Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

GT–24. Airgram from the Ambassador in Guatemala (Mallory) to the Department of State¹

G-23

Guatemala City, November 11, 1959

Called on President Ydígoras today² noon for purpose saying goodbye and taking up contents Department’s Instructions A-55 and A-56.³ Conversation lasted approximately one and a quarter hours.

President began by informing me recent intelligence received from Assistant Chief National Police Mexico whom he once assisted in exile of information on possible interventionist activities Caribbean Legion from Cuba. President said plans laid for three invasion attempts: one Guatemala, one Nicaragua and one Dominican Republic. He related general subject Juan José Arevalo stating his information Arevalo to receive $150,000 from Cuba with hope expressed by Raul Castro that money would not be primarily for political purposes but for military adventures. He said that the Caribbean Legion is supposed to have three MIG fighters in Costa Rica. I said I did not believe it. He said he didn’t either.

As a forerunner to his discussion of invasion threats from Cuba, the President referred to the new Cuban Ambassador⁴ who he said is in contact with subversive elements. He said this occurred to the extent that the Venezuelan Ambassador⁵ who presumably had been closer to the Cuban here than anyone else had discussed with him some anxiety. He said the Venezuelan is a career Army officer and therefore deserving of attention and belief. He referred to an article to be published in El Espectador of this afternoon which apparently will point the finger of accusation against the Cuban Ambassador.⁶

President having thus laid groundwork for discussion re Department desires, I dilated extensively on Arevalo, pointing out his arrival physically or to political power in Guatemala would be nothing short of disastrous. From there discussion developed into activities of MDN, of PR and splinter parties of left with President stating flatly Arevalo on arrival would not only take over entire far left, but most of PR and a considerable portion President’s own Party Redencion, who would go out of fear.

President said he had been endeavouring obtain at least tacit cooperation all MDN leaders and is meeting with them again tonight.⁷ His purpose is to have some sort of cooperation of anti-Communist political groups to which both he and MDN dedicated in contrast PR which is not anti-Communist. He did not offer estimate his chance of success. Admitted MDN leadership so continually divided as to be ineffective. He has however offered them in addition to present Minister of Finance and Under Secretary Communications one additional Cabinet post. He told them their hopes upcoming Congressional elections not realistic in expecting they can capture 14 seats. He willing endeavor assist them four or five seats providing they will cooperate in government.

Both before and after taking up Department’s instruction, President brought up and I consciously stimulated considerable discussion of the moderate left PR. President said he is not only trying, but to certain extent is working with Galich, to take over leadership PR Party as Galich is old friend, anti-Communist, able, moderate and not tarred with brush of violence which is true of Mendez because of brutality practiced while Chief of Police under Arevalo. When I asked him for estimate chances of Galich’s ascendency and strength he might exhibit in event of resurgence of Arevalo, President offered no direct answer, only indicating he could work with Galich, but Arevalo’s return would automatically draw to him entire gamut from somewhat right of center. Ydígoras dilated on possibilities working with Galich saying he needed cooperation in Congress from new PR deputies elected and not obstructive tactics as Villagran Kramer and Castillo Arreola. [text not declassified] At appropriate moments and bearing in mind Department’s instruction, I adverted to future dangers, the peril which Arevalo would bring and the necessity for astute appraisal and action. I suggested that were he successful in establishing some working relationship with Galich and were Galich successful in establishing some leadership over PR, it were desirable maintain in working relationships by at least noncombative situation with a moderate left at moment non-Communist.

Department’s instruction A-56 was slightly modified by Embassy to fit in with conditions of the moment and in view President’s particular susceptibilities. In keeping with Department’s very thoughtful permission and with show of frankness I allowed President to read our revised next.⁸ Regarding those parts of Department’s instruction which perhaps were a little more pointed on the political side, he did not voice observations. He did, however, read whole document with very close attention taking what I would judge to be at least 20 minutes so to do. He asked questions respecting individual words in English. He stopped from time to time to discuss particular points which showed he apparently seizing significance. He made particular mention in a considerable discussion of Department’s observation that splinter parties of the left would quickly unite under Arevalo.

