cancelled.⁶ He explained that there was considerable pressure from the commercial airlines for these transports to be taken off of commercial runs, although, on the other hand, the routes they were now running were not covered by commercial lines and some would not be economical to run on a commercial basis.)

General Van Oordt argued that, practically speaking, there were only seven planes flying on active duty in the Peruvian Air Force. In answer to Mr. Rubottom’s query about the British planes in the Peruvian Air Force, the General said that these Hawker Hunters are to all intents and purposes grounded for lack of parts. It was not only a question of acquiring replacement parts but of making some 50-odd alterations which had been developed in this model subsequently, and for which the planes would have to be sent to England. He said that these planes had not fired a shot nor dropped a bomb.

General Van Oordt then explained that he was a great protagonist of the principle of hemispheric defense, of arms standardization in the hemisphere, and of purchases in the United States. He said that he opposed the purchase of the British planes. He would like to continue making purchases in the U.S., but said that the Air Ministry is nevertheless studying the possible purchase of British, French or Canadian planes in case they were unobtainable in the United States. He hoped that the Ministry would not have to do this.

General Van Oordt asked that all these factors be carefully considered in studying the Peruvian Government’s aircraft request.

Mr. Rubottom said he appreciated General Van Oordt’s speaking with such frankness and that he would like to reply with equal frankness. He agreed that the needs of hemispheric defense and the desirability of standardization made it far preferable to purchase military equipment in the U.S. rather than elsewhere. He explained, however, that the U.S. felt the need to hold down the level of military purchases to what appeared really necessary, although, naturally, we could not interfere with a country’s sovereign right to decide for itself how it was to spend its money in accordance with its own judgment of its needs, capabilities and resources. He added that the Department of State is under constant pressure from certain sectors of the Congress to limit military equipment going to Latin American countries. Additionally, he continued, we are often accused by the Latin Americans themselves of unnecessarily arming the Latin American countries.

Mr. Rubottom then referred to Prime Minister Beltran’s talk with Ambassador Achilles about his new program, some of which had appeared in the press, and he referred particularly to Beltran’s desire to reduce military expenditures. Mr. Rubottom said we were particularly disappointed that the Peruvian Government should be pressing its request for aircraft without a downward revision as we had urged, and despite Peru’s difficult economic and financial situation. However, we now had no recourse, he continued, but to process the request in its present form, although we were very doubtful of favorable action. He explained that there were other government agencies involved in the matter and that their decisions on possible Peruvian request for economic and financial assistance might well be prejudiced by any such commitment of funds or credit to military expenditures of this magnitude.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.5622/8–759. Confidential. Drafted August 11.
2. Assistant Secretary Rubottom served as principal adviser to Secretary Herter at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Santiago, Chile, August 12–18; for documentation, see CH–23; CR–24; DR–11; VE–34.
3. In a memorandum of the August 4 conversation, Assistant Secretary Rubottom asked that the Peruvian Government reconsider its request for aircraft in view of Prime Minister Beltrán’s plan to reduce military expenditures. (723.5622/8–549)
4. A copy of the Peruvian Embassy is aide-mémoire of June 9 is in file 723.5622/6–959.
5. The Peruvian Embassy reduced this request from eight to six F–86-F’s in an aide-mémoire of May 11, 1960 to the Department of State. (723.5622/5–1160)
6. Ambassador Berckemeyer requested the six C-46 aircraft in an aide-mémoire of March 30 to the Acting Secretary of State. (723.5622/3–3059) In a conversation with Berckemeyer on May 20, Assistant Secretary Rubottom asked that Peru consider this request “in the context of many other, more burdensome Peruvian military expenditures.” (723.5622/5–2059) Berckemeyer told Rubottom on June 9 that Peru had decided to postpone the request for the C–46’s and to ask for the aircraft listed above. (723.5622/6–959)
7. In a note of April 12, 1960, to the Department of State, the Peruvian Embassy requested authorization to purchase 10 C–45 [illegible in the original] and 2 B–260 aircraft. (723.5622/4–1260) In telegram 8 of July 5, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Peru that it had approved these purchases, but it suggested that the U.S. Air Mission Chief should try to dissuade Peru from purchasing two B–578 aircraft because of their unit cost of $126,500 and possible maintenance and spare parts problems. (723.5622/7–560)
   In telegram 803 to Lima, May 24, the Department of Defense, with Department of State concurrence, offered Peru four or five T–37’s from the fiscal year 1961 Military Assistance Program and night F–86F’s under a Military Assistance Program grant in fiscal year 1960 instead of the prospective purchase of F–86F’s by Peru. (723.5622/4–2560) In telegram 1011 from Lima, June 1, the Embassy in Peru informed the Department of Peruvian agreement to this offer. (723.5622/6–160)