Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

HA–7. Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, August 28, 1958

SUBJECT

• Marine Corps Training Mission to Haiti

Problem:

The President of Haiti, Dr. Duvalier, has requested that a Marine Corps Training Mission be assigned to Haiti. The problem is to determine whether the United States should comply with this request. If the Haitian Government is given an affirmative answer, a supplementary question arises: should we make assignment of the mission subject to certain provisos, notably agreement by President Duvalier to provide satisfactory operation conditions for the mission and to take measures designed to allay current political tensions?

Background:

President Duvalier requested a Marine Corps Training Mission in late March and has become doubly anxious to have the mission arrive since the revolutionary attempt against his government on July 29. He desires the mission to bring about a permanent improvement in the status and sense of responsibility of the Haitian army as well as to help stabilize his Government and as evidence of U.S. support.

A Marine Corps Survey Team which visited Haiti from May 18 to 31 concluded that there is a definite need for a military mission to improve the efficiency and capability of the Haitian army, and to promote stability within the Haitian army and in the Republic of Haiti itself. It recommended that a fairly large mission be sent (an initial minimum of 30 members to be increased to 50) as that advice could be given both at headquarters and field levels. The General Staff of the Haitian army has stated that Haiti’s economy could not support a mission of the recommended size but President Duvalier has privately assured us that the necessary funds would be forthcoming.

Discussion:

The charge that the U.S. supports Latin American dictators may be brought against us if we send a Marine Training Mission to Haiti. Duvalier’s government has taken on many of the characteristics of a dictatorship; abuses by the secret police, destruction of newspaper plants, arrests of labor leaders and journalists, persecution of political opponents, arbitrary arrests and prolonged imprisonment without trial. However, during the attempted coup on July 29 there was no disaffection in the Haitian army or the general population and the ability to hold power for the foreseeable future whether or not we send a training mission. He justifies his strong-arm tactics on grounds that the opposition is plotting his own violent overthrow and he cites the July 29 attempted coup as proof.

Possible criticism of the Marine training mission as U.S. intvervention in Haiti is to be expected from various sources including the USSR propaganda apparatus which voiced this criticism against the recent brief protection of the Guantanamo Base water supply by 60 Marines. Moscow Radio has already taken the line that the involvement of Americans in the attempted coup on July 29 is evidence of U.S. intervention against the Duvalier government. The fact that President Duvalier has specifically and urgently requested assignment of the Marine Training Mission can be used to offset charges of intervention. Prior agreement by Haiti to allay domestic political tensions and a prohibition against the mission’s training of the Haitian police at this time would lessen the danger of the mission’s becoming involved in internal matters.

The secret police were first organized about January of this year and have steadily increased in importance since that time. They probably deserve much credit for crushing the July 29 revolution and Duvalier may be convinced that they are his chief reliance in keeping control of the government. Emboldened by the July 29 incident, the secret police may now commit greater abuses than in the past; this could result in diminution of popular support for Duvalier at home and he himself might become a virtual prisoner of his own “palace police” if he permits their power to grow unchecked. This danger is the greater because the army has been weakened by successive “purges” of its officers. Duvalier may realize the dangers of this situation and may move to bring the secret police under control by incorporating them into the regular army. A decree reorganizing the Haitian army (issued August 4, 1958) refers to the need for a more adequate system of control and administration of the Army of Haiti considering the “increase in its effective forces and the number of Special Services.” The same decree makes the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces responsible for the direction of “all military and police operations.” If the secret police are brought into the army, they would presumably come within the purview of the proposed Marine Corps Training Mission and be subject to our advice. Since this eventuality would expose us to strong criticism, it should be explained to President Duvalier ahead of time that the training mission will not become involved in advising or training the police.

The over-riding need is a period of political stability in Haiti to give the government a chance to attack its other problems (economic, financial, social). Beginning in December 1956 when Magloire was ousted, Haiti was rocked by one political crisis after another as a succession of short-lived governments tried and failed to wield power. Serious financial and economic deterioration accompanied the political upheavals and Haiti appeared to be on the verge of administrative chaos when the military council of government took power in June 1957. Using illegal force when necessary, the Haitian army restored a semblance of political, administrative and financial order, permitted an election to be held and turned over power in October 1957 to a civilian government headed by Dr. Duvalier. President Duvalier has also resorted to an illegal strong-arm methods to maintain order and seems to have an acute fear of opposition political activity. In these circumstances it appears probable that political stability in Haiti for the present will only be achieved at some cost in civil liberties; if this is accepted as a realistic working assumption, the objective of the U.S. should be limited to achieving a gradual amelioration of the situation. Our ability to use our influence to this end would be enhanced by the presence of a Marine training mission.

