Office of the Historian

HA–11. Telegram from the Ambassador in Haiti (Drew) to the Department of State1

Port-au-Prince, February 27, 1959, 2 p.m.

321. Deptel 317.

I have finally come to share the opinion held by U.S. Government officials in Haiti, my diplomatic colleagues and overwhelming majority [Typeset Page 758] Haitians of all walks of life that prospects of long-term survival of Duvalier regime are at present time poorest since his inauguration October 1957. Reasons are many and complex internal reasons may be summarized as follow:

(1)
Desperate economic-financial situation stemming from heritage previous administrations aggravated by poor current coffee crop with sharp unseasonal decline in foreign exchange and government revenues.
(2)
Bad administrative practices and management of government machinery leading to almost total failure administration and constructive projects despite glowing promise.
(3)
Politically President Duvalier has succeeded in alienating practically all groups including not only supporters of this political opponents, but many patriotic Haitians initially prepared support him if given a chance, has estranged both influential Catholic Church and some Protestant groups and due largely excessive brutality secret police has won enemy all classes ranging from wealthy elite to black masses followers of ex-President Fignole.2
(4)
He has ruthlessly trampled on civil liberties through [Facsimile Page 2] suppression independent press and tolerated, If not directed, brutalities by secret police. Latest incident of savage beating responsible business man by officer of President guard culminates long record of brutality and has undone any possible good effect of relaxation harsh police measures in January this year.
(5)
President has almost entirely neglected any effort develop his own popularity. He remains largely isolated from population, holding court alone in palace with almost no attempt through public appearances in Port au Prince or provinces to broaden base his support. His furtive secretiveness probably overlaid with large measure primitive superstition has alienated most decent supporters, leaving him surrounded by small palace clique of persons of lowest possible result. Believe it is now too late for Duvalier succeed broadening base his popular support.

Externally principal elements are:

(1)
The political alliance between Dejoie and Fignole has shaken government and holds greatest potential threat to regime.
(2)
Propaganda activities and threats of invasion from Dejoie and followers from Cuba are encouraging enemies and triggering many to abandon ship they believe will sink.
  • The ill-concealed hostility of Castro in Cuba and Betancourt in Venezuela is further comforting exiles those countries and opposition at home.
    • (4)
    December 22 alliance with Trujillo is proving serious liability at home and abroad.

    Despite all the foregoing it must be recognized that Duvalier has skillfully concentrated power including arms and ammunition in Presidential guard and secret police with Army practically leaderless and powerless. It is obviously impossible forecast how or when his overthrow will occur but hostile landing on coast might well provide spark leading to mass uprising now only restrained by fear secret police. Given his fanatic character and messiah-like complex I see no chance he will abandon reins of government peacefully. Also working his [Facsimile Page 3] favor is absence any one political figure capable holding country together. While many names mentioned by opposition there is general feeling that neither Dejoie, Fignole nor Jumelle could stay in office long and that only a junta or committee public safety (U.S. support being assumed) following his overthrow could maintain order and hold new elections.

    Also strengthening his position are U.S. aid and recent developments in field foreign investment although generally believed this assistance will only delay his inevitable downfall.

    Director USOM and [text not declassified] concur.

    Drew
    1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/2–2759. Confidential; Priority. Department telegram 317 to Port-au-Prince, February 25, requested the Embassy to report official and public reaction to the announcement that the United States was extending budgetary support to Haiti. The Embassy was also asked for its evaluation concerning the current stability of the Duvalier regime and the possibility of strengthening its popular bases of support. (738.5–MSP/2–2459)↩
    2. Daniel Fignole briefly served as the Provisional President of Haiti between May 26 and June 14, 1957.↩