HA–26. Special National Intelligence Estimate1
SNIE 86.1–60
Washington, September 27,
1960
THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN HAITI2
The Problem
To assess the political and economic situation in Haiti, and the
short-term prospects.
Conclusions
- 1.
- President Francois Duvalier’s tenure of power is now reasonably
secure. So long as Duvalier
remains active and continues to receive sizable external assistance,
we foresee no major change in the Haitian political situation. The
opposition is weak and discouraged. The military are unlikely to
move against the government and are reasonably capable of
maintaining internal order in present circumstances. (Paras. 8–9,
15–16)
- 2.
- Even with continuing external aid on the scale of that received in
recent years, the hand-to-mouth Haitian economy will show little or
no improvement. The coming smaller off-year coffee harvest is likely
to produce another budget and balance of payments crisis in 1961.
Substantial improvement in the basic economic situation would
require a long-term program of investment in economic development on
a scale not hitherto contemplated. (Paras.
10–14)
- 3.
- Duvalier will persist in
his demands for U.S. aid on a massive scale and in his expressions
of resentment at its denial. Nevertheless, his object is to obtain
more aid and he would not intentionally
go so far as to forfeit that which he now receives. (Paras. 17–19)
- 4.
- Duvalier probably still
makes or approves of all major decisions. We believe that as yet his
leftist advisors can do little more than intensify the President’s
own prejudices. (Paras. 20–21)
The main threat to continued stability arises from the President’s
ill health. Without Duvalier,
a struggle for power would be certain to occur. The military would
be likely to seize control, but probably would be unable to
stabilize the situation. The outcome would probably be a prolonged
period of instability in which pro-Castro elements would certainly
strive to gain control. (Para. 22)
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Discussion
- 6.
- Background. Haiti is an overcrowded and
impoverished country: its levels of production, income, health, and
literacy are the lowest in the Western Hemisphere. Its politics are
highly personal, but reflect underlying tensions between a
long-established mulatto elite, a rising Negro elite, and the city
mob of Port-au-Prince. The mass of Negro peasants is, for the most
part, politically inert.
- 7.
- Since the end of the U.S. military occupation (1934), it has been
normal for a Haitian President to complete his six-year term of
office, to seek to perpetuate himself in power, to be thereupon
overthrown by a military junta, and to be fairly promptly replaced
by a successor selected by the junta in private consultation with
leading politicians. Following the overthrow of President Magloire
in 1956, this customary though extra-constitutional procedure broke
down when the contending political factions could not agree upon a
successor. After several interim governments had been overthrown by
popular disorder in Port-au-Prince, the army, in September 1957,
finally procured the popular election of Dr. Francois Duvalier. He was bitterly
opposed by the mulatto elite and by organized labor in
Port-au-Prince, but was enthusiastically supported by the Negro
elite and was generally popular among the peasants.
- 8.
- The Political Situation. Until the spring
of 1959, Duvalier’s tenure of power was precarious. Opposition
leaders in exile were actively conspiring against him with some
encouragement from the new regime in Cuba. An invasion of exiles
with Cuban support was imminently expected. The army could not be
relied upon to resist it. Duvalier’s control of the internal
situation depended primarily upon the terror inspired by his
notorious “secret police.” The Haitian treasury was virtually empty.
At this point the situation was stabilized by the receipt of $6
million in U.S. budgetary support and by the arrival of a U.S.
Marine Corps mission to reform and revitalize the Haitian military
establishment. These measures were significant, not only for their
direct effects, but more importantly as signs of U.S. interest in
sustaining the Duvalier
regime. This indication of U.S. support was largely responsible for
the absence of an attempt against the regime in May 1959, when
President Duvalier was
incapacitated by a severe illness.
