Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

HO–2. Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, March 26, 1958

SUBJECT

• Political Situation in Honduras

I am deeply concerned over the outlook for continued political stability in Honduras. As you know, President Villeda Morales came to power largely on the strength of a liberal campaign of promises verging on the Tammany type. As yet, however, he has accomplished virtually nothing, for lack of economic means.

It would be a severe blow to United States interests if the present Honduran government were to collapse. While it is impossible to predict what sort of government would emerge from such a collapse, it is unlikely that it would provide as favorable an atmosphere for the solution of the country’s fundamental problems or adopt as friendly a policy toward the U.S. as now prevails. A period of political chaos might also follow with adverse repercussions in the neighboring countries. The present Villeda government, while far from perfect, is sincerely striving to establish representative democracy in Honduras and solve the country’s basic problems. Villeda is very friendly to the United States. He has shown a keen awareness of the dangers of the communist movement in Honduras and he has taken steps to combat it. Coming into office as a result of honest popular elections, he symbolizes the trend toward the establishment of democratic government which has been noted in other parts of Latin America. We would like to see him succeed.

Unfortunately there are signs of political trouble ahead for Villeda. Many of those who supported him in the belief that he would do something for them are beginning to grow restless. Our Ambassador in Tegucigalpa² reports a growing feeling that Villeda will not remain in office through this year.

As Villeda’s popularity declines, his opposition can be expected to become more active. The communists, who had been quiet for several months, in February stepped up their activities in the labor field and succeeded in forming a communist-dominated federation of trade unions in Tegucigalpa. The Nationalist Party, including the very large number of government workers (virtually the entire personnel of the Honduran Government) who were replaced en masse by Liberal Party members, can be expected to seize upon every opportunity to embarrass the new administration by drawing attention to the disparity between Liberal promises and Liberal performance. There are persistent rumors of dissension within the liberal Party itself; some of the radical Liberals have no feeling of loyalty toward Villeda and might well turn against him at an opportune moment. The military would probably abandon him in the face of any serious deterioration of his popularity. Finally there is already some indication that conservative elements in control of neighboring states are not well disposed toward Villeda’s brand of liberalism.

As I see it, the only possibility of averting the threat of a political crisis in Honduras lies in assisting Villeda to make good on at least some of his campaign promises by improving the economic situation in Honduras. This would involve prompt and fairly large scale participation in economic development programs in Honduras. Some efforts along these lines (i.e., the Smather’s Amendment Loan program³ and the Engineering Construction Unit project) are already underway, but these will not be adequate to deal with the present situation. Also, as you know, several applications from Honduras for DLF and IBRD loans are being processed. It is my understanding that these are being pressed forward as rapidly as possible. Whether these will be approved soon enough to avert a dangerous political situation remains to be seen.

Summary:

1. The Villeda government in Honduras will shortly be facing serious political difficulties which are likely to result in its downfall, unless it can do something to improve the economic situation in Honduras.

2. The only possibility of averting this threat lies in prompt and fairly large scale U.S. participation in economic development programs in Honduras.

3. It would seem essential, in trying to implement the objective outlined in the NSC paper⁴ to strengthen representative democracy, that we do what we can to strengthen the Villeda administration and help it to promote the sound development of Honduras and thus strengthen confidence in Honduran democratic institutions.

1. Source: Department of State, ARA/OAP Files, Lot 61 D 110, “Briefing Materials—Honduras—1958.” Confidential. Drafted by John L. Gawf of the Office of Middle American Affairs.
2. Whiting Willauer was Ambassador to Honduras until March 24, 1958. Robert Newbegin was appointed Ambassador on March 26 and presented his credentials in Tegucigalpa on April 21.
3. The amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1956 named after Sen. George A. Smathers (D-Fla.), provided for the use of a portion of the defense support funds authorized in the Act for health, education, and sanitation projects, and for land resettlement programs in Latin America. For the text of the Mutual Security Act of 1956 (Public Law 726), enacted on July 18, 1956, see 70 State 555.
4. Presumably the reference is to NSC 5613/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” September 25, 1956, which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VI, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Document 16.