Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

PE–10. Telegram from the Ambassador in Peru (Achilles) to the Department of State¹

Lima, May 16, 1958, 6 p.m.

1034. While long-range effects of VP’s visit there cannot yet be forecast, I submit following at this time.

(1) Weak government here was hoping to utilize visit to seek more U.S. loans and may not have been averse to prospect of mild Communist anti-U.S. demonstrations to impress us as to need for help. Seriousness of demonstrations however surprised, mortified and shocked government. Demonstrations were partially designed to embarrass government and after-effect has been considerably to weaken government’s already shaky position.
Some coolness on part Peru Government apparent before incidents and even more thereafter with attempt shift blame to U.S. rather than face up to own responsibilities for maintenance order, social advancement and avoidance discouragement of foreign investment. We should help them regain confidence and face but continue remind them tactfully of their own responsibilities.

(2) One strong impact has been on university ferment where pot already boiling before visit due not only traditional excessive politicking by LA students but to frustration of students over poor teaching, facilities and prospects. Too early yet to evaluate this.

(3) Public reaction has been one of humiliation, admiration for VP and reiteration of traditional warm friendship for U.S. But most have shown more shame for violence and discourtesy than liking for U.S. policies. Reaction has also shown undertones of widespread latent non-Communist antipathy toward U.S. because of its wealth and power and resentment at certain aspects of its economic policies or actions as they adversely affect Peru, notably of course re lead and zinc. In this connection U.S. editorials citing latin resentment at U.S. policies have been widely reprinted here. It is this latent antipathy and periodic resentment, coupled with low living standards, which makes Communism dangerous out of all proportion to its numbers. Reaction has shown that trade far more important than aid. Latter nevertheless important here, particularly when it works from bottom up to help maximum number neediest help selves and avoids bureaucratic tendency toward bigness. It has hitherto done both and same grass roots approach even more necessary in future to combat Communism. Some military aid also needed to maintain armed forces as strong stabilizing and anti-Communist element.

(4) Pain of favorable reaction diminished by wide criticism here, and reprinting of criticism in U.S. press, over sending U.S. troops to Caribbean.

(5) Events here and at Caracas dramatically revealed ability of Communists in LA to arouse mob support and cause trouble. This demonstration of Communist strength has obviously caused jubilation in Moscow and presumably impressed uncommitted peoples everywhere.

(6) Immediate effect in Peru has been in some respects strongly favorable to U.S., in other unfavorable. Long-term effect here and elsewhere will depend upon whether (1) Communists are emboldened to stir up even stronger anti-U.S. feeling and obtain wider support in doing so, or (2) public opinion in the Americas is sufficiently alerted to Communist threat to their own freedom to check further Communist proselyting and assure effective government action. This presents real challenge to all of us, particularly in field.

(7) More fundamental problem is how U.S. can overcome latent antipathy aroused by its power and periodic resentment over its policies or action, from which Communists get wider support, or preferably transform these feelings into friendly ones. We occasionally get credit for our unselfish and altruistic use of our mighty position but only occasionally. This requires good presentation abroad but, more fundamentally, avoidance of any moral basis whatever for criticism. (I recall Secretary’s simile of “spot of coal dust on face of movie actress far more conspicuous than same amount on face of miner”). It means not repeat not preaching but making obviously clear in deeds as well as words our devotion to our basic ideals. Among other things it means finding better answer than we have in past, and VP in statements here, Caracas and elsewhere has made much progress toward it, to problem of making clear our antipathy to dictatorships without slipping into intervention. It means, without in any way impairing our policies of developing individual and collective strength, de-emphasizing as far as possibly military aspects of our policy. This involves maximizing civilian, and controlling military, influence on foreign policy. It means making our economic policies and actions conform to those we profess, those we know to be in real national interest, and avoiding insofar as possible damage to friendly countries. This involves obtaining frequent majorities in Congress along lines of national rather than local or sectional interest.

This presents even greater challenge to us all, particularly to those at home.

Please excuse foregoing long and rather presumptious moralizing. I know the difficulties. Please give copy to VP.

I have no objection to foregoing being declassified for congressional or other official use, with deletion paragraph (4) and first word and two words just before last word of first paragraph of (1) and all of second paragraph of (1).

Achilles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-NI/5–1658. Official Use Only; Priority. This telegram was sent in two sections.