Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

HA–23. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State¹

Washington, June 28, 1960

SUBJECT

• Haitian–United States Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Ernest Bonhomme
• CMA – Mr. Wieland
• CMA – Mr. Warner

Ambassador Bonhomme called at 4:00 pm by invitation and the ensuing conversation lasted an hour and a half. It was a wide-ranging exchange of views on this United States assistance program in Haiti, with President Duvalier’s speech at Jacmel last week, as the starting point. Neither Ambassador Bonhomme nor the CMA officers had yet seen the text of President Duvalier’s remarks, but only newspaper articles concerning it. Highlights of the discussion are the following paragraphs.

Ambassador Bonhomme was unable to explain why President Duvalier had chosen to express himself on United States assistance in this public way in Haiti. The Ambassador only commented that the occasion was the dedication of a wharf built with the assistance of private United States firms. His implication was that this occasion pointed up the contrast between private and official United States efforts to help Haiti. The Ambassador thought that press efforts to portray President Duvalier as calling for a choice between the United States and Soviet Union had been a misinterpretation of his words.

Mr. Wieland asked what were the Ambassador’s views on how to put matters back on the tracks. The Ambassador paused, then replied that he supposed the President was awaiting some results from the “Special mission” he had entrusted to Ambassador Turkel when the latter visited Haiti.²

We showed Ambassador Bonhomme a draft press release³ the Department has prepared for possible use in clarifying the dollar amount of United States aid to Haiti in Fiscal 1960 and 1959 and the 10-year period 1950–59. The Ambassador commented that this press release may be missing the point Haiti has tried to make: i.e, what has this aid accomplished? He referred to the $3 million loan for a private sugar mill as an example, as well as the $300,000 road study loan. We pointed out that although the sugar mill loan has not been used, it is nevertheless a legitimate example of United States efforts to help. We observed that much time and effort by United States officials went into getting the loan approved in view of the high priority given in by the GOH. We mentioned that, as the Ambassador knew, there had been great interest show by the Haitian Government in getting this done including telegrams from President Duvalier. Failure to use the funds is not the fault of the United States Government nor of the Haitian Government but appears to be due to the efforts of the borrower to transfer his interest in the loan to a third party.

The present status of the road study loan was also discussed briefly, with the Ambassador apparently puzzled and frustrated by previous and present delays. Mr. Warner said he thought that the DLF would be disposed to proceed rapidly with this loan once the Artibonite problem were cleared up. This prompted the Ambassador to make more general comments about Haiti’s relations with the DLF. He complained that Haiti makes an application and then a long time after, often many months later, is informed that the application is not in proper form, is not in English, or that it lacks supporting data. He still is not sure whether applications should go through USOM in Haiti or go directly to the DLF. He understands that the USOM represents the DLF with regard to DLF disbursements in the Artibonite valley, but he doesn’t know if USOM represents the DLF in all other matters in Haiti. In any event, some applications have been submitted through the USOM and have gone on to the DLF but subsequently they were found to be faulty. Ambassador Bonhomme wondered why the USOM could not immediately have told the Haitian Government about the inadequacies of the applications prior to sending them on to the DLF with consequent administrative delays.

Ambassador Bonhomme recalled that in the latter stages of the Magloire Government (1956), he had witnessed a similar hesitancy in going through with United States assistance. He said he had found out later this had been due to the expectation by the United States that the Magloire Government was not going to last. He said that all sorts of reasons had been given to him (he was Haitian representative on the joint development council at the time) and he was assured that funds were available for repairing Hurricane Hazel damage but the result was that very little assistance was forthcoming. Mr. Warner assured Ambassador Bonhomme that this is not the case now and that the United States is prepared to cooperate with the Haitian Government to carry out an effective program. He said he was not familiar with the situation in 1956 but that it has been our intention and still is to do everything we can to be of assistance in overcoming the problem in Haiti which we recognize as being serious and urgent. He said that we assume, and hope that the Haitian Government assumes, as a basic premise that there is good will and good faith on both sides and that with such an assumption, we would like to get down to specifics, identifying what the specific problems are and trying to work out specific solutions. Mr. Warner stated that as we see the situation, the next step in the Poté Colé project and in the Artibonite valley is for the Haitian Government to nominate the key personnel who are needed before activities can be fully resumed.

