Office of the Historian

HO–4. Memorandum of Conversation, by the officer in Charge of Honduran Affairs (Gawf)1

Washington, December 2, 1958

SUBJECT

  • Current Political and Economic Conditions in Honduras

PARTICIPANTS

  • Ambassador John C. Dreier, Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs
  • Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Director, Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs
  • Colonel Oswaldo Lopez, Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces
  • John L. Gawf, Honduran Desk Officer

Colonel Lopez said that he was very much worried by the way things seemed to be going in Honduras. He spoke at great length about the ineptitude of the Villeda administration, as a result of its having replaced the entire personnel of the Honduran Government with inexperienced Liberal Party members, despite his pre-election promise to form a government of national unity. He went on to describe the corruption, waste, fiscal mismanagement, softness toward Communism, and the violations of privacy which had been perpetrated upon various members of the Nationalist Party by an organization of hatchet men, which the Liberal Party had set up. He inveighed against the Liberal Party’s efforts to place the Security Police under the ministry of Gobernacion, against the efforts of the Villeda Administration to curtail the role of the military by cutting the budget and against the manner in which the Villeda Administration seemed to be running the country into bankruptcy.

Colonel Lopez said that he understood that conditions had become so serious that Villeda had recognized that a cabinet reshuffle was necessary and that hence, the entire cabinet was soon to resign leaving Villeda free to eliminate those members who had been most responsible for the present difficulties. He left the impression that in this category were Roberto Martinez and Fernando Villar.

At this point Mr. Stewart observed that we too had been feeling some concern about the way things seemed to be going in Honduras. However, he added that the present events seemed to be following a pattern which was not uncommonly seen in Latin America when new governments take over. He went on to say that in many cases after a year or two of stumbling and making mistakes many such governments [Typeset Page 807] had at [Facsimile Page 2] last leveled off and managed to govern effectively. In the case of Honduras, Mr. Stewart went on to say, we have seen some indications just within the last few weeks that the Villeda Administration had become fully aware of the magnitude of the dangers and problems facing them and had taken some important first steps toward effecting a remedy. He discussed the IMF program, which the Government now has under consideration and expressed the view that if the Honduran Government agrees to the conditions which the IMF program would impose, Honduras would have made a long step toward stability. Mr. Stewart then reviewed the events by which Honduras had instituted constitutional, democratic government in Honduras for the first time and recalled what a favorable impression this made throughout the hemisphere. He went on to say that he hoped that the understandable impatience of the Hondurans for more evidence of progress would not lead them to any act of force or violence, because, he said, that once such means were adopted, not only would Honduras lose a great deal of esteem in the eyes of the world but it might also precipitate a chaotic situation from which nobody would benefit.

Colonel Lopez agreed that it would be unfortunate for the Villeda Administration to fail and he said that he intended to do everything he could to help it succeed. He then went on to describe what he conceived to be the role of the military as a guardian of Honduran democracy. He claimed that it was essential for the military to stand behind the Government to insure its stability.

Mr. Stewart said that the role of the military in Honduras during the past year had indeed been highly constructive and said that he hoped it would continue its splendid record of maintaining order until the Villeda Administration could solve the current pressing problems.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 715.00/12–258. Confidential.↩