Duvalier’s tenure of power is now reasonably secure. The internal
opposition is thoroughly discouraged and intimidated; the opposition
in exile, denied further Cuban support, is no longer a serious
threat. The military and security forces are effectively controlled
by being divided into components no one of which is capable of
acting separately against the regime, and by the appointment of
commanders personally dependent on Duvalier and so divided by personal rivalries as to
be unlikely to combine against him. The army, which includes the
small air force and coast guard, numbers 5,200, but its ground
forces are scattered over the country in small police and
constabulary detachments, except for an understrength battalion at
Port-au-Prince. The National Police and the Presidential Guard,
nominally part of the army, are actually independent commands under
Duvalier’s direct control. Moreover, the 200-man Presidential Guard
separates the army battalion at Port-au-Prince from any large supply
of ammunition. There is, in addition, a civilian militia of about
400 men and women specially selected, like the Guard, for personal
loyalty to Duvalier.10.The Economy. Duvalier inherited a stagnant economy and today it
continues in decline, but probably not sufficiently to provoke
serious political consequences. The major problems are inadequate
resources, low agricultural productivity, lack of diversification,
and meager economic development. Moreover, domestic savings and
investment—almost nonexistent—and foreign investment are
insufficient to keep up with capital deterioration,
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much
less to increase production to support the expanding
population.11.Agricultural production is retarded by the prevalence of
subsistence farming on small family plots. There are only two
important commercial plantations in the country, one producing
sugar, the other sisal. The major export is coffee, which grows wild
and receives a minimum of processing from the peasants who collect
it. Haiti’s continued heavy dependence on coffee, with its
alternating high and low crop years and price fluctuations, results
in periodic strains on the country’s solvency. Even though
agriculture is the major economic pursuit, about a quarter of
Haitian imports are food and other agricultural products.12.While the government is adhering to a financial stabilization
program prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its
finances are in a sorry state, partly as a result of administrative
ineptitude and graft. The public debt is close to $70 million and
the rising burden of foreign debt (more than half of the public
debt) and amortization now makes it difficult for Haiti to borrow
more. In recent years, debt service and amortization have amounted
to almost 10 percent of the budget. Haiti’s budget deficit amounted
to $8 million in the 1958–1959 fiscal year. Even though the
government has suspended debt service and amortization, it probably
will fall short of meeting current
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expenses by about a million
dollars in the fiscal year ending on 30 September 1960.13.The regime has managed to keep afloat in the past year with the
continuation of major outside assistance, a good coffee crop, above
average tourist earnings, and the prospect of larger sugar exports
to the U.S. Under terms of the IMF
stabilization agreement, Haiti has been shored up by a $4 million
standby agreement and has received $5.4 million in balance of
payments support; a new arrangement with the IMF is under negotiation. The U.S.
provided $6 million in budgetary support as grant aid during the
1958–1959 fiscal year, and has already allocated a million dollars
in grant aid to cover the estimated current deficit. In addition,
Haiti has continued to receive sizable external development loans
and assistance, mainly from the U.S.314.Even with continuing external aid on the scale of that received in
recent years, the hand-to-mouth Haitian economy will show little or
no improvement. Economic development is not keeping pace with
capital depreciation and population growth. The coming smaller
off-year coffee harvest is likely to produce another budget and
balance of payments crisis in 1961. Substantial improvement in the
basic economic situation, as distinguished from budgetary and
balance of payments relief, would require a long-term program of
investment in economic development on a scale not hitherto
contemplated. If such a program were to be undertaken, its
implementation would be hampered by Haitian sensitivities regarding
national sovereignty as well as the Haitian spoils system.15.Political Prospects. So long as Duvalier remains active and
external assistance continues, we foresee no major change in the
Haitian political situation. The domestic opposition is weak,
unorganized, and discouraged. The military are unlikely to move
against the government and are reasonably capable of maintaining
internal order in present circumstances.16.A successful armed incursion by Haitian exiles—with or without
Cuban support—is unlikely. Haitian exiles are few in number and for
the most part lack revolutionary zeal. Even though there is
important sympathy for Fidel
Castro among students, teachers,
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and
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intellectuals,
Castroism has had little impact on the Haitian peasantry. Moreover,
Castro’s efforts at reconciliation with Haiti—in contrast to his
earlier activity against Duvalier—and his virtual abandonment of
Haitian exiles make trouble from that quarter not likely. A
filibustering expedition would probably meet with no more success
than that of a year ago, which received no local support and was
eventually annihilated by Duvalier’s men.17.A matter of immediate concern is that, since early this year,
Duvalier has become
extremely antagonistic in his dealings with U.S. agencies in Haiti
and severely critical of the terms and scale of U.S. economic
assistance. He has opened the joint economic development projects to