On loans, he declared that in spite of a considerable memory for detail, he had never been told reason why certain loan applications had been rejected. I did not fail to point out this was during time of Roberto Alejos. He said he now realizes it was not American Government which had been poorly disposed, but rather Guatemala proposals which had been improperly presented. He also now realized that the package handed Dr. Milton Eisenhower, which they had believed was properly done and which Dr. Eisenhower had characterized as the finest presentation he had seen, did not constitute a proper loan application.

The President expressed particular pleasure over Department’s suggestion that it might prove desirable to make some public utterance in connection with democracy and constitutional governments and I said I had used that point in making my address to him the previous evening at the Presidential palace which he pointed out is to be published in full today.⁹

President voiced concern about himself and like-minded Latin American colleagues at what appears to be a spirit of understanding manifest following visit Premier Khrushchev to U.S. He said Americans seemed to be taken in, whereas Latins were practical enough to know that no matter what arrangement was made, no matter what conditions were met, and no matter how we might comport ourselves, the Russians would continue working hard and actively to undermine the situation in Latin America. He related this to the Cuban and other situations and hoped that the United States would not prove gullible.

President terminated discussion by saying he taking every possible step prevent Arevalo getting favorable position. He had caused to be instituted seven processes ranging from the murder of Arana,¹⁰ the violation of two girls, through robbery and other things. I remarked I understood a court action per se would not prevent Arevalo from returning, that such needed court judgment against him. President confirmed this saying he was pushing for action. He made it clear he wished avoid possibility of Arevalo either being nominated as a Congressman or getting a seat.¹¹

Mallory

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.14/11–1159. Confidential.
2. November 10. The airgram was prepared on that day.
3. In airgram A–55 of November 5, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Guatemala as follows: “It would appear desirable, therefore, to plant in Ydígoras the thought that there is little basic difference between the ideals and programs voiced by him and by the P[artido] R[evolucionario] leadership, and that it would be in the mutual party and national interest to enter into a tacit working relationship, in anticipation of the December elections and their results.” (611.14/11–559).
   In airgram A–56 of November 5, the Department of State instructed Ambassador Mallory to assure President Ydígoras of U.S. readiness to cooperate with his Government in elaborating and implementing programs intended to place Guatemala firmly on the road to stability within a democratic system.” (611.14/11–559).
4. Antonio Rodríguez Echazábal.
5. Brig. Gen. Rafael Virgilio Vivas.
6. The referenced article, which appeared in the November 11 issue of El Espectador, is quoted in airgram G–25 from Guatemala City, November 14, 1959. (611.14/11–1459).
   The Guatemalan charges of Cuban support of efforts to overthrow the Ydígoras Government were aired in a special meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States on December 5, 1959. For text of the note to the Chairman of the Council of the OAS from the Representative of Guatemala, read by the Representative of Guatemala at the Special Council meeting on December 5, see OEA Ser.G/VC–d–781 (English), 3 December 1959. The Cuban Representative to the OAS denied the charges. For the statement made by Ambassador Leví Marrero Artiles, Representative of Cuba, in the special meeting of the Council of the OAS on 5 December 1959; see OEA Ser.G/V C–d–782 (Spanish).
7. In airgram G-25, cited above, Mallory reported that Ydígoras stated on November 10 that he had refused to talk with the MDN leaders in the presence of the 1958 MDN Presidential candiate, Cruz.
8. Not found in Department of State files.
9. No record of this address of November 9 was found in Department of State files.
10. For documentation on the assassination of Col. Francisco Arana, Chief of the Guatemalan Armed Forces, July 8, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. II, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, pp. 655 and 664.
11. Commenting on the Guatemalan Congressional election of December 6, 1959, at the Secretary’s staff meeting of December 9, Rubottom said “the election outcome was more favorable than we anticipated in supporting Ydígoras.” (Memorandum by Calhoun, December 9, 1959; Secretary’s Staff Meetings, Lot 63 D 75)