The present status of U.S.-Haitian relations calls for a positive gesture on the part of the United States to effect the reverse practice of the Duvalier government to the participation of American citizens in the July 29 attempt and the fact that it was launched from U.S. soil. A few days after that even, President Duvalier sent his Foreign Minister on an urgent mission to Washington to deliver a letter to President Eisenhower requesting U.S. military assistance for Haiti. The arrival of a Marine training mission would be a timely, positive response to this plan for help. Further, this reassurance of our good intentions might render Duvalier more amenable to our influence in bringing about an improved domestic political climate.

Conclusions:

1. We may be criticized for “supporting a dictator” if we send a Marine mission to Haiti, but it appears that Duvalier in fact has considerable popular support and the ability to hold power regardless of whether we send the mission. By sending a mission we may be able to influence Duvalier away from dictatorial methods. The Mission might be viewed by U.S.S.R. propagandists as evidence of U.S. intervention in Haiti but this charge can bee offset by the fact that President Duvalier has requested the mission. We should seek prior agreement that Duvalier will take steps to allay the political tension and that no advice or training will be given to the police.

2. The secret police have brought Duvalier into disrepute but they are his chief reliance in keeping power and it would be unrealistic to expect him to abolish them at this time. We should encourage Duvalier to bring the police under control but we should make it clear that we will not become involved in police training.

3. Haiti’s greatest need is a period of political stability and we can contribute to this by using a Marine training mission to influence the Haitian Army constructively. The Haitian army has been the ultimate and practically the only source of stability in the past year and a half although seriously weakened by purges.

4. The present status of our relations with Haiti calls for a positive gesture to offset the adverse reaction of Haitian officials to the participation of Americans in the July 29 attempted coup and the fact that it was launched from U.S. soil.

Recommendations

1. That you sign the attached letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. John N. Irwin, II,² recommending that Marine Corps personnel be assigned to Haiti on a training mission provided that the Haitian Government agrees to let the mission operate under conditions deemed satisfactory by the Department of Defense and by this Department. An essential condition to be met prior to despatch of mission personnel is that the Haitian Government agree to take measures designed to allay current political tensions. Further, the letter states that the Haitian Government should be informed that if there is a recurrence of internal violence of political origin, the training mission’s activities may be curtailed or the mission possibly withdrawn in order to avoid any appearance of U.S. involvement in Haitian domestic matters. The letter also expresses the Department’s belief that the training mission should not become involved in training or advising the Haitian police. The letter suggests finally that a representative of the Department of Defense visit Haiti in the near future to inform President Duvalier of our decision and the conditions attached to it.

2. That you initial the attached telegram³ informing Ambassador Drew of our views on the assignment of a Marine Training Mission to Haiti.

3. That you initial the attached memorandum⁴ informing the Under Secretary of our conclusions and requesting his concurrence in your letter to the Department of Defense and the telegram to Port-au-Prince.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.5811/8–2858. Secret. Drafted by Norman Warner, Officer in Charge of Haitian Affairs, and cleared with George O. Spencer of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs.
   The source text is an uninitialed carbon copy. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Wieland to Rubottom dated January 22, 1959, which describes several of the documents relating to the Marine Corps mission to Haiti. It indicates that the August 28 memorandum constitutes a “position paper” on the subject.
2. Not printed. The letter from Rubottom was sent on September 9 to Mansfield D. Sprague, who had replaced Irwin as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the interim. In addition to the contents described in the August 28 memorandum, the letter sent to Sprague on September 9 included a paragraph indicating that the Department of State’s approval of the assignment of Marine Corps personnel to Haiti did not mean that the Department approved of all of the recommendations of the military survey team, especially those concerning material or financial support of the Haitian military. (738.59/9–958)
3. Not attached to the source text and presumably the same as telegram 99 to Port-au-Prince, drafted by Warner on August 28 initialed by Snow, and transmitted on September 5. (Not printed; 738.58/9–558).
4. Not printed. No indication has been found that the memorandum was sent.