the Haitian spoils system, thereby provoking a cut-back in the
disbursement of U.S. funds for such projects and a slowdown in
operations. In an attempt to induce massive U.S. aid, Duvalier has both threatened to
seek Communist Bloc assistance and warned of the local Communist
threat in his underdeveloped country.4 One
effect of the President’s complaints has been to evoke considerable
public criticism of the U.S.18.Duvalier’s anti-U.S. behavior is probably rooted in his
frustrations: his own inability to improve the miserable living
conditions of the bulk of his people and the inadequacy of U.S. aid
to bring about any early or substantial change in their hopeless
situation. He probably realizes that the U.S.-sponsored long-term
development projects will be of eventual benefit to Haiti, but he is
also impressed by the fact that they have had little or no effect on
the miserable lot of most Haitians and are therefore of little
political benefit to him.19.Duvalier will persist in
his demands for U.S. aid on a massive scale and in his expressions
of resentment at its denial, employing such threats as seem to him
necessary to gain consideration, but his object is to obtain more aid and he would not intentionally go so
far as to forfeit that which he now receives. Because of his
difficulties with the U.S., he may feel some sympathy for Fidel Castro. More importantly,
Castro’s recent approaches toward a reconciliation are attractive to
Duvalier as insurance
against further Cuban support for the Haitian opposition and as
reinsurance against interference by Trujillo. Nevertheless,
Duvalier’s interests are basically different from Castro’s and he is
unlikely to risk losing the Haitian Army’s support by too close an
identification with the Cuban regime.20.The situation is complicated by the apparent decline in Duvalier’s
physical and mental health since his severe illness in May 1959 and
by his apparent reliance on a small group of leftist advisors,
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including
one or two probable Communists.5 While it is
difficult to assess the degree of influence exerted by these men, it
is likely that they have considerable control over access to the
President and over the information reaching him. However, the
Haitian military still have access to Duvalier and influence with him. We believe that as
yet the President’s leftist advisors can do little more than
intensify his own prejudices, and that Duvalier—a tough-minded and
suspicious man—probably still makes or approves of all major
decisions himself.21.For its part, the Haitian Communist movement, despite a modest
revival, remains the smallest in Latin America, and is unlikely to
be a decisive factor while Duvalier is in office. The Communist Party and the
pro-Communist Popular Socialist Party have been outlawed for years
and there is no evidence of an effective underground in Haiti or
among Haitian exiles. While Duvalier harps on the potential threat of communism,
he probably does not see it as an immediate threat to him.
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On
the contrary, although he acts from time to time against Communist
activities, he finds it necessary or useful to employ the
administrative talents of individual Communists and has acquiesced
in the return of key Communist figures from exile. Nevertheless, the
Communists, who are chiefly mulatto intellectuals, are still few in
number. Their influence and that of their sympathizers is as yet
primarily as individuals in the government bureaucracy—some in key
posts—and in the press, education, and intellectual circles. Their
continued location in their present positions enables them to
stimulate anti-American sentiment and to work toward the development
of an effective Communist organization.22.The main threat to continued stability arises from the President’s
ill health. Still vigorous in appearance, Duvalier continues to suffer the
bad effects of his severe heart attack. Should he die or be
seriously incapacitated for a prolonged period, a struggle for power
would be certain to ensue. There is no one leader who could command
the quick and widespread support necessary for strong government.
The military would be likely to seize control of the government, but
probably would not be able to stabilize the situation. The result
would probably be a period of disorder similar to the nine-month
hiatus preceding the installation of Duvalier, when six provisional governments rose and
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fell.
In such an unstable situation, pro-Castro elements would certainly
strive to gain control of Haiti.23.For historical reasons, there has long been bitter enmity between
the Haitians and the Dominicans. The Haitians particularly hate and
fear Trujillo. As a consequence of this fear, the Duvalier regime was hesitant to
provoke Trujillo by imposing the sanctions invoked against him by
the Organization of American States, but finally did so.24.In early 1959, when the Duvalier regime was threatened by Castro, the Dominican Republic was
prepared to intervene to prevent hostile (Cuban) access to its land
frontier with Haiti. It might again consider doing so to forestall
or counteract the rise to power of a Haitian regime associated with
Castro. Dominican
intervention in such a case would be more likely to take the form of
active assistance to anti-Castro Haitian elements than of outright
military invasion. Dominican support, however, would tend to
discredit any Haitian faction which accepted it.25.If the Trujillo regime were to be overthrown, the attitude of any
successor government toward Haiti would depend on its character. A
Dominican military junta, or any genuinely liberal regime, would
probably be preoccupied with domestic problems, but would be as
concerned as Trujillo to prevent or counteract the establishment of
a pro-Castro regime in Haiti. On the other hand, a pro-Castro regime
in the Dominican Republic would probably give active support to the
establishment of a pro-Castro regime in Haiti.