When asked again what specific problems he saw in the situation, Ambassador Bonhomme hesitated and then said that the question appeared to him to be one of general atmosphere. He thought that in some cases United States technicians had gone farther than they should in carrying out their advisory roles. The Ambassador thought that in a situation such as we have in Haiti, people should perhaps be allowed to make mistakes. The Ambassador seemed to be implying that United States advisors are sometimes paternalistic in their actions and that this had offended the dignity and self-esteem of Haitian officials. The Ambassador was not specific other than to mention Mr. Yoe and Minister Philippeaux in this connection.

Ambassador Bonhmme also remarked that some of the best-qualified Haitian technical and administrative personnel are not politically in sympathy with the Duvalier administration. He thought that part of the assistance program should be to train technicians rather than to expect to find technicians already qualified. Mr. Warner commented that we realize the program cannot operate in a political vacuum and we recognize that political considerations have to be taken into account by the Duvalier government. We consider that President Duvalier is the best judge of the Haitian political picture. However, if there are political objections to individual Haitian employees, we think it would be better to talk over the situation ahead of the time instead of having the man abruptly fired. In this connection, Mr. Warner asked the Ambassador whether he thought the basic principle of having mutually acceptable personnel working in the program was a desirable principle from a practical working point of view. The Ambassador agreed that this was an essential principle, but it was at this point that he suggested that to be acceptable personnel should not necessarily be the most highly qualified from a technical point of view. Mr. Warner commented that we are not trying to have a program which is dependent on any single man for its success and Mr. Wieland cited the case of the recent departure of Mr. Ward from Artibonite valley and the difficulties we are having in trying to find another man who is as well qualified. Nevertheless, in order that the work go forward, we have named a temporary replacement who is not as well qualified but who we think is acceptable for the time being. In the same spirit we have accepted the Haitian Government’s nominations of Mr. Cantave and Mr. Jospitre and believe that we can carry on a satisfactory program with them even though they do not appear to be as well qualified, from the point of view of previous experience, as the men they replaced.

It was apparent that Ambassador Bonhomme is discouraged and frustrated by the present state of affairs. At one point he mentioned that he has been considering returning to Port-au-Prince to tell President Duvalier that it he continues his apparent new policy of turning away from the United States, the Ambassador’s usefulness in Washington may be ended. Mr. Wieland and Mr. Warner said they hoped the Ambassador would not find it necessary to do this and assured him of their very high regard. Mr. Warner said that if the Ambassador should return to Port-au-Prince, he should assure his Government, if it has any doubts, that United States policy toward Haiti continues to be one of cooperating to the fullest extent possible in working out problems of mutual concern. Near the end of the conversation, Mr. Warner referred to the Artibonite valley difficulties and said these are traceable in part to what happened there years ago when, from the Haitian Government’s point of view, a great deal of money was spent with comparatively little result. The DLF was keenly aware of these past difficulties, and the criticism which had arisen as a result, when it approved the loan for further work in the valley; perhaps the DLF has seemed excessively cautious and strict in its administration of the loan funds. However, the DLF wished to assure that the funds are used with the maximum effectiveness. Thus how to achieve an effective operation appears to be the real problem in the Artibonite valley and in other projects rather than the amount of money. Mr. Warner commented, and the Ambassador agreed, that money in itself will not solve the problem. When asked for what specific suggestions he would have to make operations more effective, the Ambassador had none, although he did say that some gesture by the United States toward Haiti at this time might be very helpful.

Mr. Wieland and Mr. Warner asked the Ambassador to inform us immediately if this Government’s understanding of what the next step is to be is not the same as ours; i.e., the Haitian Government should name persons to fill the key jobs still vacant in the Artibonite Valley and in the Poté Colé project. Mr. Wieland added that if the GOH had a different understanding of what the next step should be, we hoped the Ambassador would advise us at once so the issue could be clarified in the interest of getting on with constructive efforts.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.5-MSP/6–2860. Confidential. Drafted by Warner.
2. On June 24, the Embassy at Port-au-Prince reported that the central theme of President Duvalier’s speech of June 21, made on the occasion of dedicating the Jacmel Wharf, was his disappointment with the meagerness of United States aid. In the speech, Duvalier admitted that his efforts to improve the general welfare had not yet succeeded, but blamed the lack of progress not on government efforts but on the inadequacy of United States assistance. The Embassy commented that while public reaction interpreted the speech as anti-American and a strong warning to the United States, the speech was only a public reiteration of views that the Haitian Government had been expressing privately to Embassy officials. (Telegram 312 from Port-au-Prince; 738.5–MSP/6–2460).
3. Not found.