Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

NI–11. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Nicaragua (Whelan)¹

Washington, January 31, 1959

Dear Tom:

We have been unable to reach an agreement with ICA about the designation of an USOM Director in Managua and I feel that the best way of settling the matter is for you to come to Washington for consultation as soon as Louis Blanchard finishes his temporary assignment as Departmental escort officer for ex-President Lásaro Cárdenas. I expect that this will be in early February. We will send your travel orders and I hope that you can arrange to be in Washington for a week or ten days.

Your presence here will be particularly helpful because we feel that President Luis Somoza faces a difficult situation in the near future and your experience and advice is needed to assist us in adopting a policy that will be best for United States interests.

We have been impressed by President Somoza’s sincere desire to lead the Nicaraguans to a type of government more democratic than that which existed under his father. If Luis is able to continue his present policy of ample civil liberties, and adheres to his promise of ending the so-called “Somoza dynasty” when his term is completed on April 30, 1963, I think our interests and those of Latin America as a whole will be served. However, the emergence of the Betancourt and Castro Governments has created a new situation. Tacho’s campaign against Betancourt while the latter was in exile in Costa Rica, and the sale of armored cars to Batista by the present Government have not endeared Luis’ regime to the current rulers in Venezuela and Cuba. Nicaraguan exiles who worked closely with Cuban and Venezuelan revolutionaries are already clamoring for help to overthrow the Somozas. We are receiving reports that Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic are likely to be targets of revolutionary groups which may assemble either in Cuba or Venezuela. We have reports that men are being trained in Cuba now for an invasion of Nicaragua and we are making a check. This seems unlikely; nevertheless, when the new Venezuelan and Cuban Governments become organized they may do so, or at least encourage and supply arms to anti-Somoza groups. Castro already had made threats against the Nicaraguan Government.

We will attempt to dissuade these or any governments from encouraging armed attacks against friendly regimes in this hemisphere and if Nicaragua should be invaded we would support, of course, the immediate application of the provisions of the Bogotá Pact² and the Rio Treaty.³

If we have judged President Echandi’s policies correctly, I doubt that he will permit any invasion to originate on Costa Rican soil. The obvious staging point, it would appear, will be either of the two countries above named or Honduras. I think the Somozas would be making a grave error if they interfered in Honduran affairs in an effort to overthrow President Villeda and see installed a government considered more friendly. These are my reasons:

1. The United States has gone on record in support of Villeda, since he is a symbol of a new era of constitutional Government in Honduras. We recognize fully that Villeda is weak and vacillating but we are doing everything in our power to induce him to correct his errors, particularly his indifference to anti-Somoza revolutionary plots in Honduras.

2. Villeda is the darling of the liberal group which included Muñós Marin of Puerto Rico; Figueres; Betancourt, and possibly Castro. Any attempt to overthrow his Government will incur their active enmity. He is also popular in the United States.

3. I do not think Nicaragua can depend too much on any Government that would succeed Villeda Morales, be it run by Carias, the Army, either Gálves, Williams, or anybody else. The overthrow of Villeda would immediately or eventually precipitate a civil war in Honduras with help to the Liberal Party from the same outside groups that are anti-Somoza in sentiment.

The above assumptions would lead one to believe that we consider the Somozas already dedicated to the overthrow of Villeda. Perhaps they are innocent of such intentions but while Colonel Velásquez is in Nicaragua they are suspect. We have a recent report that the clandestine radio station which attacks Villeda daily is on Nicaraguan soil. In any event, there are many who want to point the finger of suspicion at the Somozas.

In the light of a changing balance of power in the Caribbean basin, I think that the Somozas should give some serious thought to a policy of using Villeda as a possible “shield” against outside interference, rather than as a person to be eliminated before the heat really is put on by their enemies. I admit that this may be distasteful to the Somozas, who feel strongly that Villeda did not clamp down on Nicaraguan exile activity last year until he was pressured into it. However, the Somozas must be aware that we kept constant pressure on Villeda through Ambassador Newbegin in Tegucigalpa to take some action against men like Pedro Vivas, Colonel Gómez Flores, and others. It may also be argued that the Nicaraguan Government might be thoroughly double-crossed by Villeda if it attempted to work out an agreement whereby both countries would actively discourage revolutionary activities. However, it is in our interests to maintain Central America in the relatively peaceful state it now enjoys and we would be exerting our influence in keeping both sides honest should an agreement be reached.

Let me say now that if the Somozas are caught in the act of trying to depose Villeda we would consider they committed a most unwise and foolhardy act and it would influence our attitude toward their Government. Moreover, if Nicaragua were haled before the OAS again on charges of this kind, we would probably have to join in the censure that most certainly would result if it were found guilty.

I will greatly appreciate your comments in an early reply, taking into account the new situation created by the overthrow of Batista and the approaching inauguration of Betancourt.⁴ I have the uneasy feeling that Nicaragua is in for serious trouble which will be accentuated if it attempts to counteract the balance of power by mixing into the internal affairs of any central American country, especially with more and more attention being paid the Somoza regime by the roving groups of revolutionaries who have been invited, in Castro’s own words, to come to Cuba and receive haven and assistance. It would be a shame if the progress made thus far by President Somoza should be undone and the country thrown into confusion and chaos.

Incidentally, I think that President Somoza used good judgment in turning down the request for assistance from Generalíssimo Trujillo. I wonder why the Somozas do not let it be known that they are not in the Trujillo camp?

Sincerely,

R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ARA/OAP Files, Lot 61 D 473, “Nicaragua.” Confidential; Official-Informal. This letter was drafted by Stewart and cleared by Dreier, Murphy, Wieland, and Bernbaum. There is no indication on the source text that the letter was sent. The source text is a carbon copy bearing Rubottom’s typed name.
2. The Charter of the Organization of American States was signed at Bogotá, Colombia, on April 30, 1948; for text, see 2 UST (pt. 2), p. 2416.
3. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) was signed at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on September 2, 1947, by the representatives of the United States and eighteen Latin American countries. It was ratified on December 12, 1947 and entered into force on December 3, 1948. For the text of the Rio Treaty, see 62 State 1681.
4. No record of Whelan’s reply was found in Department of State files.